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ARTICLES
Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the OECD's




Formed in 1961 to promote global economic and social well-being, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has become the
collective voice of rich countries on international tax issues. After an initial focus on
improving commerce through addressing double taxation issues, the organization shifted
to a focus on restricting tax competition and increasing automatic exchanges of tax
information. In this paper we analyze the reasons for this shift in policy focus. After
describing the history of the OECD's work on taxation, we examine the OECD's project
against "harmful tax competition" as it has played out since its launch in the 1990s. We
analyze the mechanisms behind the project from a public choice perspective. While
typical economic models portray tax competition as a prisoner's dilemma between
governments, a more powerful perspective is of the incentives of politicians and
bureaucrats. We conclude that the project against tax competition is an example of the
interplay between the interests of politicians and international bureaucrats. The OECD
project illustrates the role that international organizations play in competition among
interest groups.
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CARTELIZING TAXES
I. INTRODUCTION
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was
formed in 1961 "to promote policies that will improve the economic and social
well-being of people around the world."1 Since then, the OECD has become one of the
world's most respected and influential organizations. Anne-Marie Slaughter describes
the OECD as "the quintessential host of transgovernmental regulatory networks, as well
as a catalyst for their creation."2 In particular, the OECD became the main multilateral
forum on tax issues through its work on solving double taxation problems caused by the
impact of differences across tax systems on entities and individuals operating in more
than one jurisdiction.3 The OECD serves as a means for the United States and Europe "to
dominate a virtually impervious institutional architecture of tax policymaking ... , This
mission expanded significantly over time as a focus on preventing double taxation shifted
to an effort to restrict "harmful" tax competition on rates among jurisdictions. The
OECD began to seek to restrain both member and non-member countries from lowering
taxes and to encourage lower tax jurisdictions to raise their rates. This represented a
substantial departure from its earlier focus on finding solutions to the problems caused by
differences in national tax systems.
5
The change in focus is important because if the OECD is successful in its efforts,
jurisdictions will have ceded an important aspect of policy autonomy and sovereignty to
an international forum dominated by a small group of industrialized economies with
relatively high tax rates. Domestic policy decisions constrained by competition among
jurisdictions to attract capital will be transformed into international decisions dominated
by a cartel of wealthy nations.
In this paper, we explore the evolution of developed countries' international
cooperation on tax issues from the initial focus on finding solutions to problems that
impeded international economic activity to a focus on protecting a few states' abilities to
collect revenues at the expense of other states.6 We ask why the OECD evolved from a
1 About the OECD, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). See also
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/general/
organisationforeuropeaneconomicco-operation.htm (last visited Oct. 2. 2011). Its predecessor, the
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation was formed in 1948 to coordinate the economic recovery
from World War 1i.
2 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 46 (2004).
3 THOMAS RIXEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TAX GOVERNANCE 99 (2008).
4 Allison Christians, Taxation in a Time of Crisis: Policy Leadership from the OECD to the G20, 5
Nw.J.L.&SOC. POi'Y 19 (2010).
5 Allison Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation and Social Contract, 18 MINN. J. INTL L. 99, 100
(2009) (describing OECD's implicit articulation of"a version of sovereignty that prioritizes responsibility to
the international community over the individual autonomy of nations" that enshrines the OECD's "vision of
what constitutes appropriate tax competition" as the norm). It also conflicts with other OECD advice about
taxes and economic growth. For example. in its economic surveys, the OECD often recommends lowering
taxes. Nordic countries are frequently advised to reform their labor markets based on the notion of the
benefits of lower taxes and broader tax bases. See generally Andreas Bergh & Margareta Dackehag, OECD
Recommends: A Consensus for or Against Welfare States? Evidence from a New Database (Ratio, Working
Paper No. 159, 2010).
6 In general, we use the term "states" to refer to jurisdictions without regard to whether they are
independent states under principles of international law. Many low-tax jurisdictions are dependent territories
or crown possessions connected to Britain (e.g., Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, the Isle of Man. Guernsey,
Jersey. and the Turks and Caicos Islands). Writing "jurisdiction" to cover both independent states and
dependent jurisdictions is both inelegant and tedious. Note also that "international taxation" generally refers
to the international interaction of different national tax systems and the way that possible problems stemming
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forum focused on lowering transactions costs to increase private sector competition
across borders into a cartel aimed at restricting competition among states. We conclude
that this transition was in part the result of entrepreneurship by a group of OECD staff
who spotted an opportunity to expand their mission, yielding a concomitant increase in
resources and prestige. They accomplished this by providing a framework for interests
within a group of high tax states to create a cartel that would channel competition in tax
policy away from areas where those states had a competitive disadvantage and toward
areas in which they had a competitive advantage. How an organization formed to
promote economic development began devoting resources to restricting competition to
benefit some states at the expense of others illustrates an important problem for
international cooperation more generally. The dynamics at work in the OECD tax
competition case are present elsewhere and suggest that the creation of forums to enhance
international cooperation is not always a benign development for the states and interests
that are excluded from those forums.
The transformation was also in part the result of the less competitive position of
developed economies with respect to the rest of the world. Until relatively recently,
larger developed economies have been sheltered from some of the competition to attract
economic activity by the combination of the costs of conducting international
transactions and the barriers to such transactions-for example, those provided by the
mix of capital controls, trade barriers, and other restrictions on financial transactions. As
these barriers declined and investors grew more sophisticated at using international
financial structures to reduce tax burdens on international transactions, states whose
economies' size had previously been sufficient to make them attractive locations for
investment found themselves struggling to capture revenue from increasingly
internationalized transactions These states then sought to restrict tax competition. This
in turn required them to create a means of delegitimizing such competition and
preventing each other from defecting from the cartel by lowering tax rates unilaterally.
Regardless of one's position on the merits of any particular tax regime, the
evolution of the OECD from a facilitator of economic competition to a cartel enforcer
represents something new in international organization behavior. Since World War II,
the world economy has moved in fits and starts toward a more open financial
architecture, one that has altered the relative positions of states in the competition for
resources.8 The cartelization of tax policy is an important effort to hold off the impact of
from this are dealt with. Since there is no international statutory law, the term can be a bit misleading. See
Alexander Jr. Townsend, Global Schoolyard Bully: The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development's Coercive Efforts to Control Tax Competition, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 215, 224 (2001-2002).
7 More broadly, this competition is reshaping societies. See PHILLIP BROWN, HUGH LAUDER & DAVID
ASHTON. THE GLOBAL AUCTION: THE BROKEN PROMISES OF EDUCATION, JOBS, AND INCOMES (2010)
(explaining that competition for jobs requiring education is now worldwide).
8 See ROBERT Z. ALIBER, THE INTERNATIONAL MONEY GAME 14 (5th ed. 1987) ("During the last
hundred years, changes in technology have widened the marketplace for goods, services, and securities. For
generations the market was smaller than the nation-state. The expansion of the boundaries of the market
beyond the fixed boundaries of the state has threatened the viability of national economic independence and
the future of many national industries."); DILIP K. GHOSH & EDGAR ORTIZ, Introduction in THE GLOBAL
STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL MARKETS: AN OVERVIEW 1. 2 (Dilip K. Ghosh & Edgar Ortiz eds.. 1997)
("Exchange rate convertibility and hedging instruments have created climates of covered arbitrage and, as a
result, most markets irrespective of their locations have become truly global."); MIRA WILKINS. An Overview
of Foreign Companies in the United States, 1945-2000, in FOREIGN MULTINATIONALS IN THE UNITED STATES:
MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE 18, 22 (Geoffrey Jones & Lina Galvez-Munoz eds., 2002) ("From 1945 to
the early 1960s, this common market [the U.S.] was a highly protected one, separated from the rest of the
[Vol.4:1
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the forces unleashed by competition on a more level playing field, but it is certainly not
the only one. There has recently been a spate of aggressive efforts by large developed
countries to demand an end to financial privacy through tax information exchange
agreements (TIEAs), threats of blacklisting, and direct payments to individuals for
stealing data from financial institutions in other jurisdictions. These efforts have the
same goals as the IRS's mail intercepts of Americans receiving letters from Swiss banks
in 1967 and 1971,9 Australia's severing of communications links to the New Hebrides in
the early 1970s,"0 and the IRS's 1973 luring of a Bahamian banker to a romantic dinner
date in Miami to allow it to break into his briefcase in search of documents that might
incriminate American taxpayers.11 The difference is that they are now undertaken on a
larger scale. The data available from foreign bankers the IRS can lure to Miami on dates
is much less than that from the people about whom a TIEA can produce automated
information flows or which a bank employee can steal using a USB memory stick. If we
are going to continue to reap the benefits of financial openness and relatively free capital
flows, an international consensus on the shape of a level playing field for the competition
for resources that takes into account the interests of more than a small group of developed
economies will be necessary.
Part II sets out a framework for evaluating debates over tax competition. Part III
provides a brief history of efforts to address the problems caused by differences in tax
regimes across states and of the emergence of tax competition. Part IV lays out the
qualitative change in international tax cooperation since the 1980s and examines the
evolution of the OECD's role against tax competition in the context of the framework set
out in Part II. Part V concludes with observations on the parameters of state competition
for wealth-creating activities.
II. JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION AS A FRAMEWORK FOR TAX
COMPETITION
States compete for economic activity in multiple ways, including offering
different mixes of security of ownership, access to resources, regulatory climates, and
demands on investors to share resources. Tax competition is but one aspect of this
competition.12 Thus a dictatorship with few checks on the arbitrary behavior of the
dictator, like Zaire under its former dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, offered privileged access
to economic resources in exchange for granting a share of the gains to the dictator.
Meanwhile, OECD countries have typically offered guarantees of security of title through
independent courts and other features of the rule of law in exchange for compliance with
world by long-standing tariffs, and also from Europe and Asia by the wide Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. From
1962 onwards, US Federal governmental-imposed barriers to trade fell rapidly.").
9 Tax Evasion Through the Netherlands Antilles and Other Tax Haven Countries: Hearing Before
the Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Government Operations,
98th Cong. 31-32 (1983) (statement of William J. Anderson, Director, General Government Division,
General Accounting Office).
1o See infra note 156.
' See infra note 146.
12 See generally ERN A. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009). States share an
interest in maximizing the global economic pie. They disagree over how to divide the pie. Allison Christians.
How Nations Share, 87 IND. L. J. 1407, 1407 (2012) ("Every nation has an interest in sharing the gains they
help create by participating in globalization.").
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regulatory regimes and payment of taxes. 3 This competition provides a lens with which
to examine the issue of tax competition.
We begin with the uncontroversial proposition that states do not themselves act.
Rather, individuals in positions of authority take actions, which together constitute the
actions of the state. A state may thus act inconsistently in different forums, as different
interest groups obtain the upper hand in determining a particular position or where
different actors have greater influence in one arena relative to another. 14 In discussing tax
issues, it is important to remember that even those interest groups that share a broad
agenda and operate in coalition within a particular government may have divergent
interests. We will use the shorthand of referring to "states" because the more accurate
phrase "the coalition of interest groups governing states" is too awkward for general use.
States want economic activity for three reasons, with different political actors
putting different weights on each. First, states need revenues to pay for their activities.
One major source of revenue is taxation of economic activity and the wealth that such
activity creates. States with natural resources may raise revenue by selling access to
those resources, 15 but most states are dependent on taxing economic activity in one form
or another. The state activities that are funded may be the provision of public goods or
genocide of disfavored ethnic groups. The crucial point is that, whether providing
education or mass slaughter, governments need funds to pay their employees and buy
supplies. Second, states may desire economic activity for its own sake, since it brings
with it the generation of wealth. A benevolent ruler or coalition of interests will prefer a
richer population to a poorer one, since the richer population will have higher standards
of living, better health, more education, and other things that enhance the quality of life.
Indeed, even a despotic regime bent on keeping power by maintaining a climate of fear
may be interested in maintaining at least some minimum level of economic activity as a
cheap means of quelling unrest. Third, corrupt interest groups seek economic activity
13 See ANDREW P. MORRISS, The Role of Offshore Financial Centers in Regulatory Competition, in
OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS AND REGULATORY COMPETITION 102, 110-12 (Andrew P. Morriss ed., AEI
Press 2010). One recent statement of the regulatory bargain was by Harvard Law Professor (and U.S.
Senator-elect at the time of publication) Elizabeth Warren. who argued in favor of higher taxes that:"There is
nobody in this country who got rich on his own. Nobody. You built a factory out there good for you! But
I want to be clear. You moved your goods to market on the roads the rest of us paid for. You hired workers
the rest of us paid to educate. You were safe in your factory because of police forces and fire forces that the
rest of us paid for. You didn't have to worry that marauding bands would come and seize everything at your
factory, and hire someone to protect against this, because of the work the rest of us did. Now look, you built
a factory and it turned into something terrific, or a great idea-God bless. Keep a big hunk of it ... But part
of the underlying social contract is you take a hunk of that and pay forward for the next kid who comes
along." Elizabeth Warren, The Elizabeth Warren Quote Every American Needs To See, MOVEON.ORG (Sept.
21, 2011). http://front.moveon.org/the-elizabeth-warren-quote-every-american-needs-to-see. Governments
tolerate illegal economic activities to reduce the political costs of other policies. See ALIBER, supra note 8, at
62-63 ("[M]ost governments tolerate black markets in foreign exchange ... In many cases the black market
permits the government to delay the political costs of formally devaluing the parity, while minimizing the
economic costs of maintaining an overvalued currency.").
14 See, e.g., Tax Treaties: Hearing Before the S Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong. 54
(1981) (statement of Rep. Dan Rostenkowski) [hereinafter Tax Treaties] ("I am not satisfied with the process
that has evolved for negotiating and ratifying tax treaties ... [T]he Treasury Department has determined.,
with little or no input from the legislative branch, those countries with which to negotiate tax treaties and has
proceeded to negotiate with those countries with virtually no oversight by Congress.").




because it offers opportunities for graft. From Chicago to Indonesia, corruption is a
perennial problem for the provision of goods by the public sector.16
If we consider the total package of non-tax regulations, taxation, and property
rights protection as a specific "regulatory bargain," we see that a state may offer different
regulatory bargains depending on the goals of the interest groups that control it; particular
circumstances such as its desirability as a location for particular economic activities;
natural resource endowments; and the level of competition from other states seeking the
same economic activities, capital or entrepreneurs. 17 This is readily apparent in the
competition between London and New York for financial industry business. 8 It is also
present with respect to a variety of regulatory areas, as with the debate over labor and
environmental standards in trade. 19 Similarly, a jurisdiction with enormous natural
advantages can offer a higher cost bargain than a state with less desirable climate and
location: California can offer many businesses a regulatory bargain to businesses with a
higher price tag than North Dakota.
This is not how the literature on tax competition traditionally considers these
issues. Instead, the literature largely presupposes a benevolent government seeking to
solve the problem of efficiently providing public goods. For example, in their influential
1986 article, Zodrow and Mieszkowski showed that mobile capital leads to a
less-than-optimal provision of a public good by the government using a model that
treated all public expenditures as beneficial.2" The same year, Wilson published his
article laying out the equilibrium conditions under tax competition. He showed that with
decentralized political decision-making, the equilibrium utility level is reduced, but he
again treated all government expenditures as producing public goods.21 Numerous
articles published since then have examined how different tax structures and different
assumptions about the mobility of capital, firms and people change the conclusions about
the effects of tax competition,22 but virtually all articles model government expenditures
16 See Fighting Corruption in the Public Sector, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/gov/
fightingcorruptioninthepublicsector. While there is evidence to suggest that moderate levels of corruption do
not interfere unduly with economic growth (operating as an informal tax), more egregious corruption may
reduce the beneficial impacts of economic activity but still promote the welfare of those receiving the
corruption. Some of the anti-offshore literature contends that corruption is part of a scheme intended to
"control" developing countries and that it "diverts attention from the real springs of power." See STEVEN
HIATT. Global Empire: The Web of Control, in A GAME AS OLD AS EMPIRE: THE SECRET WEB OF ECONOMIC
HIT MEN AND THE WEB OF GLOBAL CORRUPTION 13, 24 (Steven Hiatt ed. 2007).
17 ALIBER, supra note 8, at 181 ("London dollar deposits differ from New York dollar deposits in
terms of political risk: they are subject to the whims of a different set of government authorities.");
MARGARET ACKRILL & LESLIE HANNAH, BARCLAYS: THE BUSINESS OF BANKING 1690-1996, at 215 (2001)
("London's distinctively open and flexible wholesale money markets offered newcomers an incomparably
low-risk entry strategy. with immediate access to a sterling deposit base or lending market and to
Eurocurrency.").
"s See, e.g., John Gapper. Are We No Longer the World's Financial Capital?, N.Y. MAG.. Mar. 18,
2007, available at http://nymag.com/guides/london/29440 (discussing competition between New York and
London).
19 See Daniel Drezner, Bottom Feeders, FOREIGN POLICY, Nov. 1, 2000, at 64, 66 (describing debate
over existence of the race to the bottom).
20 See generally George R. Zodrow & Peter Mieszkowski, Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and
the Underprovision of Local Public Goods, 19 J. URB. ECON. 356 (1986).
21 See generally John D. Wilson, A Theory of Interregional Tax Competition, 19 J. URB. ECON. 296
(1986).
22 See John D. Wilson, Theories of Tax Competition, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 269 (1999), for a review of
some of the theoretical literature on tax competition. For a thorough review of the empirical research on tax
2012]
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as uniformly beneficial.2 3 This exclusive focus on public goods plays a role in the
conflation of taxation with sovereignty.24
If we limit our consideration to the special case of government as benevolent
provider of public goods,25 the analysis can be summarized as the following: in a world
without tax competition, the benevolent government sets its tax rates at a level sufficient
to fund its welfare-enhancing activities. Firms and individuals pay their taxes, and public
goods are provided. Governments with large economies raise substantial revenue with
modest taxes, while governments with resource-poor or small economies are unable to do
so because the levels of economic activity within their resource-poor/small economies are
too low to generate sufficient tax revenue to enable their governments to purchase the
public goods their populations' desire. 2 6 The introduction of tax competition offers these
competition, see generally Philipp Genschel & Peter Schwarz, Tax Competition: A Literature Review, 9
SOCIO-ECONOMIC REV. 339 (2011).
23 The state is traditionally treated as a goal-directed organization that aims to solve market failures
by taxing and spending and is therefore per definition benevolent. See RICHARD E. WAGNER, FISCAL
SOCIOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: AN EXPLORATORY ESSAY 3 (2007); ALAIN DENEAuLT,
OFFSHORE: TAX HAVENS AND THE RULE OF GLOBAL CRIME 31 (2011) (arguing that states are "powerless" to
"tax capital to finance programs in the public interest that were its responsibility."). In that context, an
important concept in the economics of taxation is the level of"optimal taxation," which is determined by a
relative weighing of efficiency and equity chosen to maximize social welfare. See Simon James, Taxation
Research as Economic Research, in TAXATION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH RESEARCH 34, 39-40
(Margaret Lamb, Andrew Lymer, Judith Freedman & Simon James eds., 2005). Following this tradition in
the context of tax competition. a restriction on a government's ability to pursue its preferred fiscal policy is
by assumption undesirable. See, e.g., William H. Hoyt, Property Taxation, Nash Equilibrium, and Market
Power, 30 J. URB. ECON. 123 (1991) (model of tax competition showing that the Nash equilibrium level of
public goods provision is determined by the number of jurisdictions); Hans-Werner Sinn, How Much
Europe? Subsidiary, Centralization and Fiscal Competition, 41 SCOT. J. POL. ECON. 85, 99 (1994)
(discussing future European tax competition and concluding that "tax rates have to be harmonized across all
countries or chosen by a centralized agency" to avoid tax rates to be driven down by competition. as
governments incur cost for supplying the mobile factors with public goods). Assuming that inefficiency
therefore is an inevitable outcome of non-cooperative behavior, other literature focus on how this cooperation
can come about. See generally Ravi Kanbur & Michael Keen, Jeux sans Frontikres, Tax Competition and
Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 877 (1993) (discussing use of minimum
tax rates to stem tax competition). A discussion about the benefits of global tax governance combined with
an international social contract is provided in Thomas Rixen, Tax Competition and Inequality: The Case for
Global Tax Governance, 17 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: A REV. MULTILATERALISM & INT'L INSTITUTIONS 447
(2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract 1488066. Also assuming that governments provide public
goods only, he argues that based on the "social-contract justification for taxation," citizens of developing
countries especially are hurt by an inadequate and suboptimal distribution of benefits as a result of tax
competition.
24 Christians, supra note 5, at 104 (discussing how sovereignty and taxation are conflated).
25 
See, e.g., CHRISTIAN AID. FALSE PROFITS: ROBBING THE POOR TO KEEP THE RICH TAX-FREE 3
(2009), available at http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images/false-profits.pdf (describing the impact of "tax
dodging" as "[p]oor countries in particular are deprived of badly needed tax revenues...").
26 Paradoxically. the anti-tax-haven literature often identifies tax havens with the concealment of
money stolen by tyrants. For example, Raymond W. Baker lists kleptocrats profiting from corruption as a
part of describing the global system of dirty money. RAYMOND W. BAKER, CAPITALISM'S ACHILLES HEEL:
DIRTY MONEY AND HOW TO RENEW THE FREE-MARKET SYSTEM 52 (1977). Tax havens offering secrecy is a
part of the "modern dirty-money system that significantly obscures global capitalism..." Id. at 192.
Saddam Hussein placed money from oil corruption in tax havens. Id. at 128. Terrorists use tax havens "in
the same way as criminal syndicates." Id. at 119. Yet when the money remains controlled by a government
controlled by the same tyrant, this same literature assumes it is spent on public goods. See Briefing Paper.
Oxfam, Tax Havens: Releasing the Hidden Billions for Poverty Eradication 1, 11 (2000) ("[T]ax havens have
contributed to revenue losses for developing countries of at least US$50 billion a year. To put this figure in
context, it is roughly equivalent to annual aid flows to developing countries... [M]any developing countries
[Vol.4:1
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governments an opportunity to lure economic activity away from other, richer economies
by cutting tax rates. The lower rates lead the revenue for the poor governments to rise
and the revenue for the rich governments to fall. Importantly, the models generally
assume that the rich countries lose more than the poor countries gain, because the need to
compete requires such low rates that the total tax collection summed across both
jurisdictions falls. Tax competition thus reduces total government revenues across all
jurisdictions even if it increases the revenue for the poor jurisdictions. Because it is
implicitly assumed that the governments are buying only public goods, tax competition
reduces total welfare by reducing the total revenues available for their purchase.2
If we examine tax competition as a subspecies of the larger competition for
economic activity, the incompleteness of this analysis is apparent. Governments do not
buy only public goods. There is also waste, fraud, and corruption, as well as considerable
purchase of public "bads" such as genocide or attacks on peaceful neighbors. Tax
revenues may buy textbooks for schools or shoes for the closet of a dictator's wife. They
may pay for lavish ceremonies and palaces or foster development and build roads.2"
Whether reducing a government's ability to charge a higher tax rate is welfare-increasing
or welfare-decreasing will depend on the impact of specific governmental spending
patterns.29 This ought to be obvious: in other contexts, governments, including OECD
members, routinely assume that not all government revenues are devoted to enhancing
public welfare. At the extreme, with pariah states, western governments frequently resort
to financial sanctions and other measures designed to starve the pariah of revenue to help
reduce its ability to oppress its population or to bring about its overthrow. The financial
sanctions on the Gaddafi regime in Libya and the Assad regime in Syria are examples
where such pressures have been enthusiastically backed by OECD member states without
have low tax revenues as well as resource constraints in form of large debt burdens, declining taxes from
trade, and reduced aid flows. These constraints result in poor provision of public goods in the countries that
have the greatest need."). Another class of literature on tax competition describes the state as a Leviathan.
See generally Frode Brevik & Manfred Gfirtner, Can Tax Evasion Tame Leviathan Governments?, 136 PUB.
CHOICE 103 (2008). This view of the government, contrasting that of a benevolent social planner. follows the
tradition of James M. Buchanan and Geoffrey Brennan. picturing the government as a tax-maximizing
Leviathan. See generally GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMEs M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION (1980): see also JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD ABEL
MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC CHOICE: TWO CONTRASTING VISIONS OF THE STATE 24 (MIT Press
2001).
27 See, for example, RIXEN, supra note 3, at 32-54, for a model of tax competition and coordination
as a prisoner's dilemma. Christians points out that the total amount lost to tax evasion is likely relatively
small compared to states' revenue shortfalls. See Christians. supra note 4. at 24 25 (collecting estimates of
$40 100 billion lost and shortfalls of $1.4 trillion in 2009 in the United States).
2' For example, the Central African Republic's dictator, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, crowned himself
emperor in 1977 after a twelve-year rule as president that had "established a reputation for megalomania and
incompetence that rivals that of Uganda's Idi Amin Dada." Afounting a Golden Throne, TIME, Dec. 17, 1977,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171 ,945849,00.html#ixzz I ZgOt I 3nF. His
coronation cost $20 million, an astounding sum considering the country's GDP, was only $250 million. Id.
The country's only paved road was an eighty kilometer route between his imperial capital, Berengo, and the
former colonial capital of Bangui. BRIAN TITLEY. DARK AGE: THE POLITICAL ODYSSEY OF EMPEROR
BOKASSA 99 (1997).
29 Interestingly, the OECD and other anti-tax-competition groups appear to have different views of
at least some limits on governments' abilities to regulate or confiscate property. The OECD. for example,
often recommends the removal of capital regulations in its Economic Surveys. See Bergh & Dackehag, supra
note 5, at 4.
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much concern for whether the sanctions would result in a lack of textbooks for schools.3"
Some pariahs, such as Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, sought to undermine
international support for sanctions by arguing that the sanctions result in reduced public
goods expenditures.3' But we need not look solely to pariah states for examples of
corruption, waste, fraud, and the purchase of public bads with tax revenues. Developed
economies have their own pathologies of expenditures-ranging from former Governor
Rod Blagojevich in Illinois32 to the Parliamentary spending scandals in Britain33 and the
Common Agricultural Policy in the European Union.34 The restricted view of tax
competition thus incompletely captures important aspects of the competition among
jurisdictions by failing to consider the full range of behaviors by the regimes it models.
The benefit of more completely specifying the objectives of the interest group
coalitions controlling governments is that doing so removes the artificial restriction of
assuming that the sole objective of increasing government revenues is to fund public
goods. We can also expand the analysis by removing a second artificial restriction at
times imposed in the tax competition literature: that tax levels have no impact on levels
of economic activity. A more nuanced view is that at least some taxes and some levels of
taxes impede economic growth.35 Precisely where the line is drawn is a matter of heated
debate, and not a question we can resolve here. The important point is that if it is
possible for particular taxes or levels of taxes to impede economic growth, a welfare
analysis of the impact of tax competition is no longer simply a matter of maximizing the
production of public goods by maximizing total tax revenue. In at least some
circumstances, reducing tax levels is likely to increase economic activity and may even
increase total tax revenue. Thus the levels of income taxation imposed in Britain in the
30 See Raf Casert, Officials: EU moving toward more Syria sanctions, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 6,
2011, available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2011/10/06/
officials eu moving toward more syria sanctions/ (enthusiasm among EU members for more sanctions on
Syrian government); Brooke Masters & David Dombey, Gaddafi sanctions pose test for banks, FINANCIAL
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2011, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/7fb969ce-4a80-1 I e0-82ab-
00144feab49a.html#axzzl a46QISOg (describing the 2011 financial sanctions on Libyan government and
government officials).
" See Saddam 's parades of dead babies are exposed as a cynical charade, THE TELEGRAPH, May
25, 2003, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/1431114/Saddams-
parades-of-dead-babies-are-exposed-as-a-cynical-charade.html. For a critical look at the impact of sanctions
in Iraq on the civilian population, see Joy GORDON. INVISIBLE WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND THE IRAQ
SANCTIONS (2010) (arguing that sanctions had a disastrous impact on population generally).
32 See ELIZABETH BRACKETT, PAY TO PLAY: How ROD BLAGOJEVICH TURNED POLITICAL
CORRUPTION INTO A NATIONAL SIDESHOW (2009) (summarizing the corruption scandals in Illinois).
33 See John F. Burns, In Britain, Scandal Flows From Modest Request, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2009,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/20/world/europe/20britain.html (describing the scandal over
MPs' expenses).
14 The CAP consumed two-thirds of the Community Budget in the 1970s and 1980s, with one
estimate that it cost each EU citizen about £250 per year in the 1990s. See David R. Stead, Common
Agricultural Policy, EH.NET, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/stead.cap (last accessed Oct. 25, 2011).
35 This is recognized in OECD research on taxation outside the context of tax competition. See
OECD, TAX POLICY STUDY No. 21: TAXATION AND EMPLOYMENT 10 (2011) ("These tax burdens discourage
employers from hiring. They also reduce the incentives for the unemployed to look for ajob, and for those in
employment to work longer or harder."); Herwig Immervoll. Average and Marginal Effective Tax Rates
Facing Workers in the EU: A Micro-Level Analysis of Levels, Distributions and Driving Factors 6 (OECD
Soc.. Emp't and Migration Working Papers, Paper No. 19. 2004). available at http://www.oecd.org/
tax/34035472.pdf (recognizing the linkage between tax burdens and economic development, they study the




1960s and early 1970s, when marginal rates approached one hundred percent on some
forms of investment income, had impacts beyond inspiring the Beatles' Taxman.
3 6
Further, there is at least some evidence that at some point on the tax scale, reducing rates
increases government revenue by both boosting economic activity and reducing the value
of investments in tax avoidance and tax evasion. Thus, even if one focuses entirely on
maximizing government revenues, the simple model is inadequate. 7
Within an interest group framework, the coalition of interest groups in power will
at times have different goals with respect to tax policy. For example, within the federal
bureaucracy in the United States, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is likely to favor
increased enforcement powers for the IRS, deficit hawks will worry about ensuring
revenues are sufficient, and the Department of Commerce may favor increasing tax
incentives for business investment.38 During internal British government debates over the
establishment of tax havens in Britain's overseas territories, the British Treasury worried
about revenue losses, the Foreign and Colonial Office about the fiscal sustainability of
the territories and their budgetary impact on Britain, and the Bank of England about the
implications for exchange control.3 9 Internationally, offshore financial centers may be
favored for providing competition in one sphere even as they are denounced for
providing it in another.4"
To evaluate the tax competition debate as a debate among interest groups within
and across nations, we must therefore consider how different types of competition affect
different interests in different nations. Helleiner's account of how U.S. financial industry
interests fended off aggressive measures sought by continental European governments to
control capital flight after World War II provides a clear example of how one set of U.S.
interests were able to influence the overall U.S. position to promote regulatory
competition when it was to their advantage.4 The cancellation of the U.S.-Netherlands
Antilles tax treaty in 1987 provides an example of how a different set of U.S.
interests-revenue authorities and law enforcement-were able to influence U.S. policy
to close off a potent channel for regulatory competition when the costs to those interests
became too high.42
36 See MARTIN DAUNTON, JUST TAXES: THE POLITICS OF TAXATION N BRITAIN 1914 1979 (2007).
Taxation was also high in the United States, where marginal rates for high-income earners rose to ninety-one
percent during the 1960s. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, How Progressive is the U.S. Federal Income
Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 13 (2007).
37 Whether cutting current U.S. or French income tax rates would increase welfare is a hotly
debated question beyond the scope of this paper.
38 This can be seen in the debate over tax amnesties to encourage repatriation of overseas profits.
See Craig M. Boise, Breaking Open Offshore Piggybanks: Deferral and the Utility of Amnesty, 14 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 667 (2007) (discussing debate over encouraging repatriation of overseas profits).
'9 See, e.g., Tax Havens and Tax Concessions, note of a meeting held in the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (March 25. 1969) (on file at the British National Archives, File FCO 59/533)
(discussing concerns of various British government offices over the rise of tax havens in dependent
territories).
40 See Andrew P. Morriss, Changing the Rules of the Game: Offshore Financial Centers,
Regulatory Competition & Financial Crises, 15 NExus 15, 17-18 (2010) (describing competition in
insurance); Craig M. Boise & Andrew P. Morriss, Change, Dependency, and Regime Plasticity in Offshore
Financial Intermediation: The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles, 45 TEX. INT'L L. J. 377, 409-414 (2009)
(describing official encouragement of firms' use of offshore vehicles to access the Eurodollar market). id. at
419-426 (describing attacks on offshore sector in 1970s over tax competition).
41 ERIC 1ELLEINER, STATES AND THE REEMERGENCE OF GLOBAL FINANCE: FROM BRETTON WOODS
TO THE 1990S, at 56-58 (1994).
42 Boise & Morriss, supra note 40, at 419-26.
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Further, discussions of "tax competition" are often framed as if the issue were
about settling the rules governing a sporting event. In essence, these discussions proceed
as if the problem were akin to deciding how to handle the differences between the two
U.S. baseball leagues, the National League and American League, over the designated
hitter rule in scheduling inter-league play.43 (The American League has the rule; the
National League does not.) Playing a game is impossible without knowing whether the
rule applies or not. Some mechanism must be chosen to resolve the particular question,
but there is broad agreement on the rules of baseball with a small number of differences
in rules to be resolved.
Regulatory competition among nations is much more complex. A better analogy
for tax issues than the problem of resolving the baseball leagues' differences over the
designated hitter rule would be imagining negotiations between Spain's Europa soccer
league and the U.S.-Canadian National Hockey League over how to play a "fair" contest
between the two league champions. Both leagues run organized sporting events but they
are not playing the same game, differing on how to measure success, the type of playing
field, the legitimate methods of play, and so on. Similarly, nations play quite different
"games" in their tax policies. Some are attempting to attract investment to locations
lacking resources; others seek to capitalize on the value of their national advantages.
Even within the confines of public finance theory, technically optimal tax regimes will
differ across nations. Moreover, cultural variables often influence tax policy. 44 Add the
New Zealand All-Blacks rugby team, Indian cricket teams, and Japanese sumo wrestlers
to the negotiations in our Europa-NHL hypothetical and our sports analogy becomes
closer to capturing the real spread of differences in national tax policies' goals and
methods.45
Thus, the competition between Ireland and France is taking place across more
dimensions than just tax rates. As noted earlier, tax systems differ in their definitions of
income, levels of exemptions, and a host of other criteria. These differences mean that
tax competition cannot be reduced to a simplistic analysis of rates alone. Not only must
any analysis take into account specific details of the tax system, such as the effective
rather than nominal rates after accounting for tax credits and deductions. Differences in
definitions can form yet another species of tax competition. For example, "dividends"
are defined differently by tax laws in different countries and this can result in either
over-taxation or under-taxation of a particular payment. 46 Thus, if countries were to
43 The American League allows a player (the "designated hitter") to hit in place of the pitcher; the
National League does not. See generally G. RICHARD MCKELVEY, ALL BAT, No GLOVE: A HISTORY OF THE
DESIGNATED HITTER (2004).
44 See, e.g., Jasmine Malone, Greek tax evasion. 'There is just such little incentive to be honest,
THE TELEGRAPH. Sept. 18, 2011, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/8770940/
Greek-tax-evasion-There-is-j ust-such-little-incentive-to-be-honest.html (quoting a Greek businessman that "1
don't feel comfortable with playing the game. but I feel justified in the sense that I am already taxed at a
grossly unfair rate in my business. Everything is made difficult. I almost dread having a good year because I
can never be sure that I won't be taken for a fool by the taxman after."). The Cayman Islands has a deeply
rooted cultural tradition of no direct taxation (combined with substantial indirect taxation via customs duties).
See, e.g., Cayman Islands, Economic Development Plan 1986-1990, at 2 (describing legend of the wreck of
the ten sails that allegedly produced grant by British Crown of freedom from direct taxation and its impact on
island culture).
41 It is widely accepted that nations have the right to determine their own tax system. Christians.
supra note 5. at 107. This may also include the right not to tax. Id. at 111.
46 University of Helsinki Prof. Marjaana Helminen's study of dividends in international tax law
makes this point: "Over-taxation or under-taxation may be caused, among other reasons, by different
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cooperate to abolish just the tax competition between them, there are many more issues
than a common tax rate to be agreed upon to obtain complete neutrality in taxation.
The problem is even more complex than this, however. Accomplishing perfect
global neutrality in taxation would require an unfeasibly extensive level of tax
coordination. Deep coordination on rates, deductions, and definitions would be required,
as well as on the structure of tax regimes themselves.47 Only with complete coordination
on taxation could countries see to it that all cross-border differences that create
"distortions" were removed.4" This can be seen by examining the ongoing debates over
relative importance of capital import neutrality49 and capital export neutrality,5" whose
conflicting requirements mean that no country can ensure that taxation is internationally
neutral in both cases.51 As long as tax rates differ between countries and investors are
treated equally within a country while being exempt from taxation at home, lower tax
rates abroad cannot make investors neutral to investing at home or in a foreign country.
Countries will be forced to choose which goal is more important.53 They will make
different choices depending on their own circumstances, and differences in tax regimes
definitions of the term "dividend" under two different states' domestic tax law, and under different states'
domestic tax law and under tax treaties. The problem is obvious in a non-treaty situation, but it is also a
problem in tax treaty situations because the definitions of the terms used in tax treaties may themselves be
unclear and may leave room for interpretation. The problem also exists because the area of legal cases
covered by the term used in other domestic legislation. Therefore, there is a lot of room for conflicts and
interpretation. It is also possible that taxpayers purposely avoid tax by taking advantage of the differences in
definitions. Alternatively. taxing authorities may intentionally seek to reach interpretations that bring tax
returns to the state in question." MARJAANA HELMINEN, THE DIVIDEND CONCEPT IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW
10 (1999).
47 Tsilly Dagan, The Costs of International Tax Cooperation 4-7 (University of Michigan John M.
Olin Center for Law & Economics, Research Paper No. 02-07, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=315373 (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). The article points out that global neutrality is possible in theory
but that the political hurdles would render it impossible. In the unlikely scenario that an agreement on global
neutrality would be stricken and implemented, any country would have an incentive to shirk on the
agreement, and the monitoring costs needed to prevent this would make the scheme too costly to be welfare
improving.
48 RIXEN, supra note 3, at 62 (explaining the prerequisite for "global" neutrality).
49 Capital import neutrality requires that investment returns do not depend on the residence of the
investor. This requires that foreign and domestic investors be treated alike in the source country, while the
residence country exempts those investing abroad from any taxation on these returns.
50 Capital export neutrality implies that an investor faces the same taxation no matter whether he
invests at home or in another country, making his investment decision based on economic fundamentals
alone. If Country B has higher taxes than Country A, Country A will need to offer its taxpayers a tax credit
to remove tax considerations from its taxpayers' choices between investments in Country A and Country B.
But if Country C has a lower rate than Country A, a taxpayer in the latter will need to make up the difference
between Country C's lower tax rate and Country A's higher rate when profits are brought back to Country A.
51 See RIXEN. supra note 3. at 61 63 (explaining how, since the different tax systems' requirements
are conflicting, total export and import neutrality cannot be obtained simultaneously within a single
jurisdiction).
52 Dagan, supra note 47, at 10 (pointing out that since tax treaties, including the OECD Model
Convention, rely primarily on the residence principle of taxation, capital export neutrality seems to be the
main focus when tax competition is discussed).
53 The aim of tax neutrality is to avoid causing inefficient investments because of tax laws. Tax
competition can be avoided if investments cannot be made at lower tax rates. Complete elimination of
competition is impossible so long as black markets exist. Investors are never completely neutral between
paying taxes and paying the price for doing deals under the table. Moreover, distortions exist both because
tax rates are low and high. Where rates are high, investors may decide not to invest at all. This causes an
inefficiency that is much harder to measure than that which occurs when capital moves from one country to
the other as a result of changes in taxation but which is nonetheless potentially significant.
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will therefore persist regardless of specific efforts to harmonize portions of the tax rules.
Moreover, tax policy is just one of many dimensions on which nations compete for
economic activities. An educated workforce, widespread use of languages common in
international trade, the size of a particular market, a common law legal system, being in
the "right" time zone, and the presence of a "creative class" are all regularly linked to
economic success." Taxation is no different in principle from these other characteristics.
In a world in which differences in tax rules are inevitable, how should we
evaluate the differences we observe? We argue that the appropriate lens is of the interest
groups within countries that use their influence to shape tax laws domestically to their
advantage.55 We propose the following as the appropriate analytical framework for
examining international tax and regulatory competition:
* States enter the competition with different endowments that affect their
competitive abilities to attract investment. Large economies such as the
United States are attractive destinations for investment and so have the
opportunity to charge a relatively high price through the combination of taxes
and regulatory costs in exchange for access to investment opportunities.
Smaller economies that lack these advantages, such as Ireland, must compete
on price. Treating taxation issues as different in kind from other international
differences disadvantages smaller, less wealthy states relative to larger,
wealthier states.
* States differ in the degree to which their public finances depend on
encouraging economic activity. For example, natural-resource-rich states can
act as rentiers while natural-resource-poor states cannot. Thus a resource-
rich state like Venezuela can better "afford" a regime hostile to investors than
a resource-poor state like Costa Rica. The degree to which particular states
are subject to competition has differed as transportation and communications
costs change, as international trade regimes change, and as the types of goods
and services traded change.
" Within states, coalitions of interest groups determine policy positions. Some
interest groups seek to maximize the state's resources to fund their priorities,
while other interest groups seek to maximize the resources focused on their
particular priority. Others focus on expanding their power. For example, the
French president would favor maximizing the resources at his disposal,
French farmers want to maximize the resources available for subsidies, and
the French tax authorities want to ensure that they have access to information
on French taxpayers. All three groups might favor a particularly high tax
regime, but for different reasons.
* Interest groups may seek to influence their governments' policies by forming
14 See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw, David Romer and David N. Weil, A Contribution to the Empirics
of Economic Growth, 107 Q. J. ECON. 407 (1992) (discussing the importance of education for economic
growth); Michael Kremer, Population Growth and Technological Change: One Million B.C. to 1990, 108 Q.
J. ECON, 681 (1993) (population size); JAMES C. BENNETT, THE ANGLOSPHERE CHALLENGE: WHY THE
ENGLISH-SPEAKING NATIONS WILL LEAD THE WAY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2004) (advantages of
English-speaking countries): Rafael La Porta. Florencio Lopez de Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic
Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285 (2008) (common law): RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF
THE CREATIVE CLASS (2002) (creative class).
5' Randall G. Holcombe. Tax Policy from a Public Choice Perspective, 51(2) NAT'L TAX J. 359, 368 (1998)
("No analysis of tax policy is complete unless it includes an explicit recognition of the public choice
environment within which tax policy is made.").
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alliances across national boundaries through international organizations and
treaties. Different forums offer different opportunities for different interest
groups. Diplomats have more influence over deliberations at the United
Nations while central bankers dominate discussions at the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS). Interest groups therefore seek to channel
policy discussions into the forum in which their influence is greatest. The
organizations' staffs also have interests, particularly in enhancing their
authority, budget, and prestige.
In this framework, international organizations can play four different roles. First,
they provide opportunities for cross-country interest groups to coordinate. 6 Second, they
influence the domestic debates by changing the cost-benefit calculation for domestic
groups through the creation of international "soft law" standards and best practices.57
Third, they offer domestic interest groups opportunities to shift a debate to a forum where
their relative strengths may be greater. Finally, they offer a means to enforce agreements
and prevent cheating from undermining agreements to refrain from competitive steps.58
To see how the OECD fits into this framework, we now turn to the evolution of its role in
international tax cooperation.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX COOPERATION
The role played by international organizations in tax issues has changed
substantially over time. Until quite recently, these efforts focused on finding resolutions
of problems caused by differences in tax regimes. The explicit goal of such efforts was
to attempt to increase international economic competition by eliminating differential
burdens on entities operating across borders through the elimination of double taxation.
This focus began to shift as the growth of tax competition became evident. In this
section, we set this history in the context of the larger trends in the world economy over
the twentieth century towards freer trade and freer movements of capital. Not only is this
history critical to understanding the subsequent policy shifts, it also illustrates an
alternative conception of the role of international organizations to the OECD's current
cartel-like focus in taxation.
A. The Era of Technical Expertise
Tax laws differ across states in a wide variety of details, including in definitions
of taxable events, rates of taxation, allowable deductions, and allocation of costs and
earnings to particular jurisdictions. As an example, consider an individual owning real
estate in a foreign country. And indeed, that would be the case for a national of Britain,
France, Netherlands, or Germany who owned real estate in the United States (or vice
56 The Commonwealth may be the best example of a "transnational" organization, which includes
both governmental and nongovernmental networks. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 2, at 138. An example of a
governmental international organization that engages non-governmental actors is the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC). which makes deliberate efforts to reach out to non-governmental actors, primarily from
the business community. Id. at 142. It may be in the interest of the decision makers of international
organizations to give their otherwise technocratic decisions more legitimacy by engaging nongovernmental
organizations in their decision-making. Id. at 220-221.
57 See SLAUGHTER, supra note 2, at 178. When government agents converge in networks,
establishing codes or best practices for instance, this constitutes what can be called "soft law." Slaughter
points out that "traditional international law-making had traditionally been hard law, but established by
treaties, while soft law can be in the form of 'international guidance."' She points out, however, that the latter
is emerging as a possibly more powerful form of law.
58 Besides binding agreements, the personal relationships of the networks they encapsulate help
strengthen the compliance with international laws and regulations. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 2, at 183.
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versa); she would be covered by both countries' estate taxes on this property at her
death.59 Compared to the estate of a taxpayer who owned real estate only within his
home jurisdiction, the estate of the cross-national property owner would be taxed twice as
much. One of the most important problems that differences in tax laws pose for
individuals and firms operating across jurisdictional boundaries is their creation of the
possibility that the same event or revenue will be taxed by more than one jurisdiction,
disadvantaging the individual or entity relative to an individual or entity not operating
across boundaries. A "strong consensus" developed that "overlapping jurisdictional tax
claims can significantly impede economic growth."6 To avoid this double taxation with
respect to estate taxes and real estate, the tax treaties between the United States and the
four jurisdictions listed above provide a tax credit in the non-domiciliary country for the
amount of tax paid in the domiciliary country.61 Addressing these problems is not simple,
and, for most of the twentieth century, international organizations working on
international tax issues focused almost entirely on finding solutions to problems created
by differences in tax laws across states, similar to this estate tax example.
Differences can create opportunities for those individuals and entities, as well as
problems, since differences create the possibility of arbitraging across jurisdictions to
reduce total tax burdens. Prior to the widespread adoption of individual and business
income taxation, these differences created relatively few problems or opportunities as
most taxable events occurred within jurisdictional boundaries. When governments
depended primarily on tariffs and real property taxes as a means of raising revenues-as
they did until the early twentieth century62 reducing an individual's tax burden required
relocation to a state with a lower tariff3 or selling real estate in a high taxjurisdiction and
59 Offshore tax expert Marshall Langer cited the problem of estate tax as a key reason for the use of
corporate entities by non-U.S. taxpayers who own U.S. real estate in testimony to a congressional hearing in
1983: "In fact, under existing law, I would consider it malpractice if I allowed a legitimate foreign investor to
make large U.S. investments without using a foreign corporation. The reason for that is a very silly rule that
has been part of the Internal Revenue Code for as many years as I can remember. It says that if the
Washington Hilton Hotel is owned by someone who is a nonresident alien in his own name, and he dies
owning that property, it is subject to estate tax in the United States. If he puts it into a domestic U.S.
corporation and dies owning the shares of that domestic corporation, it is still subject to estate tax in the
United States. But if he puts it into a foreign corporation, any foreign corporation. a Netherlands Antilles
corporation. a Chinese corporation, or a Russian corporation, under the estate tax situs rules, he is deemed to
own foreign property which is not subject to estate tax in the United States." Tax Evasion through the
Netherlands Antilles and Other Tax Haven Countries: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on
Gov't Operations, 98th Cong. 179 (1983) (statement of Marshall J. Langer).
60 Christians, supra note 12, at 1412-14.
61 This example is taken (in a simplified form) from Michael W. Galligan, Making Sense of Four
Transatlantic Tax Treaties: U.S. Netherlands, US Germany, U.S. France and U.S. UK, 17 SPG INT'L
PRACTICUM 47, 48 (2004).
62 See RIXEN. supra note 3. at 86 (pointing out that the most common revenue sources of
governments, aside from tariffs, were primarily taxes on land and real estate). Britain had already imposed a
peacetime income tax in the mid-nineteenth century. with other nations following from the early 1890s. See
CAROLYN WEBBER & AARON WILDAVSKY, A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND EXPENDITURE IN THE WESTERN
WORLD, 309-10 (1986). The size of Western governments was however still small. Id. at 310. In the United
States, government revenues were raised after the election of Woodrow Wilson as President with the
Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, which allowed for a graduated income tax. Id. at 413.
63 For example, retired British military officers moved to the Crown dependencies Jersey and
Guernsey after the Napoleonic Wars in part because lower tariffs on whiskey and tea lowered the cost of
living. An estimated three thousand British residents moved to the islands by 1834. three-quarters of whom
were military retirees and their families. See RAOUL LEMPRIERE, HISTORY OF THE CHANNEL ISLANDS 156
(1974). The first double-tax agreement was that between Prussia and Austria-Hungary in 1899. See RIXEN,
supra note 3, at 87.
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buying it in a low tax one (and, possibly, creating a taxable event through the sale). As a
result, in a world dominated by indirect taxation, all individuals and businesses operating
within any particular state generally faced equivalent tax environments within that
jurisdiction;64 the existence of differences in national tax regimes had relatively little
impact on the cost of doing business internationally.65
Before the introduction of the income tax, international tax issues were few and
far between. Agreements on taxation between nations were mostly limited to dealing
with the taxation of railway companies, inheritances, and international salesmen.66 Not
until governments began to impose direct taxes on larger numbers of individuals and
businesses during the twentieth century did the problems posed by differences begin to
become more widespread. 6' By 1919, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) had
formed a Committee on Double Taxation, which called for a multilateral solution to the
problem and urged the newly formed League of Nations to eradicate the "evils of double
taxation., 6' The topic was important enough to be discussed at the 1922 International
Economic Conference in Genoa, which unsuccessfully wrestled with post-World War I
international economic issues.69
Even under the relatively simple systems of direct taxation in use during the
twentieth century prior to World War II, the problems posed by differences among tax
systems were substantial enough that the League formed a committee to examine the
problem. It is a testament to the complexity of the problems posed by even these
relatively simple tax systems that the League committee abandoned its efforts in 1927.
They found that "[iun the matter of double taxation in particular, the fiscal systems of
various countries are so fundamentally different that it seems at present practically
impossible to draft a collective convention, unless it were worded in such general terms
as to be of no practical value.,,7' A 1928 League conference did provide three versions of
a model convention on double taxation, although these still left many details for bilateral
negotiations. The conference also created a permanent Fiscal Committee to address tax
64 A firm importing material from its operations elsewhere would, of course, be charged duties on
the imports, while a firm making the same materials locally would not. But the international and national
firms faced equivalent tax situations with respect to the decision of whether to source domestically or
internationally.
6' Tax rates, however varied, could not have skewed choices of business location much. Corporate
income tax in the United States was introduced in 1909, and then at only one percent. See WEBBER &
WILDAVSKY, supra note 62, at 523. In both England and the United States, however, the income tax was as
high as ten percent in some areas and in certain years. Id. at 344.
66 RIXEN, supra note 3, at 87.
67 Governments may have been motivated to address the problem because among the first to
complain about double income taxation were diplomats taxed by both their home countries and their
countries of residence. See Claudio M. Radaelli & Ulrike S. Kraemer, The Rise and Fall of Governance's
Legitimacy: The Case of International Direct Taxation (Jan. 28, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
https:Heric.exeter. ac. uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10036/23834/RadaellilnformalGovernance.pdf (last
visited Nov. 4, 2012). Deneault argues that the League entered into drafting double taxation agreements
formally designed to avoid taxing the same sum twice to-in practice-allow companies "to avoid paying
taxes." DENEAULT, supra note 23, at 29.
68 See RIXEN, supra note 3, at 88.
69 
A.M. ENDRES & GRANT A. FLEMING, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC
POLICY, 1919 1950, at 58 (1998); COMM. OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS ON DOUBLE TAXATION AND TAX EVASION,
DOUBLE TAXATION AND TAX EVASION 5 (1927) (referring to the International Economic Conference in Genoa
in April 1922. which "recommended that the League of Nations should also examine the problem of the flight
of capital").
70 COMM. OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS ON DOUBLE TAXATION AND TAX EVASION, supra note 69, at 8.
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issues. 7 Despite the Great Depression and World War II, the League continued to focus
attention on the issue and to involve highly regarded tax experts in crafting technical
solutions to double taxation problems. 12 As with the 1928 models, the general
frameworks designed by the experts left many details to further negotiations between
states for inclusion in bilateral agreements. 3 By 1946, the League's Fiscal Committee
had agreed on two different models on how to divide the tax base, recognizing the
problem that each of the approaches favored a different set of countries.7 4 The transition
of discussions to the newly formed United Nations made solving double taxation issues
even more complex, since the U.N. membership included both Soviet bloc and
developing countries, whose tax systems differed from Western developed economies'
tax laws in additional ways.75 These complications soon brought the discussions within
the U.N. to an end. 6
The problems remained, however, and the ICC turned to the newly formed
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), the predecessor to the
OECD, for a forum within which to craft solutions to double taxation problems. "
Originally created in 1948 to coordinate American and Canadian Marshall Plan aid to
Europe, the OEEC's objectives expanded in the late 1950s to "economic matters in a
broad sense of the term.""8 In 1956, it organized its own Fiscal Committee to address
double taxation issues.7 9
The OEEC's expanded mission also led to a broadening of its membership
beyond Europe, and the organization was recreated as the OECD in 1961 with the
71 Double taxation can be handled unilaterally through tax exemptions, credits, and deductions. See
RIXEN, supra note 3, at 32-54 (discussing the choice between these approaches). However, treaties may be
preferred to unilateral measures, as being in a "treaty club" with rich countries may offer other opportunities
and advantages for developing nations. See Dagan, supra note 47, at 21 22.
72 See RIXEN, supra note 3, at 88-92; Allison Christians, Networks, Norms, and National Tax
Policy, 9 WASH.U. GLOBAL STUD. L. Rev. 1, 10 (2010). Christians terms the "primary role" of tax treaties
"to create, from the valid and competing jurisdictional claims of the United States and these respective treaty
partners, both the legal ground for international tax disputes and the obligation of governments to resolve
them." Christians, How Nations Share, supra note 12. at 1419. The OECD's efforts thus play a key role in
legalizing tax issues, which is one reason its mission shift is so important.
7, Christians. Networks, supra note 72, at 13.
74 See RiXEN. supra note 3. at 96.
75 In the Soviet Union, Premier Joseph Stalin had in 1928 abandoned the New Economic Policy,
which had allowed for some free trade and taxation. The system in place was instead of the completely
totalitarian kind. See PETER J. BOETTKE, CALCULATION AND COORDINATION: ESSAYS ON SOCIALISM AND
TRANSITIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 162 (2001). Latin American countries that became members in 1945,
such as Argentina. Brazil. and Chile had customs as a share of government revenue of 24.7%, 50.3%. and
41.1o%. respectively, compared to 5.8% in the United States. Taxes of income and wealth, meanwhile,
provided 17.9%. 10.2%. and 23.7%, respectively, compared to 43.0% in the United States. See Kenneth L.
Sokoloff & Eric M. Zolt, Inequality and the Evolution of Institutions of Taxation Evidence from the
Economic History of the Americas in THE DECLINE OF LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIES: GROWTH, INSTITUTIONS,
AND CRISES 83, 103 (Sebastian Edwards, Gerardo Esquivel & Graciela Mdrquez eds., 2007.).
76 See RIXEN, supra note 3, at 91-97, for an account of this process.
77 The GEEC's more homogeneous membership made it possible to avoid some of the issues the
more heterogeneous U.N. membership caused. As Rixen points out, the Fiscal Committee's delegates were
government officials, who would come to agree on an approach leaving them with much flexibility in their
bilateral agreements. See RIXEN, supra note 3. at 98 99.
78 Hugo J. Hahn. Continuity in the Law of International Organization, 4 DUKE L. J. 522, 523
(1962).
79 See RIXEN, supra note 3, at 97.
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addition of the United States and Canada as members.8" The new organization described
its goals in the 1960 Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development as promoting policies that are designed:
(a) to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment
and a rising standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining
financial stability, and thus contribute to the development of the world
economy;
(b) to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as
non-member countries in the process of economic development; and
(c) to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral
non-discriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations."
In addition to these substantive goals, individual members sought to accomplish their
own goals with respect to the organization 2 and the organization's impact on them.
8 3
The OECD's initial role in tax measures were an effort to minimize the transaction costs
of doing business across different tax systems by creating a framework that could help
solve double taxation issues, an approach consistent with its formal goals of expanding
economic development. This expressed itself in the 1963 Draft Model Convention on
Income and Capital,84 which established the OECD as the primary multilateral forum in
international tax policy."
The 1963 Model Convention provided nations with a framework upon which to
negotiate, but it did not attempt to suggest how specific tax policy questions be answered.
Resolving double tax issues to spur development was also a goal of the United States'
80 The 20 members in 1963 were Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Japan joined in 1964, Finland in 1969, Australia in 1971, and
New Zealand in 1973. Later members are Mexico in 1994; the Czech Republic in 1995: Hungary. Korea,
and Poland in 1996; the Slovak Republic in 2000; and Chile, Estonia, Israel, and Slovenia in 2010.
Currently, there are thirty-four OECD member states. By limiting membership, the OECD may have created
an incentive for states to seek membership, a model that has been followed by other international
organizations. See Bruno S. Frey, The Public Choice View of International Political Economy, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONs 7. 13 14 (Ronald Vaubel & Thomas D. Willett
eds., 1991). The organization also grew substantially. Its budget was 159 million francs by 1971, US$164
million in today's value. By 2011, the OECD had a budget of US$491 million. Member states contribute
proportionately to the size of their economy; the U.S. contributes almost twenty-two percent (US$123
million). See OECD, About, Budget (http://www.oecd.org/about/budget) (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
81 Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development art. 1, Dec. 14,
1960.
82 For example, the creation of the OECD involved negotiations over which countries would supply
the deputy directors. Italy insisted that it be given a deputy directorship as a condition of membership.
necessitating expansion of the number of deputy directors to five. Similarly. Britain expended considerable
effort in retaining the chairmanship of the Economic Affairs Committee in the mid-1960s, despite pressure
from the OECD Director to allow a country with fewer economic problems to hold the chair.
83 For example, during Britain's economic difficulties in the 1960s, British officials carefully
negotiated changes in language to OECD documents discussing Britain's economy.
84 OECD, DRAFT DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL (1963), available at
http://faculty.law.wayne.edu/tad/Documents/Tax treaties/oecd 1963.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). OECD
model convention provisions evolved into "industry standard[s]" in many cases. See, e.g.. Christians, supra
note 12. at 1433 ("The tax treaty MAP [mutual agreement procedure] came into being in the early days of tax
treaty history and has become the industry standard through the Model Tax Convention promulgated by the
OECD.").
85 See RIXEN, supra note 3, at 99; Christians, supra note 5, at 99 (noting that OECD was "long
prominent as a central global institution for technical tax policy design").
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broad extensions of its tax treaties with European nations to those nations' overseas
territories and newly independent former colonies during the 1950s.86
Even though the OECD's more homogenous membership eliminated some of the
conceptual conflicts that had prevented the U.N. from effectively addressing the double
taxation problems, even the narrower set of tax issues that the OECD addressed remained
complex. Unlike the League of Nations, the OECD brought government officials (at
least from a small group of governments) to the table as well as technical experts. And
the OECD's focus on the problems its members had with the interactions of their tax
systems narrowed the range of issues to be resolved. As a result, the Draft Model
Convention was perceived as more politically feasible than its League-drafted
predecessors. 7 Even after the 1963 Model Convention was published, efforts continued
to refine the solution and to address additional issues. A revised Convention was
published in 1977 by what was now called the Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA)."
Both the 1963 Draft and the 1977 Convention were flexible frameworks for
resolving tax issues between developed country national systems.8 9 In neither form did
the OECD propose substantive policies on tax questions. By the end of the 1970s, the
OECD model was "practically the infrastructure of the current bilateral treaty-based
system" 9 and the OECD was the most important arena for international tax negotiations,
86 See Tax Evasion through the Netherlands Antilles and Other Tax Haven Countries: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov't Operations. 98th Cong., 51 (1983) (statement of William J.
Anderson. Dir., Gen. Gov't Div., Gen. Accounting Office) ("Most U.S. tax treaties with tax haven countries
are in effect because previous U.S. treaties with developed nations were extended to present and former
colonies of those nations."). The preamble stated that the purpose of the treaty was to avoid double taxation.
See Elisabeth E. Owens, United States Income Tax Treaties: Their Role in Relieving Double Taxation, 17
RUTGERS L. REv. 428, 429 (1962). Since U.S. nationals were shielded from double taxation by tax credits of
the U.S. government, the treaties did little for American nationals, except for those living abroad. Id. at 432-
33, 445. Since several countries with which the United States had signed treaties in the beginning of the
1960s did not offer tax credits to their citizens to the same extent, they were also relieved from double
taxation more significantly by signing the treaty. Id. at 445. The treaties also may have been aimed at
encouraging U.S. investments in Western Europe. Id. at 446. The U.S. signed its first treaty with France in
1932, but had increased its number of treaties to thirty by 1973. See RIXEN. supra note 3, at 109 111.
87 See RIXEN. supra note 3. at 99 100. For example. the draft convention was to be revised
according to how bilateral double tax agreements diverged from it. but as they all conformed to it, this
became unnecessary.
88 C. Miller, Alternatives to the OECD Model, in TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS:
A SYMP. OF OECD AND NON-OECD COUNTRIES 83, 83 (1990). The predecessor of the CFA was named The
Fiscal Committee.
89 Rixen describes the commentary section of the convention as "the most flexible instrument
available to governments trying to induce changes to a series of bilateral treaties that cannot easily and
quickly be renegotiated." RiXEN supra note 3. at 100. As a framework for addressing tax issues between
developed economies, the OECD model proved unacceptable to developing countries, and in 1967 they
turned to the U.N. to create an alternative model. This work was done through its "ad hoc group of experts"
containing mostly government appointed officials responsible for negotiating treaties for their countries. Id.
at 102. The U.N. published its own Model Convention in 1980, adapted from the OECD Model Convention
but modified to address the unique tax issues that arise between developed and developing countries. Id. at
102 104. On the dominance of the OECD Model Treaty. see Diane Ring. Who Is Making International Tax
Policy?: International Organizations as Power Players in a High Stakes World. 33 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 649,
700 n.242 (2010) (noting that the U.N. is not a competitor to the OECD in international taxation issues).
Brauner notes that the U.N. Model Convention has practically vanished from influence. Yariv Brauner,
International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REv. 259 (2002-2003).
90 Brauner, supra note 89, at 310.
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a status that the organization continues to hold today.9 The complexities of resolving
double taxation issues were still seen as something largely requiring individual
negotiations between countries to handle substantive matters, as evidenced by a U.S.
Treasury official's 1983 Congressional testimony that because of the "wide range of
international economic relationships and the diversity of foreign tax systems, we must
approach each treaty relationship separately" in designing treaty terms. 92 Even the broad
solutions created by the double taxation treaties within these frameworks still left
significant issues to be resolved on a case-by-case basis through a variety of
hard-to-access decisions.93 Significantly, the OECD provides important "soft law" that
guides international tax law "by issuing commentary, guidelines, best practices, and the
like. 94
Thus the first way governments conceived of international tax issues was as a
technical problem that required careful negotiations to ensure that international business
activity was not unduly burdened by double taxation. 95 The conceptualization of the
problem as a technical one made it a natural issue to shift into a multilateral forum.
When the difficulties of reconciling all of the world's divergent tax systems overwhelmed
the experts, the major trading countries shifted their efforts to the OEEC/OECD, where
they could address the most critical problems affecting the largest volume of international
business (which occurred between their members).
How the OECD handled tax issues evolved with the organization during this time
as well. By the 1970s, three bodies within the organization were particularly important.
First, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA), which meets twice a year, officially does
9' The OECD Secretary General describes the organization as being "at the forefront of setting tax
standards for the global economy." Christians, supra note 72, at 14-15.
92 Tax Evasion through the Netherlands Antilles and Other Tax Haven Countries: Hearings Before
a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 98th Cong. 261 (1983) (statement of John E. Chapoton,
Asst. Sec. for Tax Policy. Dep't of Treasury). See also JOHN STOPFORD & Louis TURNER, BRITAIN AND THE
MULTINATIONALS 202 (1985) (describing dispute between United Kingdom and United States over U.S.
states' application of unitary taxation).
93 Christians, supra note 12, at 1409 ("[T]ax agreements provide only a design for allocating
international income among nation states. It is the application of these agreements that determines how
revenues are allocated in practice. This application has taken place over the years through hundreds of
thousands of interpretative decisions, the vast majority of which are not accessible to the public."): Tax
Treaties. supra note 14, at 8 (describing need to adapt model treaties "to reflect the particular policy needs of
each country, the economic and commercial relations between the two countries, the need to mesh the
provisions of two different tax systems and, finally, the levels of economic development of the two treaty
partners."). Christians also notes that international tax law "features little international formal guidance such
as regulations, administrative determinations, or cases." Christians, supra note 12, at 1409. Indeed, even on
the core function of blocking "treaty shopping" by non-residents attempting to take advantage of a
jurisdiction's treaty with the United States, the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy in 1983 stated in
congressional testimony that there was "no model limitation of benefits provision" and that a "single model"
would not be "appropriate" because of the "wide range of international economic relationships and the
diversity of foreign tax systems" that required "approach[ing] each treaty relationship separately." Tax
Evasion through the Netherlands Antilles and Other Tax Haven Countries: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of
the H. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 98th Cong. 261 (1983).
94 Christians, supra note 12, at 1411. She also notes that "[m]ost soft international tax law emerges
from the OECD in its self-described role as 'market leader in developing [tax] standards and guidelines.'" Id.
at 1447.
9' This conceptualization continues to be important. In 1981. John Chapton. Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury. Tax Policy, described tax treaties' role as "an important element in the international economic
policy of the United States, one of the fundamental objectives of which is to minimize impediments to
international flows of capital and technology. Among these impediments are the inconsistent rules of
national tax systems and their interaction." Tax Treaties, supra note 14, at 3.
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the bulk of the OECD work on taxation.96 Countries are represented in the CFA by
senior tax officials and tax administrators. Second, the OECD staff that works on
taxation belongs to the Centre for Tax Policy and Administration (CTPA). In contrast to
the delegates to the CFA, who represent their respective countries, businesses, and
organizations, the staff of the CTPA consists of international bureaucrats.97 The work is
divided between working parties, whose meeting agendas are usually prepared by a
division of the CTPA connected to their field.9" The agendas for CFA meetings are often
prepared by the CFA Bureau, an executive committee appointed by the CFA.99 Which
countries are appointed to the bureau can therefore be significant in determining the
direction of its work. 100 The various incentives, ideas, and connections of these
representatives will eventually form the basis for the consensus-based statements of the
OECD.' O' Finally, the OECD Council is the body with formal decision-making power to
speak for the organization; its decisions are made by consensus. The Council consists of
purely national representatives, who are high-level diplomats. 02 The council does,
however, deal with all kinds of policy issues, and taxation is but one of them. It is more
of a venue for channeling projects and decisions further down in the organization than an
arena where tax policies are formed.'l 3
96 The CTPA is a part of the 2,500-member OECD Secretariat that constitutes the organization's
staff. OECD, About, available at: http://www.oecd.org/about (last visited Sept. 20, 2012). Its members are
experts in their fields many are tax economists with experience and knowledge of the latest developments in
international taxation politics. Michael Webb. Defining the boundaries of legitimate state practice: norms,
transnational actors and the OECD's project on harmful tax competition, 11 REV. OF INT'L POL. ECON. 787,
792 (2004). The current staff is around one hundred people from twenty-five different countries. Owens
looks back on his time in office, INT'L TAX REV. (Feb. 12. 2012). http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/
Article/2967120/Owens-looks-back-on-his-time-in-office.htm. As "international bureaucrats," they are
detached from the politics of their home country. Christians, supra note 72, at 19. They may previously
have served as senior tax officials in their home country or represented their country in an OECD committee.
More rarely, staff members have been recruited as young professionals. OECD, Staff Categories
(http://www.oecd.org/document/62/0,3746,en 21571361 45609340 40833406 1 1 1 1,00.html#agrades)
(last accessed Sept. 15, 2012) ("[r]ecruitment of Young Professionals (grade Al) is extremely limited.").
97 Christians, supra note 72, at 19.
98 Hugh J. Ault, Reflections on the Role of the OECD in Developing International Tax Norms, 34
BROOK. J. INTL L. 757. 762 (2009).
99 Id. at 760.
'00 Interview 4 with OECD personnel (2011) (We conducted five interviews with current and
former OECD personnel in late Spring and Summer 2011. We agreed not to identify the individuals
interviewed, which encouraged frank discussion of the agency and which shields our sources from
retaliation). France, Japan, and Ireland were for instance elected to the new CFA Bureau that was set up for
the work preparing the 1998 Report discussed below. Choosing Ireland to participate might have served to
give legitimacy to the work. Interview 5 with OECD personnel.
'0' Christians, supra note 72, at 22 ("These tax policy groups form an intertwined epistemic
community that holds an important and influential position in the law-making order."). Since the OECD is
not a law-making body, it does not entail the same official records and public scrutiny to which national law-
making bodies are subjected. It is therefore inherently difficult to identify at which point decisions are made
and who makes them. Even if one could attend one of the high-level meetings at which the issues may be
openly discussed, policy is often formed outside of the big venues, making it impossible for any student of
decision to capture the process. See id, at 26-27.
102 Christians, supra note 72, at 17.
03 OECD, Who Does What, (http://www.oecd.org/about/whodoeswhat) (last visited Sept. 20.
2012). These Council ambassadors have many issues on their table, and what they may focus their
discussions on varies. For instance, as the expansion of the OECD was high on the agenda with the entrance
of Mexico in 1994, tax policy was not the main priority, and the Council would therefore endorse documents
on taxation without discussing the topic much at its meetings. Interview I with OECD personnel, supra note
100. The Council directs projects to subcommittees of government officials at a lower level. Its statements
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B. The Growth of Tax Competition
Tax competition has been an issue for governments for as long as they have taxed
income. In 1934, Canadian mining millionaire Harry Oakes moved to the Bahamas to
escape Canada's high tax rates, complaining that eighty-five percent of his income was
being taxed away. A Canadian newspaper headlined the story of Oakes' departure with:
"Multimillionaire Champ Tax Dodger: Santa Claus to Bahamas. But Heart Like a
Frigidaire to the Land that Gave Him Wealth., 114 Moves like Oakes' were relatively rare,
both because of their high cost and because before World War II relatively few people
regularly paid taxes at rates like those Oakes found excessive. Nonetheless, the
transformation of corporate income taxes from taxes on shareholders into a separate tax
on corporate entities (a post-World War I development in the United States and later in
Britain),'15 the sharp rise in tax rates on both individual and corporate income used to
fund World War I,"06 and the efforts to control businesses through taxation that began in
the 1920s all educated a generation of tax lawyers and accountants in the need for
innovation in financial structuring to reduce tax burdens.I17 Even before World War II, a
growing industry of lawyers and other professionals were actively engaged in finding
ways to use complex and often vague statutory and regulatory language to reduce
individuals' and firms' tax bills.
After World War II-just as the OEEC/OECD was being organized and taking
on tax issues-three important changes in the world economy further increased the
importance of differences in tax regimes. First, as the European economies recovered
from the devastation of World War 11 during the 1950s and technological developments
continued to reduce the cost of doing business internationally,' 8 cross-border transactions
are important, but at least in the area of tax policy, they are usually drafted by OECD staff members.
Christians, supra note 72, at 17-18. Thus, this is not where policy is formed, but rather where national policy
is channeled into projects, where policy is mobilized by mandates to the OECD Secretariat, which may
delegate further to subcommittees.
104 MICHAEL CRATON, A HISTORY OF THE BAHAMAS 254-255 (3rd ed. 1986). Oakes was later
elected to the Bahamian Assembly in the last pre-secret-ballot election. MICHAEL CRATON, PINDLING: THE
LIFE AND TIMES OF THE FIRST PRIME MINISTER OF THE BAHAMAS 1930-2000, at 13 (2002).
1o5 STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CORPORATE INCOME
TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT 109 110 (2010) (noting that after World War 1, "Congress transformed the corporate
income tax from its original pass-through vision to a separate, and at least partially additional, tax at the
entity level"); DAUNTON, supra note 36. at 94 (noting that separate corporate taxation did not develop in
Britain until after World War 1I).
106 BANK, supra note 105, at 89 (stating that top surtax rate on individuals went from six percent in
1913 to fifty percent in 1917); DAUNTON, supra note 36, at 74 ("At the end of [World War I in Britain], the
proportion of people paying income tax was higher than ever before, and the rate was at an unprecedented
level.").
107 See, e.g.. BANK, supra note 105. at 142 (describing 1920s tax structuring to take advantage of
exemptions).
'08 For example. during the 1920s, transatlantic telephone calls were expensive and difficult, and
travel between Europe and North America required ocean liner voyages lasting four days or more. See BOB
DICKINSON & ANDY VLADIMIR, SELLING THE SEA: AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE CRUISE INDUSTRY 19 (2nd ed.
2007). These transactions costs limited opportunities for transcontinental investments by raising their costs.
After World War II, these costs fell dramatically. For example, the cost of a three-minute phone call between
New York and London dropped from $250 in 1930 to a few cents today. See MARTIN WOLF, WHY
GLOBALIZATION WORKS 119 20 (2004). See also PAUL EINzIG, THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE 239
(2nd ed., 1970) (noting that it was not until the 1950s that international telecommunications worked
smoothly). Similarly. transatlantic air travel became both possible and more affordable, cutting travel times
from days to a matter of hours, and prices by a factor often from 1949 to 2009. See Andrew Evans, Super
Colossal Transatlantic Travel, Circa 1949, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENT TRAVEL (Aug. 20, 2009),
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expanded. The combination of the Great Depression and the war had dramatically
reduced private trade, but once Europe began to recover from the devastation of the war,
cross-border transactions assumed increasing new importance. Trade barriers among
developed economies fell as the result of increasing European economic integration and,
more broadly, through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 9 Between
1950 and 1970, the world's high-income countries saw growth rates of an average
4.9%. l"' This resulted in a rapid increase in global trade, which between 1948 and 1960
grew by just over 6%;I" and 8% from 1960 to 1973."2 Trade broadened as well as
expanded. Thus, while Britain and the United States accounted for over half of world
exports in 1950, by the 1970s they lost some of this dominance to other European
countries and Japan."13 (The OECD members' share also increased as the organization
expanded from 60% of merchandise exports in 1960 to 70% in 1973.)114 Just as
importantly, international financial transactions expanded beyond the trade in
government bonds that had dominated early twentieth century international finance to
include private financial transactions. "' Between 1961 and 1985, bank deposits
denominated in external currencies (e.g., currencies other than the home currency of the
bank where the money was deposited) grew from about $1 billion to $2,000 billion. 116
Taxable foreign transactions involving American taxpayers grew substantially during the
1970s. 117 The post-World War II dissolution of the colonial empires also made some
previously internal transactions "international" and subjected them to potentially
inconsistent tax regimes. All these developments made solving double taxation problems
a growing priority for businesses, financial services professionals, and financial
institutions.
Second, the combination of the gradual weakening of capital controls and the rise
of floating exchange rates expanded opportunities for cross-border economic activity
available at http://blogs.nationalgeographic.com/blogs/intelligenttravel/2009/08/super-colossal-transatlantic-
t.html.
109 The GATT was founded as an inter-governmental treaty in 1947, negotiated between twenty-
three countries. See BERNARD H. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
WORLD TRADE SYSTEM: THE WTO AND BEYOND 38 (2001). Although the GATT was not a very strong
institution until the 1960s, it has been "the major focal point for industrialized country governments seeking
to lower trade barriers." Id. at 9, 38. See also GREG BUCKMAN, GLOBAL TRADE: PAST MISTAKES. FUTURE
CHOICES 23, 31 (2005) (explaining that rapid economic growth was an important factor behind the trade
increase. Integration was further boosted by technological advances in transportation, as jet airplanes began
flying non-stop between London and New York in 1957.). See id. at 37 (explaining that although there were
trade negotiations also before the World War II, they were few and far between). Christians notes that the
evolution away from tariffs represents the development of a principle against directly taxing the flow of
international trade in goods through tariffs. Christians, supra note 12, at 1412-13.




114 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WORLD TRADE REPORT 2008: TRADE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD
16 (2008). Japan's membership was particularly important in increasing the OECD members' total share.
115 R.C. MICHIE, THE GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKET: A HISTORY 153 (2006) (describing the pre-
World War I market as "a pool of securities shared by the main markets and capable of moving easily,
quickly. and cheaply between the different financial centers in response to minute variation in price"); Boise
& Morriss, supra note 40, at 409 11 (discussing Eurobond market development).
116 ALIBER, supra note 8. at 177.
117 Internal Revenue Service. Review of Service Programs Relating to International Transactions
(Aug. 25, 1981), excerpted and reprinted in Improper Use of Foreign Addresses to Evade U.S. Taxes:
Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov 't Operations, 97th Cong. 53 (1982).
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while increasing the financial sophistication necessary to conduct it. Although many
countries initially maintained their wartime capital controls after the end of World War II,
these controls were progressively relaxed over the next thirty years and had almost
completely vanished among developed economies by the 1980s." 8 The sophistication
necessary to operate internationally increased as well with the collapse of the post-World
War II Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, which produced a world of largely
floating exchange rates," 9 creating both risks and opportunities for businesses operating
internationally. This internationalization of capital markets was no accident. It partly
developed as a result of policy choices led largely by the developed countries and driven
by western Europeans and U.S.-trained economists working at the International Monetary
Fund. 120  The dismantling of capital controls reflected a strong commitment by western
European economies to a global financial system. 121 But financial liberalization was also
due at least in part to the unique dynamics of finance. Unlike trade in physical goods,
where agreement between both parties to liberalization is necessary, financial
liberalization can be driven by unilateral efforts, and both Britain and the United States
pushed forward with liberalizing finance in pursuit of gaining market share in financial
transactions for London and New York, respectively.1 2' Thus important constituencies in
both Britain and the United States were able to mobilize their governments at appropriate
times to take liberalizing steps that benefited their financial industries.
123
Third, the rise of the Eurocurrency market offered businesses opportunities to
obtain financing internationally at lower costs than available domestically. For example,
during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the cost of borrowing in the Eurodollar market
(i.e., in dollars outside the United States) was significantly lower than borrowing in
dollars within the United States. 124 As a result of federal government policies
118 BARRY EICHENGREEN, GLOBALIZING CAPITAL: A HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
SYSTEM 1 (2d ed. 2008) ("The three decades following World War 11 were then marked by the progressive
relaxation of controls and the gradual recovery of international capital flows. The fourth quarter of the
twentieth century was again one of significant capital mobility. And the period since the turn of the century
has been one of very high capital mobility-in some sense even greater than that which prevailed before
1913."); Manuel Guitifn, Capital Account Liberalization: Bringing policy in line with reality, in CAPITAL
CONTROLS. EXCHANGE RATES, AND MONETARY POLICY IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 71, 74 (Sebastian Edwards
ed., 1997) ("Perhaps the most critical feature of the recent evolution of capital movements has been the
relaxation of capital controls, the bulk of which took place in the context of a broad liberalization and
deregulation of domestic financial markets in industrial countries.").
119 EICHENGREEN, supra note 118, at 91-92 (summarizing Bretton Woods system); id. at 134-36
(describing movement to floating exchange rates).
120 RAwI ABDELAL, CAPITAL RULES: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL FINANCE 3 (2007) ("European
policymakers conceived and promoted the liberal rules that compose the international financial
architecture."). Abdelal sees the role of the United States in liberalization as "ad hoc" rather than the result
of a uniform policy, and he emphasizes that the EU and OECD rules both developed without significant U.S.
influence. Id.
121 ABDELAL, supra note 120. at 105 (noting that by the late 1980s "capital account liberalization
was becoming the usual behavior of OECD members," and that this was driven by Europeans).
122 HELLEINER, supra note 41, at 196 ("[F]or an open financial order to emerge, it was not necessary
for states collectively to obey liberal rules, as is assumed to be the case in the trade sector. An open order
could be created if a single state or group of states unilaterally provided resourceful financial markets
operators with a degree of freedom.").
123 HELLEINER. supra note 41, at 6, 83.
1
24 
See HEATHER D. GIBSON, THE EUROCURRENCY MARKETS, DOMESTIC FINANCIAL POLICY. AND
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTABILITY 10 14 (1989) (describing the growth of the Eurodollar market);
STOPFORD & TURNER, supra note 92, at 34 ("Some of the early American moves to Europe [by banks] were
in response to restrictive US regulations primarily aimed at keeping dollars at home."); DILIP K. GHOSH,
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discouraging U.S. multinationals from borrowing in the United States to fund their
international operations, those companies began to borrow outside the United States.
1 25
As domestic interest rates rose during the 1960s and 1970s, those same companies made
extensive use of Eurodollar financing through the Netherlands Antilles, taking advantage
of a quirk in the U.S.-Netherlands Antilles tax treaty that eliminated the U.S. withholding
tax on payments made to Antilles entities. 126 At the time, the IRS acquiesced to and
approved of this financing business, although the use of conduit entities in this fashion
later became known as "treaty abuse.',
127
Use of international business structures to reduce regulatory and tax costs
expanded as entrepreneurs in various jurisdictions had learned how to lower their costs
through a wide variety of international business structures. For example the Roosevelt
Administration's acquiesced to the rise of flags of convenience as a means of allowing
war supplies to be shipped to Britain prior to U.S. entry into World War II to evade
America's pre-war neutrality legislation's prohibitions on U.S.-flagged ships' sailing to
belligerents. This changed the face of shipping after the war as Liberian and Panamanian
flagged ships appeared in greater numbers.'28 Shipping firms and their customers learned
both the scope of the benefits and the practical methods of international arbitrage from
this experience. As we noted earlier, a Dutch entrepreneur's realization that the U.S.-
Netherlands tax treaty's extension to Dutch Caribbean possessions allowed U.S.
companies to access the Eurodollar market without the costs of the U.S. withholding tax
produced a multi-million dollar business on the island of Curagao in the 1960s. 129 The
Eurocurrency markets themselves led American banks to open European branches. 130
The demands of the oil and entrep6t businesses, in Kuwait and Hong Kong respectively,
resulted in their exemption from British currency controls for a time and created
opportunities for currency transactions unavailable within the sterling area.
131
Offshore Markets and Capital Flows: A Theoretical Analysis, in THE GLOBAL STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL
MARKETS: AN OVERVIEW, supra note 8, at 422 ("Entrep6t centers and Eurocurrency came into existence to
satisfy the regulation-choked investors, transnational enterprises, and communist countries such as the Soviet
Union and its satellite countries which wanted to keep dollars but not under the jurisdiction of the United
States."). This was broadly true of currencies, such that the Eurocurrency market included trading in more
than dollars. Id.
125 GBSON. supra note 124, at 10-14.
126 See Boise & Morriss, supra note 40. at 406-10.
127 See Richard L. Reinhold, What is Tax Treaty Abuse (Is Treaty Shopping an Outdated Concept)?
53 TAX LAW. 663 (2000) (discussing development of concept).
128 See BOLESLAW ADAM BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDY
(1962); RODNEY P. CARLISLE, SOVEREIGNTY FOR SALE: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE PANAMANIAN
AND LIBERIAN FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE (1981).
129 Boise & Morriss. supra note 40, at 406 10.
130 ALIBER, supra note 8. at 175 76 ("Participation in the Eurodollar market is the primary activity
of most of the fifty branches of U.S. banks in London. In the absence of the ability to sell dollar deposits in
London, most of these banks would not have established London branches. Similarly. participation in the
Eurodollar market is the primary activity of the German banks in Luxembourg.").
131 CATHERINE R. SCHENK, BRITAIN AND THE STERLING AREA: FROM DEVALUATION TO
CONVERTIBILITY IN THE 1950S 10 (1994) ("Due to Hong Kong's entrep6t trade and Kuwait's oil production,
these two members of the sterling area operated free markets in sterling against dollars which were tolerated
by the British authorities."). This practice was ended in 1957. Id. See also CATHERINE R. SCHENK, The Rise
of Hong Kong and Tokyo as International Financial Centres after 1950. in CENTRES AND PERIPHERIES IN
BANKING: THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 81, 86 (Philip L. Cottrell, et al. eds., 2007)
("In the post-war period, the importance of Hong Kong as an international banking centre shifted to a new
level. The absence of exchange control in the colony contrasted with a global environment of tight controls
on capital-account convertibility and fixed exchange rates ... IT] he 'window' of opportunity that Hong Kong
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As entrepreneurs learned the advantages of innovating business structures, those
structures grew increasingly complex. For example, by the early 1960s the Anglo-Dutch
multinational Royal Dutch/Shell had 500 entities operating in more than ninety
jurisdictions. 132 Even more than any specific arbitrage strategy, the development of
London and New York as rival financial centers after World War II drove down the cost
of international business structures. 133 Banks, lawyers, accountants, and other
professionals in both cities aggressively competed for business both by pushing their
national governments to lower regulatory costs and through innovation.' 34
During this period the OECD largely played the role of a pool of technicians able
to provide the expertise and the contacts to help countries agree on the rules for taxation
of activities that crossed borders. Through the 1970s, the OECD Model Convention
served (and continues to serve today) as a framework on which countries could base
bilateral treaties. Although the OECD sought agreement on the convention from
government representatives rather than just technical experts, the Model Convention
itself was not a policy product but a framework within which participating countries
would settle politically the substantive issues necessary to complete a tax treaty. This
approach left to the individual treaty talks the crucial questions necessary to set the
boundaries for taxation between countries: Who has the right to tax which transactions?
Where is the line drawn between what is mine and what is yours? Once those boundaries
were agreed, the model convention also left each jurisdiction free to tax at whichever
rates they pleased, while using whatever other provisions that they deemed to be in their
individual interests.
This approach worked well for some transactions. If an American firm bought a
British firm and operated it as a subsidiary, the framework created by the model
convention plus the Anglo-American tax treaty could handle dividend or interest
payments from the subsidiary to the parent and similar transactions. The problem from
the tax authorities' point of view was that entrepreneurial lawyers' and other
professionals' creation of international business structures quickly outstripped national
tax authorities' abilities to keep up with the varieties of transactions and their impacts on
tax liabilities. Once the rules were set in a treaty, lawyers and others set to work to find
structures that minimized the total tax bill. For example, the sale of goods and services
between related parties, an issue since at least the 1930s and generally labeled "transfer
pricing," posed serious problems as multinational enterprises expanded the scope of their
operations since it could be used to shift profits from one jurisdiction to another. 135 As
offered as a gap in sterling-area exchange control attracted substantial financial flows from North America
and Europe as well as Asia.").
132 Profit Is Raised for Royal Dutch, N.Y. TIMES. March 3, 1962, at L25.
133 HELLEINER. supra note 41.
134 One incident that illustrates the role of entrepreneurs in spreading policy ideas was the effort by
Merrill Lynch to form an exclusive arrangement with Guam in 1982 to offer tax structures through the
jurisdiction. See Merrill Pioneering a New Tax-Free Route to Europe, As Old Haven Sinks, SECURITIES WEEK
2 (Dec. 6, 1982), reprinted in Tax Evasion through the Netherlands Antilles and Other Tax Haven Countries:
Hearing Before the Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of the H. Comm. On Government
Operations, 98th Cong. 742 (1983). More generally, law firms played major roles in developing captive
insurance offshore. See Andrew P. Morriss, industry Insider ... Tom Jones and LJ Fallon, CAYMAN
FINANCIAL REVIEW, October 5. 2011, available at http://www.compasscayman.com/cfr/2011/10/05/industry-
Insider ---- Tom-Jones-and-LJ-Fallon (describing origins of offshore captive industry).
h3 When assets are moved within a multinational enterprise ("MNE") across state borders, there is no reason
to believe that the enterprise would report the value of that transaction according to market principles. An
MNE can also use a low-tax jurisdiction as the base of a part of the MNE that is on the receiving end, even if
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intangible property grew in importance, firms discovered that they could use royalty
payments to transfer profits to lower tax jurisdictions-and jurisdictions began to offer
lower taxes on royalties to capture transactions. The spread of the ring-fenced tax
regimes that reduced or eliminated taxes on entities not doing business within the
jurisdiction as pioneered by the Netherlands Antilles in the 1950s also complicated the
picture.
1 36
Moreover, national tax authorities often lacked the information they needed to
evaluate whether tax evasion was occurring. For example, an IRS review found that
dividends of $16 million were reported to have been paid to East German residents in
1978 and a fifteen-percent withholding tax deducted, when the actual rate applicable to
East Germany was thirty percent. The reported concluded, "This condition was not
identified or corrected during processing."' 137 Even where one nation's tax authorities
persuaded another's to share information, making use of the information often turned out
to be impossible because the recipient lacked the capacity to process it. In the United
States, the IRS simply warehoused foreign tax authorities' reports of payments to U.S.
taxpayers for much of the 1970s because it was unable to match the foreign tax records to
U.S. records as the foreign records did not include the taxpayers' U.S. social security
numbers, the agency lacked the foreign language capacity to read the reports when they
were not in English, and it was unable to determine how to make use of data reported in
the company is not conducting any business activity there. Rather, there is an incentive to set prices to
allocate profits depending on the different tax rates in its two locations. Thus the aim of an agreement is for
each country to get its "fair share" of the tax. By pricing below market value, the tax authority in the
receiving end gains, as it taxes according to profits, while the government from which the asset is transferred
loses out. In the case of inaccurate pricing furthermore: "An MNE could suffer double taxation on the same
profits without proper transfer pricing." Two administrative bodies are then involved in assessing the value
of the transfer. While the revenue authority in the state to which the assets are transferred want to see to it
that the value is not over-estimated for the sake of tax deductibles, the customs authority in the same country
is keen to make sure that the value of the transaction is not underestimated. There is a tension between these
bureaucracies, both trying to value the transaction in a way that benefits them. Transfer pricing is in of itself
only a natural part of an MNE. A price must be set on goods and services changing hands of the different
parts of the enterprise. Inaccurate transfer pricing however, brings with it two types of worries. On the one
hand, there may be double taxation. In the case that an asset is priced too high, the tax base falls completely
to the originating government. When the government in the other end discovers that lower profits are being
reported than what is actually the case, they may want to levy a tax, which would lead to double taxation. On
the other hand, a firm may be practicing income shifting by having its income under-reporting the income in
the high-tax country, while over-reporting in the low-tax country, by claiming higher than market prices for
the international shipping within the enterprise to the high-tax jurisdiction and lower than market prices in the
other case. See Eric J. Bartelsman & Roel, M. W. J. Beetsma, Why Pay More? Corporate Tax Avoidance
Through Transfer Pricing in OECD Countries (Ctr. Econ. Policy Research. Working Paper No. 2543, 2000).
Although transfer pricing has been an issue for many decades, it is only with the proliferation of MNEs that it
has become a serious concern. See John Neighbour, Transfer pricing: Keeping it at arm's length, THE OECD
OBSERVER (Jan. 2002), available at http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/printpage.php/aid/670/
Transfer pricing: Keeping it at arms length.html (last accessed Oct. 2, 2011). The OECD issued a report
in 1979 that set up guidelines for transfer pricing. MARGARET LAMB, ANDREW LYMER & JUDITH FREEDMAN,
TAXATION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH To RESEARCH 187 88 (2005). To obtain a fair allocation of tax
revenues, the OECD adopted the "arm's length principle." by which it is meant that a firm market value is to
be set on the asset being transferred. See Liu Ping & Caroline Silberztein. Transfer Pricing, Customs Duties
and VAT Rules: Can We Bridge the Gap?, 1 WORLD COM. REV. 36. 36 (2007). This principle was originally
practiced by the United States and copied by the League of Nations in 1935 in their allocation convention.
RiXEN. supra note 3. at 95. As Christians summarizes, "the effect of transfer pricing rules is to divide
revenues between countries in a generally acceptable way." Christians. supra note 12. at 1421.
136 Boise & Morriss, supra note 40, at 408-09.
137 Internal Revenue Service, supra note 117, at 60.
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foreign currencies where exchange rates varied over time."' In one instance, after IRS
field agents discovered that they could not access the forms the Canadian tax authorities
sent to the IRS because the forms "were not processed by the service and therefore were
not retrievable," the field agents worked out an arrangement with the Canadian tax
authorities to obtain their own copies of the forms being sent to the IRS main office from
the Canadians whenever the Canadians believed the forms "could be of significance" for
the United States. 3 9 That "front line" American tax personnel were forced to rely on
foreigners' judgment of what was important by the inadequacies of their own agency to
process English language paperwork from the United States' closest neighbor is an
indication of the magnitude of the problems that less well-funded tax authorities around
the world faced.
In addition, legal arbitrage efforts swiftly expanded beyond tax issues. The
availability of bearer share corporations in the Netherlands Antilles attracted investors in
U.S. real estate (possibly including some Americans) who valued both the anonymity that
the bearer shares provided and, perhaps, that the shares could be transferred without U.S.
tax authorities knowing that the property had changed hands.' Individuals in civil law
jurisdictions established trusts in common law jurisdictions to avoid forced heirship
laws.141 Captive insurers located in offshore jurisdictions offered firms a combination of
deductible premiums, flexible coverage, and access to the global reinsurance market.
14 2
As the volume and size of international transactions grew, the scope of the problems they
38 Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS (Income Information Document Matching
Program): Hearing before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs of the H. Comm. on
Gov't Operations, 94th Cong. 17 (1976) (statement of Jacob Kaufman & Dean Scott, Subcommittee Staff
Investigators, on Detail from GAO) ("IRS agents had very little or no knowledge relating to the existence or
use of the foreign income information documents. This is not surprising since all these documents simply
arrive at the Philadelphia Service Center and then are shipped off without examination to a Federal records
center."); Id. at 50 ("To begin with, finding someone who knew anything about the forms was a big problem
but after that the reasons provided, as quoted in our statement, were that they were in a foreign language, and
there were no identifying numbers on them. Therefore, because of this, IRS said it could not use them in the
matching program or for any other purpose for that matter."); Id. at 83 (statement of Donald C. Alexander,
Commissioner, IRS) (stating that IRS needs information in dollars at time paid. but does not get it). It is easy
to chuckle at the IRS's problems. but it would have been virtually impossible to know what was meant in
U.S. dollar terms when a form reported a 1976 payment in lira. when that currency fluctuated against the
dollar from 681.20 to 917.43, a difference of over thirty percent. unless the day of the payment was also
specified. Federal Reserve Statistical Release H. 10, Foreign Exchange Rates, Italy Historical Rates, Federal
Reserve, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h 10/hist/dat89 it.htm (Dec. 29, 1989).
139 Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS (Income Information Document Matching
Program): Hearing before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs of the H. Comm.
On Gov't Operations, 94th Cong. 4 (1976) (statement of John J. Olszewski, Former Director. Intelligence
Division, IRS).
140 Boise & Morriss. supra note 40, at 411 12. Somewhat ironically, U.S. jurisdictions like Nevada
market themselves as providing secrecy. See Brian Grow & Kelly Carr, Special Report: Nevada's Big Bet on
Secrecy, REUTERS, Sept. 26, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/26/us-shell-games-
nevada-idUSTRE78P1Y020110926 (describing the state's marketing of privacy in beneficial ownership).
The use of foreign entities to hold real estate to avoid or evade transfer taxes is once again in the news, this
time in Britain. See James Charles, Beware Stamp Duty Schemes, THE SUNDAY TIMES (London), January 29,
2012.
141 See, e.g.. Firm Memo, Walkers Global Legal and Management Solutions, The Uses and
Advantages of Jersey Trusts 1 2. available at http://www.walkersglobal.com/Lists/News/Attachments/
168/(Jersey)0% 2OUses%/ 20and%/ 20Advantages%/ 20of%/o20Jersey%/ 20Trusts%/o20(2).pdf (last accessed October
25, 2011) (discussing use of Jersey trusts to avoid forced heirship laws).
142 See MORRISS, supra note 13.
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posed for national tax authorities increased as well. 143 Other law enforcement interests,
particularly within the United States, began to pay attention to the use of international
business structures and to openly speculate that they were being used to launder criminal
proceeds or to conceal criminal activities.
44
States adopted a variety of counter-measures to thwart taxpayers' efforts to lower
their tax obligations through international transactions. In the United States, the adoption
of Subpart F in 1962 escalated a long-running IRS campaign to restrict U.S. taxpayers'
abilities to use foreign entities to reduce or evade their U.S. taxes. 145 Law enforcement
operations involving intercepting mail to U.S. taxpayers from Swiss addresses and
arranging a Miami dinner date for a Bahamian banker to allow tax authorities access to
the banker's briefcase while he was pursuing romance were among the more colorful
ones discussed publicly. 146 In the United Kingdom, the continuation of capital controls
into the 1970s provided British authorities with important measures with which to
prevent money from leaving the jurisdiction and so escaping taxes. 14 7 More generally
among EU governments in the 1960s and 1970s, only Germany had somewhat liberal
capital-account policies despite the commitment in the 1957 Treaty of Rome to move
towards free movement of capital. 148 This restricted most European taxpayers' ability to
shift funds out of a jurisdiction to avoid or evade taxes. Liberalizations did come
underway gradually, as even France moved away from its policy of dirigisme and
state-guaranteed finance in the 1980S.149 As restrictions on capital flows declined, the
impact of tax competition became more keenly felt. 150
Several factors restricted national tax authorities' abilities to control international
businesses' and individuals' use of both legal arbitrage methods and illegal tax evasion.
143 See, e.g., Tax Evasion through the Netherlands Antilles and Other Tax Haven Countries:
Hearing Before the Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov 't
Operations. 98th Cong. 1 (1983) (statement of Douglas Barnard, Subcommittee Chair) ("Offshore tax
evasion schemes-which appear to have reached epidemic proportions-result in the loss to our Treasury of
hundreds of millions and very likely billions of dollars annually.").
144 See Illegal Narcotics Profits: Hearings before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the
S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong. (1979) (Testimony of Irvin B. Nathan, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General. Criminal Division. US DOJ) (discussing law enforcement concerns about offshore
transactions).
141 See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY. THE DEFERRAL OF INCOME EARNED
THROUGH U.S. CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: A POLICY STUDY 101-63 (2000) (describing
measures). Almost from the start of the modern income tax, the IRS had spent considerable effort attempting
to prevent "personal holding companies" from being used to lower tax bills and Subpart F represented an
international extension of that campaign.
146 Tax Evasion through the Netherlands Antilles and Other Tax Haven Countries: Hearings Before
a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov't Operations, H.R., 98th Cong. 3 (1983) (statement of William J.
Anderson, Director, General Government Division, General Accounting Office, describing mail watch):
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727. 730 31 (1980) (describing briefcase incident).
147 STOPFORD & TURNER, supra note 92. at 198 ("The 1947 Exchange Control Act put the Treasury
firmly in the driving seat as far as control of outward investment was concerned.").
1
48Paola Bongini, The EU Experience in Financial Service Liberalization: A Alfodelfor GATS
Negotiations?, VIENNA SUERF -THE EUROPEAN MONEY AND FINANCE FORUM 18 (2003), available at
www.suerf.org/download/studies/study20032.pdf (last accessed Oct. 2, 2011).
149 Vivien A. Schmidt, The Untold Story: The Impact of European Integration on France in the
Mitterrand Era (1981 1997), 3 (1997) (unpublished manuscript prepared for delivery at the European
Community Studies Association Fifth Biennial International Conference, 1997), available at
http://aei.pitt.edu/2720 (last accessed Oct. 2. 2011).
150 See Christians, supra note 12, at 22 ("Governments might view the costs and benefits of their
treaty obligations differently for different countries, over time.").
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Tax efforts sometimes conflicted with other economic interests.' 15 Important financial
industry interests in both the United States and the United Kingdom sought to improve
the competitive positions of the New York and London financial centers. 15 2 In the United
States, the widespread use of Antillean finance subsidiaries by American businesses
during the 1960s both cut borrowing costs for the U.S. companies and served American
interests by easing the capital shortages produced by Lyndon Johnson's spending
programs in support of his domestic agenda and the escalation of the Viet Nam War.
153
In addition, serious missteps by the IRS in the course of tax evasion investigations and
the politicization of tax investigations by the Nixon administration in the United States
led to legal restrictions on the IRS that reduced its ability to investigate international
financial affairs and reduced its credibility. 154 In Britain, decolonization raised concerns
that British taxpayers were going to be saddled with financial responsibilities for overseas
territories, bringing the Foreign and Colonial Office into policy debates on the side of
encouraging, rather than restricting, British dependent territories to develop low tax and
zero tax regimes to attract business. 155 So powerful were these pressures that the Foreign
and Colonial Office (FCO) was able to insist that British Labour Party Prime Minister
Harold Wilson complain to Australian Liberal Party Prime Minister Geogh Whitlam in a
1974 exchange of letters about Australia's restrictions of communications with the New
Hebrides as part of Australia's efforts to combat the use of New Hebridean entities to
reduce Australian taxpayers' tax bills. 15 6 Moreover, the lack of "natural recourse for
151 See, e.g., STOPORD & TURNER, supra note 92. at 242 (describing how balance of payments
concerns limited the UK's ability to "get tough" with London-based Greek shipping interests over taxes).
152 HELLEINER. supra note 41.
151 See STUART W. ROBINSON. JR., MULTINATIONAL BANKING: A STUDY OF CERTAIN LEGAL AND
FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE POST-WAR OPERATING OF THE UNITED STATES BRANCH BANKS IN WESTERN EUROPE
278 (1972).
154 Illegal Narcotics Profits: Hearings before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, S., 96th Cong. 23 (1979) (Testimony of Irvin B. Nathan. Deputy Assistant
Att'y Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. DOJ) (stating that the Tax Reform Act of 1976 "minimized, if not eliminated,
[the IRS's] role in nontax law enforcement and devotes itself almost exclusively to the voluntary tax
collection system"). Not surprisingly, some members of Congress denied knowing about the provisions in
the law that restricted the IRS's collection efforts. Id. at 84 (Senator Cohen noting that "I suspect everyone
on this committee, most of the Senate and surely most of the House of Representatives, voted for the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, most of whom, myself included, being unaware of the provision dealing with this
particular measure [cooperation across agencies] because of the nature in which tax reform bills are enacted
on Capitol Hill.").
155 For example, in the debate over the Australian response to the New Hebrides' tax haven
activities, the FCO noted in an internal memorandum that: "Whatever the merits of Mr Whitlam's argument
that most of the benefits of the tax haven activities go to people escaping tax and those assisting them to do
so, and not the New Hebrides or its residents, it must be borne in mind that the trust companies established in
the New Hebrides have contributed well over $A1 million to British National Service revenue in four years.
There have been other tangible but unquantifiable benefits. e.g. activities by investment companies in the
development of meat production. A territory's resort to an offshore finance industry reflects the lack of any
alternative scope for economic development to improve its own prosperity. Experience has shown that in the
absence of natural resources a well-managed finance industry can work a dramatic and very beneficial
change on the economy of a small and undeveloped territory." New Hebrides "Tax Haven" 4,
correspondence between Australian and British officials (Aug. 21, 1974) (on file with the British National
Archives, File PREM 16/8).
156 Letter from Harold Wilson to Gough Whitlam (Aug. 30, 1974) (on file at the British National
Archives, File PREM 16/8). In a memo a few days earlier, Pacific Dependent Territories Department of the
Foreign and Colonial Office noted: "On the one hand neither this nor any previous United Kingdom
government has actively encouraged the growth of an offshore finance centre in a British dependent territory,
and the initiative for the relevant legislation comes from the territories themselves. On the other hand, no UK
Government has ever taken direct action against an established finance industry in a dependent territory, and
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governments ... against arbitrage" meant that there were no simple barriers to tax
competition available.15 Thus from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s, in both Britain and
the United States the interests which would have sought to restrict legal arbitrage and
rewrite tax policies to reduce taxpayers' abilities to use international structures to lower
their taxes legally or illegally were operating at a disadvantage.'58 By the end of the
1970s, however, U.S. tax authorities were beginning to regain policy ground on
international transactions, as we describe below.
Although the role of the OECD in international tax issues during the 1970s was
primarily as a respected source of technical competence able to aid in the resolution of
difficult problems caused by differences in national tax regimes, interest in using the
organization to address tax competition began to appear. For example, in the internal
debate over Britain's response to Australia's measures against the New Hebrides
financial center, one summary FCO memo noted that there were "legitimate grounds for
concern" by Australia, and it suggested that Britain tell the Australians to focus their
efforts on the OECD working party on tax to create a means to address the problem that
avoided the limitations of the British constitutional structure and Britain's obligation to
promote its territories' economic development. 9 In general, however, by offering
frameworks for resolving disputes over the details of taxation, the OECD avoided
infringing on national sovereignty while reducing the transactions costs of states reaching
agreements on how to handle differences in taxation. However, it did build such a
presence in international tax law that "it has created debate about whether its guidance
should be considered effectively binding on states, even if it is not technically law. 160
The OECD thus evolved over time into a resource with considerably higher value than it
had simply as a reservoir of technical expertise.
it would certainly be inequitable for HMG now to discriminate by insisting on the scrapping of one territory's
advantageous legislation while continuing to tolerate similar legislation in other territories." See New
Hebrides "Tax Haven", supra note 155, at 3.. That a socialist British prime minister was defending a low tax
jurisdiction against a (at least nominally) market-oriented Australian prime minister indicates the degree to
which the British establishment saw the importance of encouraging development in the overseas territories
even at the expense of tax collections by allies. Britain was similarly unconcerned about the impact of its
Caribbean possessions' tax policies on American tax collections.
117 Christians, supra note 12, at 10.
158 See, e.g., Improper Use of Foreign Addresses to Evade U.S. Taxes: Hearing Before a Subcomm.
of the Comm. on Gov't Operations, H.R., 97th Cong. (1982) (statement of Alan W. Granwell, International
Tax Counsel) (describing "real purpose" of tax treaties as "to reduce the foreign taxes which U.S. businesses
pay abroad").
"9 Letter from P.J. Weston (Aug. 23, 1974) (on file with the British National Archives, File PREM
16/8). The letter noted: "The UK is represented on working parties in both the EEC and the OECD which
have been set up to combat the growing tax avoidance industry and the use of tax havens. Australia is in fact
also a member of the OECD working party. (The problem of tax havens also arises in connection with the
examination of the impact of multi-national companies which is being carried out under the auspices of the
United Nations ECOSOC.) We are, moreover, often under pressure from other countries to do what we can to
put down the tax havens which have grown up in our dependencies and ex-dependencies in the Caribbean
and in the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. While we are obliged to explain that our powers to intervene
are limited either by the constitutional independence of the territories concerned or the practical difficulty of
acting against what seem to the inhabitants of such territories to be their interests, we are also bound to do
what we can by way of international cooperation to find ways of minimizing the damage they do." Id. at 2.
It further noted that this response "has the concurrence at official level of the Treasury and the Board of
Inland Revenue." Id. at 3.
160 Christians, supra note 12, at 48.
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IV. THE INTERNATIONAL FIGHT AGASINT TAX COMPETITION
The international political climate grew increasingly hostile towards the
facilitators of tax avoidance and evasion. The OECD has been working on containing tax
competition from "tax havens" since at least the early 1970s.161 In the early 1980s, the
OECD embarked on an effort to influence national tax policies, including the policies of
non-member states, on substantive matters including tax rates and the exchange of
information in an effort to protect member states from competitive pressures.
A. Changing the Agenda
By the early 1980s, a number of important financial and political changes altered
the competitive picture for the developed economies. Private entities and individuals
were using increasingly sophisticated financial transactions to challenge states' ability to
continue to extract revenue from economic activities as it became increasingly clear that
a result of tax treaties was to facilitate "double non-taxation." 162 In particular, by the late
1970s and early 1980s the world's growing numbers of "tax havens" were evolving from
places where shady characters delivered suitcases of cash for concealment into
jurisdictions offering increasingly sophisticated financial, accounting, and legal services.
For example, the Cayman Islands' initial success was in attracting banking business from
the Bahamas after the post-independence Pindling government demanded
"Bahamianization" of the financial services sector workforce.163 By the early 1980s, the
islands had expanded into offering a location for captive insurance companies, including
the Harvard medical entities' first offshore captive.1 64 Law firms in the Cayman Islands
were staffed by counsel with Oxbridge degrees and significant experience in London's
financial industry. 61 Just a short flight from New York, with no capital controls, and
with excellent communications infrastructure (built deliberately to foster the finance
industry), 166 the growth of a sophisticated financial industry in the Cayman Islands and
elsewhere in the Caribbean and Bermuda made offshore transactions available to a much
broader swath of American businesses and individuals. Similarly, the growth of
European offshore financial centers in Switzerland, Liechtenstein, the Channel Islands,
and the Isle of Man also brought sophisticated financial transactions within the reach of
more European businesses and individuals. Even countries like the Netherlands-not
normally referred to as an "offshore jurisdiction"-began to expand the opportunities
161 See, e.g., Letter from P.J. Weston (Aug. 23, 1974) (on file with the British National Archives,
File PREM 16/8) (noting that "[t]he UK is represented on working parties in both the EEC and the OECD
which have been set up to combat the growing tax avoidance industry and the use of tax havens").
162 See RIXEN, supra note 3, at 13. As the right to tax is divided between the residence and source
country of income, the residence country is no longer allowing merely for a tax credit or deduction. The tax
imposed on its residence business or individual does no longer depend on the tax imposed by the source
country. To attract capital and economic activity, countries therefore have an incentive to lower the tax rate
to attract more investments. If, according to a tax treaty, a certain stream of income is to be only taxed at
source, a zero tax rate in the source country means that no tax is paid to any jurisdiction. Id.
163 Letter from T. Russel to D.F.S. Le Breton 1-2, Commissioner in Anguilla (May 21, 1975) (on
file with the British National Archives, File FCO 44/1181) (recounting that after threats to offshore sector,
Bahamas "rapidly lost a great deal of off-shore business and the big bank operations normally have branches
in several tax havens so that at the least whiff of trouble in the wind they can transfer business to another
haven that seems more settled"): CRATON, PINDLING. supra note 104. at 161 ("Many companies transferred
all or part of their operations to what were seen as more favorable locations, bringing the first surge of
prosperity to the Cayman Islands and reinforcing the longer-established financial industry of Bermuda.").
164 See Morriss, supra note 134.
165 Morriss, supra note 40.
166 id.
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they offered outsiders to reduce taxes and "Dutch sandwich" entered the tax-planning
lexicon.16 As a result, the large developed economies found themselves in a position
similar to that of the rest of the world's economies: having to compete for investment.
Behaving as monopolists traditionally do when forced into a more competitive
marketplace, these states sought to erect barriers to such competition.
In the United States, concern over the impact of international financial
structuring on tax laws came to the fore in the early 1980s. In 1981, the IRS issued a
report by its general counsel, Richard A. Gordon,16 entitled Tax Havens and Their Use
by U.S. Taxpayers (which became known as the "Gordon Report"), focusing official
attention on revenue losses while conceding that another state's choice of tax rates
(including zero rates for specific transactions) was "a legitimate policy decision. 16 9 The
Gordon Report explicitly called for coordinated action against tax havens. 70
Demonstrating that the issue had caught official attention, the United States canceled the
relatively unimportant tax treaty with the British Virgin Islands in 198211 and the much
more significant tax treaty with the Netherlands Antilles in 1987.172 In 1982, Congress
granted the IRS the power to order a taxpayer or the holder of the taxpayer's records to
produce any books and records that are relevant to the taxpayer's return, 171 and U.S.
corporations were required to have books and records of their foreign corporations ready
for IRS examination. 174 In 1983, the Reagan administration launched its Caribbean Basin
Initiative, which subsidized American business conventions in Caribbean jurisdictions
agreeing to information exchanges with the United States to aid in U.S. tax
enforcement. 175 The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 also abolished the withholding tax on
interest paid to foreign corporations and nonresident aliens, marking the end of the
167 See Jesse Drucker, Google has made $11.1 billion overseas since 2007. It paidjust 2.4% in
taxes. And that's legal., BLOOMBERG Bus. WEEK, Oct. 25, 2010, at 43.
168 Richard A. Gordon must be distinguished from Richard K. Gordon, an American law professor
and former IMF staff member, who writes on offshore issues as well.
169 RICHARD A. GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE BY UNITED STATES TAXPAYERS: AN
OVERVIEW. REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, THE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL (TAX
DIVISION) AND THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY (TAX POLICY) 4 (1981).
170 Id. at 10. ("The United States alone cannot deal with tax havens. The policy must be an
international one by the countries that are not tax havens to isolate the abusive tax havens. The United States
should take the lead in encouraging tax havens to provide information to enable other countries to enforce
their laws.").
171 See Boise & Morriss, supra note 40. at 419 20. One reason for the cancellation was that the
growth in payments from the United States to the British Virgin Islands was increasing beyond the size
expected for a jurisdiction with British Virgin Islands' population. According to the Gordon Report, the total
payments from the British Virgin Islands to people who officially were residents, for instance, had increased
from one million to eight million between 1975 and 1978. Meanwhile the number of British Virgin Islands
firms in which United States citizens had interest increased between 1970 and 1979 from 53 to 678. GORDON
supra note 169, at 149 50.
172 See Boise & Morriss, supra note 40. at 423 25. During a congressional hearing discussing the
Antilles tax treaty. Rep. Benjamin Rosenthal (D.-N.Y.). chair of the subcommittee holding the hearing, asked
a government witness, "But you will not lose sight of the fact that you work for the U.S. Government rather
than the Dutch Government?" after the witness enumerated reasons why changing the treaty would be
difficult. Improper Use of Foreign Addresses to Evade US. Taxes: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the
Comm. on Gov 't Operations H.R., 97th Cong. 42 (1982).
173 Gregory P. Crinion. Information Gathering on Tax Evasion in Tax Havens Countries, 20 INT'L
LAW. 1209, 1215 (1986).
174 The exception was for third parties with interest in the record that would object to the disclosure.
Crinion. supra note 173, at 1219.
175 Barbados, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic entered that agreement with the United
States in 1984. Crinion, supra note 173, at 1236.
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"Antilles Window" through which a reduced withholding tax treatment could be obtained
through the use of Netherlands Antilles entities.1 6 That same year saw an amendment to
the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970177 requiring that banks and other financial institutions
report to the IRS any deposit or withdrawal of currency in excess of $10,000 and
requiring that anyone traveling into the United States carrying over $5,000 report it to the
Customs Service. 178 The penalty for failing to report these transactions was raised from
$1,000 to $50,000, and the maximum jail sentence was raised from one to five years.
179
Subsequently, the 1985 Money Laundering Act amended the post-Nixon 1978 Right to
Financial Privacy Act to expand extraterritorial application of American laws in pursuit
of drug money. i0 Despite all these measures, the IRS continued to estimate losses due to
tax evasion to offshore jurisdictions in 1985 to be several billion dollars,' and in 1985,
the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations concluded an investigation of
money laundering and came out with recommendations to Congress and the
Administration to impose sanctions on non-cooperative tax havens.82
Several key European states were also forced to confront the constraints of the
more globalized financial economy during the early 1980s. In France, the election of
Socialist President Francois Mitterrand brought an initial sharp left turn in economic
policy. 183 Soon after taking office, Mitterrand nationalized twelve major industrial
groups and forty-one financial institutions.'84 The economic pressures created by these
actions together with the remainder of the government's "social growth" agenda slowed
economic growth and increased unemployment.1 15 Exchange rate pressures forced two
devaluations of the franc within the European Monetary System (EMS) of pegged
176 See S. Cass Weiland, Congress and the Transnational Crime Problem, 20 INT'L LAW. 1025,
1037 (1986); Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369 § 127(a), 98 Stat. 494, 648-50 ("Repeal of
the 30 Percent Tax on Interest Received by Foreigners on Certain Portfolio Investments").
177See The Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions Act of
1970, 31 U.S.C. 5311 et. seq, available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section8-1.pdf. See
also Weiland, supra note 176, at 1039.
178 See, H.R.J. Res. 648, 98th Cong. 2d Sess., § 901(g) (1984).
179 Weiland, supra note 176, at 1039-40.
180 Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18.
.8 Crinion. supra note 173, at 1211.
112 The report focused on the offshore banks problem. and was released the day after a record fine
of $2.25 million had been announced for Crocker National Bank of San Francisco for unreported currency
transactions. Chairman Sen. William V. Roth Jr. (D.-Del.) stated, "It's time to get though with the tax havens
that insist on playing Pontius Pilate while the drug pushers and other criminals exploit their banking systems
to the detriment of our citizens." See Jerry Estill, Senate Panel Urges Crackdown on Bank Reporting, The
MIAMI NEWS, August 28, 1985, at 9A, available at http:/ news.google.com/
newspapers?id=uKAmAAAAIBAJ&pg=4502,3372564 (last accessed Oct. 11, 2012); Cheryl Arvidson, Fed
Called Lax in Fight on Money Laundering, The MIAMI NEWS. August 28. 1985. at 3A; Douglas Jehl. Panel
Urges Tough Sanctions Against Foreign Tax Havens, Los ANGELES TIMES, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/1985-08-29/news/mn-23687 1 tax-havens (last accessed Oct. 11. 2012). There is
some irony in Roth's position, given that he later co-wrote a book attacking the IRS. See WILLIAM V. ROTH,
JR. & WILLIAM H. NIXON, THE POWER TO DESTROY: HOW THE IRS BECAME AMERICA'S MOST POWERFUL
AGENCY, How CONGRESS IS TAKING CONTROL, AND WHAT YOU CAN DO TO PROTECT YOURSELF UNDER THE
NEW LAW (1999).
183 David R. Cameron, Exchange Rate Politics in France 1981 1983: The Regime-Defining
Choices of the Mitterrand Presidency, in THE MITTERRAND ERA: POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND POLITICAL
MOBILIZATION IN FRANCE 56, 56 (Anthony Daley & Melanie Nolan eds., 1996).
114 Henrik Uterwedde, Mitterrand's Economic and Social Policy in Perspective, in THE
MITTERRAND YEARS 133, 134 35 (Maclean ed.. 1998); Serge Halimi, Less Exceptionalism than Meets the
Eye, in THE MITTERRAND ERA, supra note 183, at 83.
185 See Uterwedde, supra note 184, at 135.
2012]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW
exchange rates through 1982. I"6 Amid speculation that France would be forced out of the
EMS entirely,"' Mitterrand devalued the franc a third time in 1983 and then initiated his
"U-turn" in macroeconomic policies. By 1986, Mitterrand was arguing that "[o]ur great
priority is inflation" and was seeking to reduce the public deficit despite high
unemployment, a startling change for a French Socialist.' The U-turn also affected
banking, and France's 1984 Banking Act produced a revolution in French banking.
1 8 9
Credit controls were first relaxed in 1985 and then completely eliminated in 1987.19' The
right-wing Rally for the Republic government that took office in 1986 continued these
monetary and macroeconomic policies, accentuating deregulation, and initiated a massive
privatization program. 191 The French left drew an important lesson relevant to our
analysis from experience of the U-turn: they realized that single-country financial
controls were unworkable within a global financial system.1 92 This pushed them toward
multilateral solutions to financial problems.
193
At the same time, Germany was struggling with an outflow of capital to the
United States, where the combination of pro-growth policies under the Reagan
administration and the abolition of the U.S. withholding tax on securities in 1984 had
boosted demand for capital. 194 Germany was one of the toughest adversaries for tax
havens in continental Europe in the 1980s, when it passed laws to quell the flight of
capital from Germany; much of this capital was flowing into European offshore centers,
Switzerland, and Luxembourg. 195 The Germans were also seeking to go beyond single
country measures and were focused on finding multilateral solutions. 
196
Moreover, the deregulation of financial markets in Europe created opportunities
for countries to attract capital using business-friendly tax and other laws. In the 1980s
and 1990s, there was a surge in so-called preferential tax regimes ("PTR") in the old EU
countries, as a form of targeted tax competition. '9 By the beginning of the 1990s,
surging global economic integration had economists arguing that the future of capital
186 Soon after his inauguration, despite heavy speculation about a devaluation of the franc and rapid
capital flight in May, President Mitterrand chose to defend the value of the franc and not to devalue it at that
point, but went through with it later that year nevertheless. Cameron, supra note 183, at 59-61. The
adjustments negotiated with the ERM were smaller than what the French politicians wanted and were
attached to contractionary fiscal and monetary policy. Id. at 58 59.
117 Vivien A. Schmidt, An End of French Exceptionalism? The Transformation of Business under
Mitterrand, in THE MITTERRAND ERA. supra note 183, at 117. 134 35; Cameron, supra note 183. at 57.
"8 Halimi, supra note 184. at 90. The reforms also came about partly because the government
wanted to see Paris as a financial center to compete with London. See JONATHAN STORY & INGO WALTER,
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE 200 (1997).
189 STORY & WALTER, supra note 188, at 197.
190 Michel Boutillier & Jean Cordier, A Look at the Way the French Financial System has Adapted
to the New Monetary Policy Regime, in ECONOMIC MODELLING AT THE BANQUE DE FRANCE: FINANCIAL
DEREGULATION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN FRANCE 178, 180 (Michel Boutillier & Jean Cordier eds.,
1996).
'' Uterwedde. supra note 184, at 136.
192 Rawi Abdelali, CAPITAL RULES: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL FINANCE 57-65 (2007).
193 Id. at 7 1.
194 STORY & WALTER, supra note 188, at 177.
195 See RONEN PALAN, RICHARD MURPHY & CHRISTIAN CHAVAGNEUX, TAX HAVENS: How
GLOBALIZATION REALLY WORKS 200 (2010).
196 Ironically, having abolished their withholding tax in 1984 to compete with the United States,
Germany reintroduced the tax in 1989 as part of negotiations with the EU to harmonize tax on capital. The
result was an increase in capital outflow from Germany. STORY & WALTER, supra note 188. at 178.
1
97Achim Kammerling & Eric Seils, The Regulation of Redistribution: Managing Conflict in
Corporate Tax Competition, 32 W. EUR. POL. 756, 761 (2009).
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taxation was bleak:'98 globalization and the mobility of capital would cause investments
to flow to wherever taxation was the lowest,199 distorting investment decisions z.2 " A
decline in revenues from corporate income taxes as a share of GDP in the OECD
countries as a result of the worldwide economic downturn in the beginning of the 1990s
gave support to these fears. As the economies recovered towards the middle of the
decade, the trend reversed and corporate tax revenues rose to record levels. 20 The Asian
crisis in 1997 may have further triggered the demand for more transparency in the belief
that tax havens were causing financial instability. 2 Other changes in the international
economic climate, such as the end of the cold war, European integration and surging
e-commerce also contributed to the demand by policy makers for more control over
capital flows.
2 3
In Europe, countries were struggling with these issues within the broader context
of the European Union's general moves towards greater financial integration in the 1980s
and 1990s.2 0 4 While willing to free financial markets from a degree of national controls
in pursuit of the wider single market, z"5 the EU's goal was a broader market, not a less
regulated or less taxed one. As a result, many EU members sought to create substitute
regulatory and tax measures at the EU level or coordinated national measures to replace
those reduced at the national level. 06 Similarly, to safeguard domestic tax collections,
France and Italy insisted that the EU combine liberalization with measures to align fiscal
regimes and increase information transmission between the EU members' financial
'98 Webb, supra note 96. at 795.
199 See generally OECD, TAXING PROFITS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
ISSUES (1991) (expressing the OECD's view that taxing corporations without distorting investments was
becoming increasingly harder).
200 See VITO TANZI, TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD 119 (1995) (stressing that greater
inefficiencies will result from investments conducted as a result of taxation, and predicting that efforts
towards tax harmonization will not be politically successful).20 Kenneth G. Stewart & Michael C. Webb, Capital Taxation, Globalization, and International Tax
Competition (Univ. of Victoria Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. EWP0301, 2003). Figure 2 in the
appendix illustrates corporate income tax revenue as a share of GPD in the OECD and in Europe
respectively. Rather than comparing countries by their statutory income tax rates or marginal effective tax
rates, Webb and Stewart focus on the corporate income taxes actually paid. Id. at 6.
202 Robert T. Kudrle & Lorraine Eden, The Campaign Against Tax Havens: Will it Last? Will it
Work?, 37 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 37, 50-51 (2003).203 Id. at 5 1.
204 See, e.g., Ray Barrell & Nigel Pain, Foreign Direct Investment, Technological Change, and
Economic Growth within Europe, 107 ECON. J. 1770, 1771 (1997). The European Commission had issued a
communiqu6 in 1974 addressing the problem with tax avoidance and evasion. It was followed in 1975 by a
Council resolution recommending member states to exchange information in the cases where money is
channeled through a third country for tax purposes. See Craig M. Boise. Regulating Tax Competition in
Offshore Financial Centers in OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS AND REGULATORY COMPETITION 50, 56
(Andrew P. Morriss ed., 2010). A European Commission May 1986 proposal for a European financial area
sought a gradual end to capital controls as a step toward establishing the internal market. STORY & WALTER,
supra note 188, at 254.
205 The EU directive of 1988 confirmed the principles of"complete, unconditional and free
movement of capital" and non-discrimination by nationality. STORY & WALTER, supra note 188, at 256.
206 Id. at 254 255. For example. the mutual funds directive of 1985 promoted the liberalization of
capital movements in the EU. Luxembourg now became attractive for fund management. France and the
Commission reacted by promoting a fifteen percent withholding tax across the EU, while Germany imposed
its own such tax often percent. This resulted in deutsche marks flooding into Luxemburg until the policy
was repealed in 1989. Id. at 258.
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institutions and tax authorities.2"7 In particular, despite resistance from some members
and only weal backing from others, France persuaded the European Commission to
propose in 1989 that withholding and corporate taxes be aligned.2"8
By the mid-1980s, it was thus apparent that there had been a significant shift in
the domestic views within a number of developed economies on the utility of offshore
financial centers. In both Europe and the United States, liberalization of finance had
exposed governments to competition that they did not like from offshore jurisdictions and
from each other. Increasingly, tax authorities saw the offshore jurisdictions as facilitating
both tax avoidance and tax evasion despite the general lack of information about the
transactions using offshore jurisdictions.2 9 Law enforcement authorities worried that the
impenetrability of offshore entities would conceal criminal activities."'
As both European governments and the United States were committed to further
financial liberalization internationally, both were beginning to search for ways to insulate
themselves from this competition. In particular, the Gordon Report helped push the
OECD to work on the matter by making clear the inability of a single jurisdiction to
address the problem effectively.211 In response, the OECD produced two 1987 reports on
the issues, Tax Havens. Measures to Prevent Abuse by Taxpayers and Taxation and the
Abuse of Bank Secrecy.212 In the former, the OECD spelled out a contorted definition of
tax havens that excluded its own members, even while acknowledging the reality that
"any country might be a tax haven to a certain extent.' 2 13 In addition to discussing
possible remedies that may be adopted by state authorities against tax evasion and
avoidance, Measures to Prevent Abuse by Taxpayers also argued that Model Convention
Article 26 was insufficient to force jurisdictions to share the information necessary to
prevent tax evasion. Noting that there were few multilateral agreements, Measures to
Prevent Abuse suggested that "[p]ooling and sharing of relevant information at an
international level . . . could constitute a new form of co-operation .. .""' These initial
steps staked out a position for the OECD that aligned with its member states' interests. It
207 See id at 255. Also in 1989, the issue of tax neutrality was brought up again as the then-
Commissioner Christiane Scrivener proposed policies aimed to achieve neutrality in direct taxation as a
"natural" part of the single market. See Claudio M. Radaelli, Harmful Tax Competition in the EU. Policy
Narratives and Advocacy Coalitions, 37 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 661, 667 (1999).
208 STORY& WALTER. supra note 188, at 255-56.
209 See, e.g., Tax Evasion through the Netherlands Antilles and Other Tax Haven Countries:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov't Operations, H.R., 98 Cong. 1 (1983) (opening statement
of Subcommittee Chairman Douglas Barnard) ("Offshore tax evasion schemes-which appear to have
reached epidemic proportions-result in the loss to our Treasury of hundreds of millions and very likely
billions of dollars annually. They also threaten the integrity of our tax system, increase the tax burden on the
vast majority of hard-pressed Americans who are honest taxpayers, and even undermine the Nation's efforts
to get at the profits of organized crimes, drug trafficking. and other criminal activities.").
210 See, e.g., Tax Evasion through the Netherlands Antilles and Other Tax Haven Countries:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Govt Operations, H.R.. 98 Cong. 97 (1983) (statement of
Robert Edwards, Deputy Comm'r, Florida Dep't of Law Enforcement) (claiming "widespread" money
laundering in Netherlands Antilles).
211 Interview 5 with OECD personnel, supra note 100.
212 OECD, Tax Havens: Measures to Prevent Abuse by Taxpayers, in INTERNATIONAL TAX
AVOIDANCE AND EVASION: FOUR RELATED STUDIES 19 (1987); OECD. Taxation and the Abuse of Bank
Secrecy in INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION: FOUR RELATED STUDIES 107 (1987).
213 OECD, Tax Havens: Measures to Prevent Abuse by Taxpayers. supra note 212, at 21.
214 See OECD, Tax Havens: Measures to Prevent Abuse by Taxpayers, supra note 212, at 48. The
report concludes with suggestions to tax authorities in matters of information sharing, but with no suggestion
for any multilateral cooperation for information exchange. Id. at 47-48.
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had articulated an intellectual argument, albeit a weak one, that its members' competition
for assets through tax competition was conceptually different from the behavior of its
members' competitors. Further, it had set forth an agenda for reforms, focusing on
enhancing information sharing.
B. Policy Entrepreneurship and Cartelization
With staff within the OECD having identified tax competition as an issue that the
organization could address, the next step was building support for OECD work within
member governments.215 Aside from Switzerland, Luxembourg, and Liechtenstein,
Continental European governments were already sympathetic to the need to reign in tax
competition; the stumbling blocks were the United States and United Kingdom. With the
arrival of the Clinton administration in January 1993 and the Blair government in May
2161997, tax authorities gained powerful allies in seeking to restrict offshore activities.
With the U.S. and U.K. changing sides during the decade, a more favorable
climate for promoting substantive tax coordination was developing. Under the leadership
of Jeffrey Owens, the OECD Project on Fiscal Degradation was launched in 1994, with a
mandate 217 to scrutinize the economies of Europe for signs of "degradation.,, 218  The
215 Interview 5 with OECD personnel, supra note 100.
216 In his first State of the Union address, President Clinton proclaimed: "Our plan attacks tax
subsidies that reward companies that ship jobs overseas. And we will ensure that, through effective tax
enforcement, foreign corporations who make money in America pay the taxes they owe to America."
President William Clinton, State of The Union Address (Feb. 17. 1993) (transcript available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/states/docs/sou93.htm). Regulations by the Clinton
administration concerning the disclosure of transfer pricing saw a reduction of the $10 million threshold for
misstatement subject to a 20% penalty to $5 million. Richard G. Minor. Tax Conferences: Euromoney
Conference Focuses on EC Tax Policy, Eastern Europe, and Transfer Pricing Developments, 6 TAX NOTES
INT'L MAGAZINE 1548, 1550 (1993). Lawrence Summers, appointed Deputy Secretary of the Treasury in
1995 and Secretary of the Treasury in 1999, also was a strong supporter of the OECD's project against
"harmful tax competition." See, e.g., Lawrence Summers. Tax Administration in a Global Era, Remarks to
the 34th General Assembly of the Inter-American Center of Tax Administrators (Washington, D.C., July 10,
2000). Summers argued in the speech that the first steps in ensuring that the administration can realize their
policy objectives without risking eroding the tax base are the OECD's work and the administration's own
unilateral initiatives. See also J. C. SHARMAN, HAVENS IN A STORM: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL TAX
REGULATION 36 (2006) (providing interview material that it was under Summers as Secretary that the U.S.
Treasury was the most supportive for the OECD project against harmful tax competition). Similarly, in the
UK. the Labour government elected in 1997 made clear in their election manifesto that they would take a
hard stance towards tax avoidance "since we owe it to the tax payer." announcing this under the headline
"Fraud." The Labour Party Manifesto 1997, Aew Labour because Britain deserves better: Britain will be
better with new Labour, available at http://www.labour-party.org.uklmanifestos/1997/1997-labour-
manifesto.shtml (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). The Tories did not mention cracking down on evasion or
avoidance in their manifesto in 1997. Instead they acknowledged, "[P]rosperity cannot be taken for granted.
We have to compete to win. That means a constant fight to keep tight control over public spending and
enable Britain to remain the lowest taxed major economy in Europe. It means a continuing fight to keep
burdens off business." The Conservative Party General Election Manifesto 1997, You can only be sure with
the Conservatives, available at http://www.conservative-party.net/manifestos/1997/1997-conservative-
manifesto.shtml (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). After a landslide victory in May 1997, Labour Party leader Tony
Blair became Prime Minister and Gordon Brown Chancellor of the Exchequer. Labour's win was largely
seen as inevitable as the Conservative government staggered on during the mid-1990s. TIM BALE, THE
CONSERVATIVE PARTY: FROM THATCHER TO CAMERON 65-66 (2010). Anyone anticipating future British
policy would have foreseen the shift well before 1997.
2 17 See WORKING PARTY NO. 8 ON TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION, OECD. FUTURE WORK
PROGRAMME AND PROPOSED MANDATE 3 (1995) [hereinafter OECD. FUTURE WORK PROGRAMME AND
PROPOSED MANDATE]; WORKING PARTY No. 8 ON TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION, OECD. REPORT ON FISCAL
DEGRADATION 41 (Feb. 6, 1996) [hereinafter OECD, REPORT ON FISCAL DEGRADATION]. These reports give a
mandate to Working Party No. 8 in 1993 to broaden its responsibilities to include fiscal degradation, whereas
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Working Group on Fiscal Degradation was created and met for the first time in
September 1994 with the aim of establishing a "Code of Good Conduct" that would
discourage countries from continuing or creating PTRs.2 1 9 The Group set up criteria for
"acceptable" tax regimes, with proposals to policy makers on how these could be
designed.2" Ultimately, the project was ignored by many OECD members, and in the
end, the OECD Ministerial Council did not endorse the report.221 The CFA decided that
the report would be given wide distribution but would not be officially published,
suggesting that the report could serve as useful input in its work.22 This project thus did
not become the great leap forward in international tax cooperation that the CTPA staff
sought. Apparently, launching such a project at the committee level did not give it
enough status as a project has that is approved on a higher level. Owens would not repeat
this mistake. The next time he would seek support for the project at the ministerial
level 223
After the Code of Good Conduct fizzled out, Owens and his supporters crafted
two measures to restore the initiative to life: a ministerial communiqu6 by the OECD
Council and an endorsement from the Group of 7 (G7). At its ministerial level meeting
of finance ministers and others in 1996, the OECD Secretariat22 4 delivered the Ministerial
Communiqu6, asking the OECD to "analyse and develop measures to counter the
distorting effects of 'harmful tax competition' on investment and financing decisions, and
the consequences for national tax bases, and report back in 1998." 225 As with many
documents issued at this level, the wording was prepared in advance as a draft that the
gathering would sign at the meeting. The meeting at which the text was prepared, which
included top officials of national tax authorities, has been described as "chaotic" with the
delegates screaming at each other, suggesting the absence of a consensus.22 6  Those
opposed called the proposed text "[a] fire that needs to be put out" and claimed that it
contradicted the basic principles of the OECD. 27 A month later, the G7 endorsed the
the mandate for the project on fiscal degradation was issued in 1994. The Working Party's mandate had
previously been updated and broadened in 1984 and 1989 respectively.
218 Interview 5 with OECD personnel. supra note 100.
219 See OECD, REPORT ON FISCAL DEGRADATION. supra note 217, at 42. The aim of the project is
described as to "avoid unfair tax competition for commercial and financial activities and to avoid the spread
of tax regimes which undermine the revenue base and open up new avenues for tax avoidance and evasion."
Id. at 7. A note from Jeffrey Owens describes the aim of the project as to "establish Code of Good Conduct
which would discourage countries from maintaining and adopting preferential tax regimes which undermine
the tax base of their treaty partners." Id. at 42.
220 See OECD, REPORT ON FISCAL DEGRADATION, supra note 217, at 9.
221 See SHARMAN, supra note 216, at 41.
222 See OECD, FUTURE WORK PROGRAMME AND PROPOSED MANDATE, supra note 217, at 3 5.
221 Interview 5 with OECD personnel, supra note 100.
224 Present at the OECD meeting were ministers and other representatives from Germany.
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, the United States, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Norway, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Portugal, the
Czech Republic, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. Also at the meeting were
representatives of the European Commission, World Bank, European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Bank
for International Settlements (BIS), International Monetary Fund (IMF). International Labour Organization
(ILO). and World Trade Organization (WTO). MINISTERIAL COUNCIL, OECD, LIST OF COUNTRIES'
REPRESENTATIVES AND OBSERVERS (1996).
5 MINISTERIAL COUNCIL, OECD, DRAFT COMMUNIQUE (1996) (emphasis added).
226 Interview 5 with OECD personnel, supra note 100.
227 Interview 5 with OECD personnel, supra note 100.
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communique, arguing that "harmful tax competition" distorted trade and investment.228
The G7 further "strongly urge[d] the OECD to vigorously pursue its work in this field,
aimed at establishing a multilateral approach under which countries could operate
individually and collectively to limit the extent of these practices. ' 29 This endorsement
was a result of skillful diplomacy by Owens and his supporters 230 and enhanced the
project's political clout.
2 31
The G7 has a history of influencing the OECD's direction through the
communiques that the group issues after its yearly summits. 2 2 The G7 was particularly
sympathetic to the cause of regulating capital flows. Primarily, it was active in
controlling money laundering through its founding of the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF).233 In addition, the EU regulators were increasingly critical of Ireland for its low
228 OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 7 (1998), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/0/1904176.pdf (last accessed Oct. 11, 2012).
229 id.
230 Interview 5 with OECD personnel, supra note 100.
231 It is important to put the role of the G7 into context to understand the dynamics of the debate.
After gaining inadequate support from OECD to win an endorsement in the Ministerial Council, Owens
wanted to ensure that he had solid support from the onset of the project from another powerful body. He
secured support from the G7, an organization with an almost identical membership but whose agenda and
actions were set by a quite different group of people from the member states: prime ministers and presidents
rather than finance, foreign. and other ministers who were present at the meeting of the OECD Council at
Ministerial Level. The G7 consists of France, Germany, Italy. Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States,
and Canada. It was created as the Group of Six in 1975 before adding Canada to its list in 1976. It would
later form the Group of Eight in 1997 as Russia joined, while still also meeting as the G7. Meetings are at the
level of executive heads of member countries. (The president of the European Commission is present,
although the EU is not formally a member.) They are thus not the same people as those of the OECD
meeting on a ministerial level, but the same countries and the European Commission that attended the 1996
G7 meeting were represented also at the OECD meeting of the Secretariat. It may then come as no surprise
that they would be supporters of the OECD Secretariat agenda. Initially, the relationship between the OECD
Secretariat and the newly formed G7 was stained with rivalry. The OECD Secretary General later wrote,
"The harm done to the OECD by the increasing institutionalization of the Seven has proved even more
serious than I feared at the time. The OECD Secretariat is not present at the G7 meetings and is not even
informed about them: the best way to undermine the power of an international organization." Richard
Eccleston, Peter Carroll & Aynsle Kellow. Handmaiden to the G20? The OECD's evolving role in global
economic governance 4. 5, Presentation at the 2010 Australian Political Studies Association Conference,
available athttp://apsa20lO.com.au/full-papers/pdf/APSA2010O0228.pdf. Although securing an
endorsement from the G7 may not have been necessary to pull the project through once it had a mandate
from the Ministerial Council, it did certainly give more clout to the project. Interview 5 with OECD
personnel, supra note 100.
232 For example, in 1979, they addressed the OECD in connection to the work on oil and energy
consumption following the rise in oil prices. Eccleston, Carroll & Kellow, supra note 231, at 4.
233 FAIF is described on its homepage as "an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the
development and promotion of national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist
financing. The FATF is therefore a 'policy-making body' that works to generate the necessary political will
to bring about legislative and regulatory reforms in these areas." See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE.,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus. In 1989, with the United States as the driving party, the G7
established FATF at its Paris summit. As money laundering was discussed referring to the "war on drugs" of
the United States, the G7 decided to convene "a financial action task force from Summit participants and
other countries interested in these problems. Its mandate is to assess the results of cooperation already
undertaken in order to prevent the utilization of the banking system and financial institutions for the purpose
of money laundering, and to consider additional preventive efforts in this field, including the adaptation of
the legal and regulatory systems so as to enhance multilateral judicial assistance." See generally Amandine
Scherrer. Explaining Compliance with International Commitments to Combat Financial Crime FATF and the
G7, Presentation at the 2006 Convention of the International Studies Association in San Diego, California.
Housed at the OECD headquarters in Paris and concerning its scope of responsibility, it is not hard to confuse
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tax policies.234 EU efforts to force Ireland to abandon its ring-fenced ten percent rate for
international financial operations backfired when Ireland cut its corporate rate generally
to 12.5% in 2004.235 Moreover, Ireland's aggressive marketing of Dublin as an
international financial center threatened further competition within the EU on tax and
regulatory matters.2 36 France was particularly concerned about the kind of low, across-
the-board corporate taxes that Ireland was now offering, and in 1997 it began to actively
call for harmonizing corporate tax rates, but consensus within the EU was blocked by
Belgium, Ireland, and Luxembourg.237 Shifting the discussion to the G7 cut out the
disharmonious voices of lower tax European jurisdictions.
With this fresh mandate, Owens and his colleagues resumed their work on tax
competition issues. Over the next two years, they worked rapidly to prepare a thorough
indictment of low tax jurisdictions, 238 culminating in the 1998 report Harmful Tax
Competition: An Emerging Global Issue.239 The report was a product of skillful political
FATF with an OECD department. As will be seen, they have also adopted similar methods in their pursuit.
On its homepage, FATF does see the need to point out that "[t]he FATF and the OECD are separate
organizations." According to Sharman, FATF also uses OECD business cards and OECD stationary. hardly
alleviating the confusion. See SHARMAN, supra note 216, at 32.
234 See Mark C. White, Assessing the Role of the International Financial Services in Irish Regional
Development, 13 EUR. PLAN. STUD. 387, 392 (2005). Ireland cut taxes dramatically in 1989 in a bid to
alleviate its persistent unemployment. See PAUL SWEENEY, THE CELTIC TIGER: IRELAND'S ECONOMIC
MIRACLE EXPLAINED 173 (1998) (top tax rates cut from 50% in 1988 to 36% in 1996 on companies, and 65%
to 48% on individual income). One of the initiatives was the 1987 creation of the International Financial
Service Center, where firms enjoyed a corporate tax of 10%. See White, supra, at 391. Initially tolerated by
the other EU members because of Ireland's moribund economy, as Irish unemployment rates fell in the 1990s
the IFSC came under increased EU scrutiny. Id., at 392. Having cut its corporate tax rate from 50% in 1988
to 12.5% over time, Ireland's economy was drawing considerable outside investment during the 1990s as
non-European firms looking to expand in Europe established operations there. SWEENEY, supra, at 173 (tax
rates).
235 See Financial Centre of Activity, Bus. & FIN., July 15. 2004, available at http://www.
businessandfinance.ie/index.jsp?p=450&n=466&a=1765 (discussing the end of the 10% ring-fenced regime);
JOHN DEACON, GLOBAL SECURITIZATION AND CDOS 312-14 (2004) (discussing role of Irish tax rates in luring
financial industry to Ireland). See also Government Confident on Tax Rate, IRISH TIMES, Oct. 4, 2011,
available at http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2011/0916/breaking34.html (discussing efforts
to preserve the 12.5% regime).
236The hostility towards Ireland's success has dampened however, as the Irish economy crashed in
the midst of the global financial crisis. After a period of great expansions in the housing sector between 2003
and 2007. the housing bubble burst in 2008. leaving the country in a dire fiscal situation, and with an
unemployment rate of above fourteen percent. See Constantin Gurdgiv, Brian M Lucey, Ciaran
MacAnBhaird & Lorcan Roche-Kelly, The Irish Economy: Three Strikes and You're Out? (March 2, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1776190 (last visited Oct. 5, 2011); Output,
prices and jobs, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2011, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21533447 (last
visited Oct. 25, 2011).
237 The EU had formed a tax policy group. composed of EU ministers of finance and their
representatives, where much attention was paid to issues of "unfair" tax practices. See COMM'N OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. TAXATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: REPORT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAX
SYSTEMS (1996), for the recommendation of the Commission of the European Communities of the formation
of the policy group. Its work illustrated the diversity of opinion among member states, with Ireland and
Belgium offering lower corporate taxation, and Luxembourg attracting savings. Claudio M. Radaelli,
Harmful Tax Competition in the EU. Policy Narratives and Advocacy Coalitions, 37 J. COMMON MARKET
STUD. 661, 672 73 (1999). The European Council on Economic Policy called for enhanced policy
coordination in the Eurozone, including "the discouragement of harmful tax competition." Id. at 675.
Germany. which had much to gain from tax coordination, put a lot of political capital into the EU policy
group. Id. at 673.
238 Interview 5 with OECD personnel, supra note 100.
239 See generally OECD, supra note 228.
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maneuvering. 240 One strategy was to keep the Business and Industry Advisory
Committee to the OECD (BIAC) out of the discussion, to eliminate an
anti-harmonization voice in the debates.241 The report again attempted to define the
"problem of harmful tax competition" so as not to limit the major industrialized
economies while promoting an international consensus around its definition. 242 In
general, the 1998 report marked a distinct shift away from the past practice of articulating
problems and recommending general solutions to pursuing a coordinated and active effort
to counteract tax avoidance and evasion, to reduce financial privacy, and to influence
states to end "unfair" tax competition.
The report changed the debate over tax competition. The anti-tax competition
argument had a serious problem since the low-tax states could make a legitimate claim to
autonomy in designing their tax regimes that was at least as strong as the developed
countries' claim to set their own rates. As Kaemer points out, identifying tax competition
as "harmful" was politically creative, as there is no such economic definition of tax
competition.243 It was therefore necessary to delegitimize the low-tax jurisdictions'
policy choices through the creation of a "standard" that they failed to meet.244 The OECD
240 Interview 5 with OECD personnel, supra note 100. See Christians, supra note 5, at 119-22
(discussing careful choice of language in OECD tax competition discussions).
241 The BIAC had been continuously involved in much of the earlier OECD work on taxation but
had no role in the 1998 report. See Webb. supra note 96, at 811 12; SHARMAN, supra note 216. at 41.
242 OECD, supra note 228. at 23, 27. "Tax Havens" are identified by the criteria: (a) "No or only
nominal taxes"; (b) "Lack of effective exchange of information": (c) "Lack of transparency": and (d) "No
substantial activities," where "[t]he absence of a requirement that the activity be substantial is important since
it would suggest that a jurisdiction may be attempting to attract investment or transactions that are purely tax
driven."
"Harmful tax regimes" are defined by the criteria: (a) "No or low effective tax rates"; (b) "'Ring
fencing' of regimes." which "may take a number of forms, including a regime may explicitly or implicitly
exclude resident taxpayers from taking advantage of its benefits, [or] enterprises which benefit from the
regime may be explicitly or implicitly prohibited from operating in the domestic market"; (c) "Lack of
transparency"; and (d) "Lack of effective exchange of information."
To estimate a regime's "potential harmfulness," three questions are laid out in the report: (1) "Does
the tax regime shift activity from one country to the country providing the preferential tax regime. rather than
generate significant new activity?". (2) "Is the presence and level of activities in the host country
commensurate with the amount of investment or income?"; and (3) "Is the preferential tax regime the primary
motivation for the location of an activity?"
The difference between a tax haven and a harmful preferential tax regime is thus that the latter has
the "ring-fencing" criterion, while tax havens have a "no substantial activities" criterion. A jurisdiction was
assessed as a preferential tax regime if it fulfilled the "ring-fencing" criterion in combination with either
having low tax rates or a lack of transparency. See Ault, supra note 98, at 769. These definitions thus
include both those jurisdictions that offer lower tax rates for foreigners, who may not be in the business of
financial services, and those jurisdictions without any special treatment that attract corporations in the
financial business. As Webb points out, part of the tactics in forming the needed consensus around these
definitions was to keep the critical voice of the BIAC away from the discussion, for them not to encourage
national lobbies to raise objection against the OECD approach on the national arena. See Webb, supra note
96, at 812.
243 Radaelli & Kraemer, supra note 67, at 16.
244 The anti-offshore campaign generally seeks to delegitimize jurisdictions that do not follow the
rich country model in taxation. For example. Deneault asserts that "the Bahamas, Andorra, Bahrain.
Barbados. the Cayman Islands, China, the Cook Islands, Guernsey. Hong Kong, Ireland, Monaco, Panama.
Singapore, Switzerland. and Taiwan" are states which "have no geopolitical relevance they are names on
lists that make it possible, through accounting manipulations and legal acrobatics, to evade the rules
governing legitimate states." DENEAULT, supra note 23, at 45-46 (emphasis added). This remarkable list of
states without "geopolitical relevance" is extraordinary not only for mixing China with Andorra, but for its
2012]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW
offered a perfect forum within which to do so. As the OECD's 1998 report noted, while
it was true that "[c]ountries should remain free to design their own tax systems," this was
true only "as long as they abide by internationally accepted standards in doing so.
'245
While no one country could unilaterally create "internationally accepted standards" in
tax, the OECD with its long history of leadership on double taxation was in the position
to do so. The introduction of the idea of international standards defined by a small group
of countries with a particular set of interests was a brilliant effort to redefine the debate.
Moreover, the OECD faced the problem that its own members were engaged in
the same behaviors it criticized in others. For example, an American Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury was quoted by Euromoney magazine in the 1970s that "[w]e are not in the
business of enforcing the tax laws of other countries, just our own. 2 46 And the United
States had encouraged the use of Netherlands Antilles entities to allow U.S. companies
access to the Eurodollar market in the 1960s and 1970s through what an IRS
Commissioner described as "almost routine" revenue rulings approving transactions no
different from those the United States would later criticize as "treaty abuse. 247 Indeed,
the United States itself has been described as a tax haven, with special tax breaks for
foreign investments.248 Manhattan may be seen as the most important tax haven in this
regard. Foreign persons pay no tax in the United States on their interest earnings, 249 and
states such as Delaware, Nevada, and Wyoming offer secrecy services such as minimal
information requirements and limited oversight for companies registering there.25 The
standard was therefore carefully written to avoid delegitimizing measures being used by
OECD members, as they were unlikely to welcome suggestions that they give up
competitions they were winning.
The report began by explaining that globalization not only had induced tax
reforms and promoted economic development and a more efficient allocation of
explicit claim that the listed states are not "legitimate" because they allow "accounting manipulations" and
"legal acrobatics."
245 OECD, supra note 228, at 15.
246 Improper Use of Foreign Addresses to Evade U.S. Taxes: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the H.
Comm. on Gov't Operations, 98th Cong. 2nd sess., 334 (1980) (statement of Public Citizen, quoting Donald
Lubick). A Ford Foundation report in 1980 noted that "Offshore' or 'haven' facilities also include the U.S.
and England. where favorable statutes protect foreign investors and externally-originating funds flows."
Offshore Banking: Issues with Respect to Criminal Use (1979). reprinted in Illegal Narcotics Profits.
Hearings before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs. 96th
Cong. 473, 474 (1979).
247 Improper Use of Foreign Addresses to Evade U.S. Taxes: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the H.
Comm. on Gov't Operations, 98th Cong. 2nd sess., 236 (1980) (statement of Roscoe L. Egger, Jr.,
Commissioner Internal Revenue Service).
248 See, e.g., Vincent P. Belotsky. Jr., The Prevention of Tax Havens via Income Tax Treaties, 17
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 59 (1987).
249 Marshall J. Langer. Harmful Tax Competition: Who are the Real Tax Havens?. 21 TAX NOTES
INT'L 2831, 2832 (2000). In a published speech. Langer further argued, "The United States, the United
Kingdom, and many other OECD countries have local laws and practices that are at least as abusive as those
of the so-called tax havens... U.S. banks have paid tax-free interest rates to foreign persons for nearly 80
years. Hundreds of billions of dollars of U.S. bank deposits are held in the United States by nonresident
aliens and foreign corporations. If the U.S. Congress ever seriously tried to tax the interest paid on these
deposits, that money would immediately disappear from U.S. banks and probably move to other OECD
countries." Id.; see also DENEAULT. supra note 23. at 112 13 (discussing London as a banking and secrecy
haven).
250 DENEAULT. supra note 23. at 86 94 (discussing Delaware); U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S.
MONEY LAUNDERING THREAT ASSESSMENT 47-48 (2005), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/mlta.pdf (last accessed Oct. 3,2011).
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resources (all things the OECD traditionally promoted) but also opened up doors to tax
avoidance by multinational enterprises ("MNEs"). The pressure to attract employment
led countries into changing their tax structures, as policies in one country have
repercussions in others. The report labeled a practice as "harmful" when a country was
"poaching" by using tax policies to attract capital from another country, as such practices
"do not reflect different judgments about the appropriate level of taxes and public outlays
or the appropriate mix of taxes in a particular economy. 251' Thus central to the OECD
critique of tax competition was the claim that attracting investment was an illegitimate
criterion for evaluating tax policy, 25 2 even though creating an attractive investment
climate was often treated as a legitimate goal in other policy areas by the OECD.253
Moreover, what was needed was a way to both ensure that OECD members toed
the line and restrained their competition against one another and to control the
independent exercise of sovereignty by non-members. The problem was that exhortation
was insufficient to expand the OECD's 1998 report beyond the OECD's membership.
The organization could make a policy case against tax competition but such a statement
would lack teeth, as the OECD would just be issuing voluntary guidelines that
non-members could ignore." 4 The innovation that transformed Harmful Tax Competition
from merely a meaningless international report gathering dust on library shelves into an
effective policy tool was its creation of an international cartel. First, to solve the internal
coordination problem the report called for an explicit deadline for regimes to "remove,
before the end of 5 years starting from the date on which the Guidelines are approved by
the OECD Council, the harmful features of their preferential tax regimes identified in the
list...,,255 Second, to induce non-members to comply, the new Forum on Harmful Tax
Practices was established, with the mandate to intensify the dialogue with non-member
countries but with a "priority task" of issuing a list of tax havens.256 Jurisdictions on the
251 OECD, supra note 228, at 16.
252 Judging by the tone at some places in the report, the response to this harm would also be firm.
The chapter on measures against harmful tax competition begins: "Governments cannot stand back while
their tax bases are eroded through the actions of countries which offer taxpayers ways to exploit tax havens
and preferential regimes to reduce the tax that would otherwise be payable to them." OECD, supra note 228,
at 37.
25' For a comprehensive and updated work on different policy area's impact in the investment
climate, see generally OECD. POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTMENT (2006), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/31/36671400.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2011). The report states, "Countries'
continuous efforts to strengthen national policies and public institutions, and international co-operation, to
create sound investment environments matter most." Id. at 7. Competition is emphasized in the report:
"[E]ffective competition and tax policies are important to ensure that investment, in particular in small
businesses, is not deterred by unnecessary barriers to entry. dissuasive taxation, and poor legal compliance."
Id. at 11. For discussions on related issues, see also OECD, GLOBAL FORuM ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT,
ENHANCING THE INVESTMENT CLIMATE: TE CASE OF INFRASTRUCTURE (2006). available at http:/
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/7/37785076.pdf (last accessed Oct.07. 2011).
254 See Webb, supra note 96, at 803, 809.
255 See OECD, supra note 228, at 56. The initial strategy for filling this list was a self-review
process that the member countries agreed to carry out. They were to make an evaluation of whether they
hosted any PTR, as defined by the report. At the end of that reporting period, not a single country would
admit to it. No jurisdiction apparently wanted to come out first as the "bad guy." The next step was to
initiate a system of informing, asking countries to report their observations of PTRs in other member
countries. In three months' time, this resulted in over one hundred such reports. Interview 5 with OECD
personnel. supra note 100. See also Ault, supra note 98, at 767 (describing the self-review process as a
'classic prisoner's dilemma").
256 OECD, supra note 228, at 51-52.
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list would face coordinated sanctions from OECD members.25 7 The list would be ready
within two years, giving tax havens an additional three years to comply with the
guidelines in the 1998 report.2 ' Even an OECD blacklist might not have carried enough
weight to establish international standards, since the organization's members'
self-interest in preventing competition was obvious.
But the OECD members had more than one hat they could wear in issuing
blacklists, and soon both the EU and the FATF were at work on blacklists of their own.259
The FATF published its first list of "Non-Co-operative Counties and Territories" (NCCT)
in June 2000, the same month as the OECD. 26" The Financial Stability Forum (FSF),
founded in 1999 by the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to study
methods of reducing global financial volatility,26 1 issued a report on non-cooperative
financial centers in May 2000, with material based on a survey that the organization had
sent to OFCs. 6 2 The EU launched a Code of Conduct for Business Taxation with a list of
66 "harmful" tax regimes in 13 EU-member countries and their offshore affiliation.263
Both the EU and the OECD were extending the informal boundaries of tax governance
into the formal sphere.264
By November 1999, the OECD had identified and evaluated numerous PTRs.265
Reports were sent to the states for comments, and after some initial panic among
non-OECD states, the offshore jurisdictions organized themselves and began meeting
with the OECD both collectively and individually.266 In 1998 and 1999, it seemed to the
Forum on Harmful Tax Practices that there was a great willingness among the offshore
regimes to cooperate to avoid being listed on the forthcoming blacklist.267 Before the
257 Id. at 66-67.
258 Id. at 56.
259 Issuing blacklists proved so attractive that some governments simply copied existing blacklists
and reissued them as their own. Where they lacked institutions to update the blacklists, this created problems
as countries were removed from the source blacklist but not the copies. See Jason Sharman, The Bark is the
Bite: International Organizations and Blacklisting, 16 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 573, 581-82 (2009). He also
points out the costs incurred as OFCs are listed on private anti-money laundering software, generating red
flags and hence raising costs of transactions, after once being blacklisted by an international organization.
See also Richard K. Gordon, The International Monetary Fund and the Regulation of Offshore Centers, in
OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS AND REGULATORY COMPETITION (Andrew P. Morriss ed.. 2010).260 
See FATF, REVIEW TO IDENTIFY NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES: INCREASING
THE WORLDWIDE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING MEASURES (2000), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf documents/reports/20000%2020010/%20NCCT%/o20ENG.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
261 See FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, History, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
about/history.htm (last visited Oct. 3,2011).
262 See Press Release, Financial Stability Forum, Financial Stability Forum Releases Grouping of
Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs) to Assist in Setting Priorities for Assessment (May 25. 2000). They
divided them into three groups according to their "perceived quality of supervision and perceived degree of
co-operation." In the least cooperative group were the jurisdictions of Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda,
Aruba. Belize, British Virgin
Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Marshall
Islands, Mauritius, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Niue, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and
the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, The Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, and Vanuatu.
263 Press Release, Primarolo Group, Code of Conduct (Business Taxation) (Feb. 29, 2000).
264 Radaelli & Kraemer, supra note 67, at 16.
265 OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION. PROGRESS IN IDENTIFYING AND ELIMINATING
HARMVFUL TAX PRACTICES (2000). available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2090192.pdf (last visited
Sept. 18, 2012).
266 Id. at 10; Interview 5 with OECD personnel, supra note 100.
267 Interview 5 with OECD personnel, supra note 100.
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final report came out in June 2000, six jurisdictions (Bermuda, the Cayman Islands,
Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius and San Marino) made commitments that saved them from
being blacklisted,26 pledging to eliminate the tax practices that were deemed harmful in
269 lsthe Harmful Tax Competition report. In the list released in June 2000, 35 jurisdictions
were labeled as tax havens, and 47 as "potentially harmful tax regimes. 270 In addition,
agreements progressed with the Seychelles and the Netherlands Antilles in the spring of
2001.271 These agreements with offshore jurisdictions were a visible sign of the project's
success and its growing significance within the OECD. This created the opportunity for
Jeffrey Owens, its Director, to upgrade the status of his office by forming the directorate
CTPA in 2001, shifting the tax competition work out of the DAF.2 72 Upgrading the
division to a directorate was an important accomplishment, giving greater clout to the
unit's work, enhancing its future importance, and boosting funding. 2  It was also
beneficial for Owens personally.274
One puzzle remains-the OECD is built on decision-making by consensus, and
two members in particular, namely Switzerland and Luxembourg, would be
disadvantaged by the anti-tax competition efforts. These two countries built their
reputations around confidentiality, something that would be threatened if they committed
to the OECD project. In its statement on the report Harmful Tax Competition, the Swiss
delegates stressed that they objected to the OECD's view that information exchange was
275the only remedy to the tax competition problem, pointing out that Switzerland was
currently pursuing a withholding system, which they asserted was a less costly and fully
viable alternative. The Swiss stressed that they found it necessary to protect personal
data and so could not support the OECD approach. Luxembourg expressed similar views
as a basis for not supporting the report.2 76
The new efforts had real costs for both countries, since, under the OECD
277Convention, mutual agreements can lead to binding requirements for the members.
268 OECD, supra note 265, at 29.
269 RICHARD M. HAMMER & JEFFREY OWENS, PROMOTING TAX COMPETITION (2001), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/11/1915964.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2011).
270 OECD, supra note 265, at 12-14, 17.
271 Interview 5 with OECD personnel, supra note 100.
272 Interviews 3 and 5 with OECD personnel. supra note 100. DAF is now called the "Directorate
for Financial and Enterprise Affairs" and deals with issues regarding competition. corporate affairs., bribery
in international business, financial markets, insurance, pensions, international investment and private sector
development. See OECD, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, http://www.oecd.org/daf (last
accessed Nov. 19, 2012).
273 Interviews 3 and 5 with OECD personnel, supra note 100.
274 Owens benefited in terms of his influence within the organization. A division head reports to
the director of the directorate. A director on the other hand, reports directly to the Deputy Secretary-General
of the OECD Secretariat. The informal link to the Secretary-General is potentially strong as well. In
addition, Owens gained direct access to opportunities to lobby the members of the G7/8 and G20. Interview
5 with OECD personnel. supra note 100. A division head, moreover, currently has a salary of€8.725 per
month, while a director earns €1 1,287. This implies a pay rise of almost thirty percent for someone
advancing from heading a division to a directorate. See OECD, Salaries and Benefits,
http://www.oecd.org/careers/salariesandbenefits.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
275 OECD, supra note 228, at 77.
276 OECD, supra note 228. at 77 78.
277 Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development art. 6. Dec. 14,
1960, available at http://www.oecd.org/general/conventionontheorganisationforeconomicco-
operationanddevelopment.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2011). Usually however, the OECD Council instead issues
recommendations, which represent a "strong political commitment" of a country. These would still be costly
for non-compliant members.
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Since members have the right to veto actions the Council proposes, 278 why did
Switzerland and Luxembourg abstain from Harmful Tax Competition rather than vetoing
it? Had either done so, the report would have been much less effective. There are two
possible explanations. First, OECD members interact on many issues and compromise is
often necessary. Setting oneself against other nations' projects may cost a country future
influence. 279 Since both countries were successful in operating within the existing
constraints, they may have believed that the report would ultimately do them little harm
while impeding their competition outside the OECD. Second, they may have made a
mistake and not appreciated the full extent to which Harmful Tax Competition would
succeed in changing the terms of debate over tax competition.
C. The Impact of Cartelization
Soon after the success of Harmful Tax Competition, the effort to restrict tax
competition suffered a significant setback with the diminution of U.S. support after the
election of George W. Bush. z'" Indeed, even prior to the election, Barbados used the
possibility of a coming shift in U.S. policy to seek concessions at a Fall 2000 meeting
with the OECD and was sufficiently emboldened by the results to walk out of a meeting
with the OECD in January 2001.2"1 While Bush's stance on tax competition was initially
unclear 282 -and the anti-tax-competition interests may have consoled themselves over the
election results with the thought that it was the conservative Reagan administration that
had cancelled the BVI and Netherlands Antilles tax treaties-in May 2001, Secretary of
the Treasury Paul O'Neill made it clear that the new U.S. administration would not
support efforts to restrict tax competition, stating that:
I am troubled by the underlying premise that low tax rates are somehow
suspect and by the notion that any country, or group of countries, should
interfere in any other country's decision about how to structure its own
tax system. I also am concerned about the potentially unfair treatment of
some non-OECD countries. The United States does not support efforts
to dictate to any country what its own tax rates or tax system should be,
and will not participate in any initiative to harmonize world tax
systems ... In its current form, the project is too broad and it is not in
line with this Administration's tax and economic priorities.
283
Prior to 1998, a similar change in U.S. priorities would likely have derailed
efforts at restricting tax competition. The difference was that there was now at least the
278 Ault, supra note 98, at 758.
279 Interview 4 with OECD personnel, supra note 100.
280 The OFCs recognized that the U.S. was a weak link in the OECD campaign and lobbied the U.S.
Congress to undermine support for the OECD project. See also SHARMAN. supra note 216, at 17. Another
problem concerned the British overseas territory of Gibraltar, the status of which has since long been a
dispute between the UK and Spain. In July 2001. Spain refused to endorse the report unless the UK took
action over Gibraltar's fiscal policies. Allowing it instead to negotiate for itself, the argument went, would
allow the territory too much international recognition. This quarrel would halt the release of the 2001
Progress Report, with an updated version of the blacklist, which was initially due to be published in July
2001. Gavin Hinks, Gibraltar row halts OECD taxpurge, ACCOUNTANCY AGE, available at
http://www.accountancyage.com/aalnews/1753426/gibraltar-row-halts-oecd-tax-purge (last visited Oct. 7,
2011).
281 Interview 5 with OECD personnel, supra note 100.
282 An indication of this was that the usually influential American delegation. present at the January
2001 meeting. did not speak much. Interview 5 with OECD personnel. supra note 100.
283 Paul O'Neill, Commentary, Confronting OECD's 'Harmful' Tax Approach, THE WASHINGTON
TIMES, May 11, 2001, at A17.
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beginning of international commitments to address the issue. Thus, the change in U.S.
position had a reduced impact since the tax competition efforts were more established
within the OECD than they had been before 1998.284 Rather than abandoning the effort,
the OECD tax group shifted its focus to promoting information exchange and bank
transparency, a topic on which O'Neill had signaled a willingness to move ahead, noting
that while the U.S. would "guard against overbroad information exchanges in which
foreign governments seek information for improper purposes or without proper
safeguards[,] [w]e cannot tolerate those who cheat on their U.S. taxes by hiding behind a
cloak of secrecy.,' 285 The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001,
changed the political dynamic once again. After 9/11, the United States increased its
focus on terrorism finance, which yielded increased backing for efforts to increase
financial transparency."'
Although the OECD's tax competition initiative had slowed as a result of the
shift marked by O'Neill's op-ed, after 9/11 the pace of work again increased, and the
delayed 2001 Progress Report could be released in November 2001 .287 This time, tax
rates took a back seat to transparency and reporting issues. In particular, the OECD
softened several important components of the original proposals. Furthermore, as the
commitments that they were now seeking from tax havens concerned transparency and
exchange of information rather than tax rates, issues such as ring-fencing and "no
substantial practices" were removed from the analysis, and the OECD changed the
expressions "harmful tax competition" and "unfair tax competition" to "harmful tax
practices." '288 Many offshore jurisdictions were more willing to comply with demands for
transparency than with ones that they adopt higher tax rates. Especially under the
condition that Switzerland and Luxemburg would first need to agree to information
exchange, the promise of future openness in the seemingly unlikely case that those two
did the same became less of a commitment. 2 9 As a result, the OECD reported in 2004
284 CTPA Senior Advisor Hugh Ault has argued that the O'Neill announcement did not have much
impact on the project. The "no substantial activities" criteria had been of little significance. he argues. and
the promise to deal with member countries first did no harm, as they had already announced to make the
required changes. See Ault, supra note 98. at 770. Others point out that the OECD had already seen a
victory with so many regimes making concessions, that concentrating on transparency was in any case the
next natural step. Interviews 3 and 4 with OECD personnel, supra note 100.
285 O'Neill, supra note 283.
286 Interview 5 with OECD personnel, supra note 100.
287 PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES, OECD, THE 2001 PROGRESS REPORT (2001). available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/28/2664438.pdf (last accessed Oct. 8. 2011) Interview 5 with OECD
personnel. supra note 100.
288 See generally OECD, supra note 287.
289 SHARMAN, supra note 216, at 153; OECD, supra note 287, at 10. Only seven jurisdictions
(Andorra, Liberia, Liechtenstein, the Marshall Islands, Monaco, the Republic of Nauru, and Vanuatu)
remained on the blacklist in its updated version in April 2002. See OECD, LIST OF UNCOOPERATIVE TAX
HAVENS (2000), available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0.3746.en_2649 33745 30578809 1 1 1 1,00.html (last visited Oct. 12,
2011). The Republic of Naura and Vanuatu were removed by the OECD in 2003. PROJECT ON HARMFUL
TAX PRACTICES, OECD, THE 2004 PROGRESS REPORT 11 (2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/33/30901115.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2011). The 2004 Progress Report
announced that twenty-two offshore jurisdictions had complied with the OECD transparency standards and
exchange of information since 2001. Id. at 11.
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that "an overwhelming majority of countries and jurisdictions identified in 2000 have
agreed to work toward transparency and effective exchange of information. "290
The loss of U.S. support weakened the anti-tax-competition efforts. This
weakness can be seen in the OECD's abandonment of its aggressive efforts to coerce the
OFCs to conform to its substantive tax standards through the blacklist. 291 Negotiations
between the OECD and OFCs began to be held on a multilateral basis, described as "a
co-operative process, 29 2 rather than in the context of OFCs individually attempting to
clear blacklisting. To prevent sanctions breaching the level-playing-field objective, the
OECD agreed that no non-member would be targeted with the "co-ordinated defensive
measures" until OECD members themselves were in compliance with the standards.
293
Since this never happened, the commitments made after these adjustments cannot be
interpreted as the same kind of surrender that the Cayman Islands engaged in after the
release of Harmful Tax Competition in 1998. 294 The application of a slightly softer
approach seems mainly to have been a response to overwhelming criticism by OFCs and
their backers of Harmful Tax Competition and the published blacklist in 2000.295 In
particular, part of the failure of Harmful Tax Competition stemmed from the OFCs' effort
to push back on the intellectual front through the 2006 report Tax Cooperation: Towards
a Level Playing Field,296 issued with the support of the Commonwealth Secretariat.297
Much as Owens had used the G7 when his initial push at the OECD had failed, the OFCs
successfully brought the Commonwealth into the debate, using a forum in which a
number of small OFCs were members and in which Britain would find it harder to
obstruct their efforts since it would not have its European allies to support it. They poked
290 OECD, TAX CO-OPERATION: TOWARDS A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD (2006), available at
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/44430286.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
291 See Boise. supra note 204, at 68.
292 OECD, supra note 287, at 9.
293 OECD, supra note 287, at 10. In light of this, the July 2001 deadline for commitments was
postponed until February 2002. Id.
294 See SHARMAN, supra note 216, at 153.
295 The OECD was accused of a double standard when two of its members (Switzerland and
Lichtenstein) could abstain from the recommendations about transparency and non-"harmful" tax practices,
while non-members were being targeted. See SHARMAN. supra note 216, at 90. This was indeed in
contradiction to the organization's claim to be promoting a "level playing-field." Id. The targeted
jurisdictions themselves expressed discontent with the report and the business community at large was
critical. For example, the Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines pointed out that "[t]he
international financial community urges competition and open markets but when we succeed they declare it
unfair." Id. The OECD's own Business Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) launched harsh criticism in
1999 at the OECD project as a whole. ld. at 72. Among many critical voices, Miami-based international
relations expert Anthony Bryan commented that, "Caribbean countries with offshore jurisdictions fear that, as
earnings from traditional industries such as banana and sugar exports fall, the crackdown on tax havens will
hinder their efforts to develop new businesses." Akiko Hishikawa, The Death of Tax Havens?. 25 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 389, 402 (2002).
296 See generally OECD, supra note 290.
297 The Commonwealth consists of fifty-four member countries, and has currently as its main
pillars to work for peace, democracy, anti-poverty and sustainable development. THE COMMONWEALTH
SECRETARIAT, What We Do. http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/190957/what we do (last visited
Oct. 25. 2011). It is financed by government contributions to separate budget funds for the Commonwealth
Fund for Technical Co-operation. which is one area that the Commonwealth works on, the largest shares
came from Australia. Botswana, Brunei Darussalam. Canada, India, New Zealand. Nigeria and the United
Kingdom. THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, Funding, http://www.thecommonwealth.org/
Internal/190945/34492/funding/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
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significant holes in the OECD's arguments on substantive tax issues and undercut the
effort to build an international consensus around the OECD's proposed standards.
At a meeting in 2004, the Global Forum decided to conduct a review of over
eighty countries to survey whether they lived up to the OECD standards of transparency
and information exchange. 298 Meanwhile, bilateral efforts were undermining the
multilateral project, as the United States and EU signed individual accords with other
nations. 299 By 2005, the project against harmful tax competition was barely alive. 30 ' The
OECD even stopped referring to jurisdictions as "tax havens," instead terming them
"participating partners." '' Whereas previous meetings have been described as somewhat
"chaotic," 30 2 a meeting in 2005 has been described as "polite."3 3 The outcome of the
review project was published in Tax Cooperation.- Towards a Level Playing Field04 in
2006, and would be updated on a yearly basis in reports with the same name. The reports
do not list countries as black or gray, but instead describe thorough examinations of the
countries, concerning a variety of issues of transparency and financial services." 5 The
black and gray list of 2000 is mentioned in the reports only in a way that diminishes its
importance: the "2000 OECD list should be seen in its historical context... More than
five years have passed since the publication of the OECD list and positive changes have
occurred in individual countries' transparency and exchange of information laws and
practices since that time. 30 6 Moreover, the OFCs successfully made the case that they
307
constituted a well-regulated set ofjurisdictions, undercutting the OECD's arguments.'
Outside events once again changed the debate, however. The tax competition
efforts revived after the global financial crisis-which some attempted to blame on
OFCs 30°-and the 2008 election of Barack Obama. Although the financial crisis had no
298 See OECD, supra note 296, at 14, for a description of the standards. The standards of
transparency and information exchange are summarized as follows: (a) existence of mechanisms for
exchange of information upon request, (b) exchange of information for purposes of domestic tax law in both
criminal and civil matters, (c) no restrictions of information exchange caused by application of dual
criminality principle or domestic tax interest requirement, (d) respect for safeguards and limitations, (e) strict
confidentiality rules for information exchanged, (f) availability of reliable information (in particular bank,
ownership, identity and accounting information) and powers to obtain and provide such information in
response to a specific request. Id.
299 Interview 5 with OECD personnel, supra note 100; SHARMAN, supra note 216, at 74. The
parties that entered into an agreement with the U.S. were the Bahamas, the Netherlands Antilles. the Cayman
Islands, and Panama. Their agreement on tax information exchange included a clause that information would
not be passed further, in effect shielding them from the OECD project. Id. Also in 2005, the EU allowed for
Austria, Luxembourg, and Belgium to be exempted from the requirement that all member countries exchange
information with other relevant national authorities, in exchange for imposing a withholding tax on earnings
from deposits. See PALAN, MURPHY & CHAVAGNEUX, supra note 195, at 223.
'oo Interview 5 with OECD personnel, supra note 100.
3'0 SHARMAN. supra note 216, at 151.
102 Interview 5 with OECD personnel, supra note 100.
303 See SHARMAN, supra note 216, at 149. However, no deadline was set this time, but "all
countries are strongly encouraged to take the necessary steps towards a level playing field." See OECD,
supra note 296, at 49.
304 See generally OECD, supra note 296.
305 Id.
306 OECD, supra note 296, at 53.
307 See Andrew P. Morriss & Clifford C. Henson. Regulatory Effectiveness in Onshore & Offshore
Financial Centers (March 2. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016310.
308 Jean Eaglesham and Alex Barker, UK Premier Calls for Crackdown on Tax Havens, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 19,
2009; Alex Barker, Brown Warns Tax Havens to Comply, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2009; Robert M. Morgenthau,
Too Much Money Is Beyond Legal Reach, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2008, available at
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connection to either OFCs or tax rates, political leaders were quick to use it to assert a
need for restrictions on financial competition. 9 Obama was an ally of Sen. Carl Levin
(D.-Mich.), the main force behind the proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act (a version of
which Obama co-sponsored while he was in the Senate).31 In addition, Obama's
ambitious agenda needed revenue, and cracking down on OFCs promised revenue (or, at
least, promised the revenue that could be spent if projected under U.S. budget rules even
if it was never collected).31' Further bolstering the attractiveness of attacks on OFCs,
aggressive tax planning efforts by Liechtenstein and Swiss banks came to light, with the
Swiss bank UBS revealed as having violated U.S. law312 and several EU governments
having purchased stolen account data from a rogue Lichtenstein banker that revealed
widespread tax evasion by their citizens.313 With four billion euros allegedly channeled
through Lichtenstein by hundreds of German business people to evade (rather than avoid)
taxes,' 14 onshore government interest in limiting access to such opportunities increased
and made the arguments in favor of controls more compelling.315 Domestic politics in
several EU nations also increased interest in demonstrating that governments were
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122273062657688131.html; Grant McCool, More Offshore Tax Probes in the
Works: AY's Morgenthau, REUTERS, Apr. 24, 2009.
309 See, e.g., Morgenthau, supra note 308. The New York City District Attorney lamented that
6vast sums of money... lie outside the jurisdiction of U.S. regulators and other supervisory authorities."
Nigel Morris, Brown leads global drive to close down tax havens, THE SUNDAY INDEP., Feb. 19, 2009,
available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brown-leads-global-drive-to-close-down-tax-
havens-1625959.html (quoting the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown as calling on "the whole of the
world to take action. That will mean action against regulatory and tax havens in parts of the world which
have escaped the regulatory attention they need."): Sarkozy on Tax Havens, and more, TAX JUSTICE
NETWORK (Aug. 28. 2008), available at http://taxjustice.blogspot.com/2008/08/sarkozy-on-tax-havens.html
(quoting the French President denouncing "the excesses of financial capitalism which has experienced
serious abuses: concealment of risks, uncontrolled sophistication of financial instruments, gaps in regulation
and persistence of tax havens capturing a part of global savings that would be more justly employed
financing investment and growth"); Lucia Kubosova, EU states crack down on tax evasion, EU OBSERVER,
Oct. 22, 2008, available at http://euobserver.com/9/26976 (last visited Oct. 8, 2011). In a meeting in Paris in
October 2008, calls were made on the OECD to curb European tax havens. The articles point out the
increased urgency of European capitals to clamp down on tax havens globally, in light of the recent financial
crisis.
30 Gordon. supra note 13. at 99.
.. See CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL'Y PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: CONGRESS'S 'PAY-As-You-Go'
BUDGET RULE (2009), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/policybasics-paygo.pdf (last visited Oct. 25,
2011).
312 See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, United States Asks Court to Enforce Summons for
UBS Swiss Bank Account Records (Feb. 19, 2009) available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv09139.htm
(last visited Oct. 22, 2011) (describing the lawsuit).
313 The Liechtenstein Connection, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Feb. 16, 2008), available at
http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/massive-tax-evasion-scandal-in-germany-the-liechtenstein-
connection-a-535768.html, (last visited Oct. 25. 2011).
314 Not so fine in Liechtenstein, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 22. 2008, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/10750259?storyid 10750259 (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
315 The G7 expanded to the G20 in 2007, and at their April 2009 summit, tax havens were high on
the agenda. See Dries Lesage, The G20 and Tax Havens: Maintaining the Momentum? 3 (June 18, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), available at www.g20.utoronto.ca/biblio/lesage-tax-havens.pdf. A press
conference in connection to the meeting focused much concern on regulations to prevent a future financial
crisis. See, e.g., Ben Hall, Stage set for tax havens battle, FIN. TIMES. Apr. 1, 2009, available at
http://www.ft.com/home/us#7720645761771122463 (last visited Oct. 12. 2012). France and Germany were
actively pushing for a tougher stance on the issue. Lichtenstein, Andorra. Switzerland. Austria. and
Luxembourg all announced that they would relax their bank secrecy laws. See Andrew Willis, Switzerland,
Austria and Luxembourg relax Banking Secrecy, EU OBSERVER, Mar. 13, 2009, available at http://
euobserver.com/?aid=27775 (last visited Oct. 10, 2011).
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"tough" on tax evasion."' For example, France's newly elected president Nicholas
Sarkozy had campaigned as an unusually free-market politician for France. 1 After his
proposed reforms of the French university and health systems were met with widespread
protests, 18 the campaign against tax havens may have served as a counterweight, to
demonstrate firmness against the wealthy.319 In Britain, Gordon Brown needed to
mobilize the left in preparation for an upcoming difficult election campaign.320
One important development slowed the anti-OFC campaign's progress. The
G7's expansion to the G20 meant that China now had an important voice there.121 Its
relatively strong economy also made China an important player in world financial affairs,
and its need for vehicles both for inward and outward investment gave it an interest in
OFCs. 322 The OECD had previously threatened to place the Chinese Special
Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau on the blacklist.3 23 Not being an
OECD-member, China did not want discussions conducted in a forum where it had no
influence and so it sought to ensure that any multilateral transparency deal be pursued at
the United Nations, where it would be able to influence the process. A compromise was
reached that eased China's fears. Hong Kong and Macau would not be blacklisted.
Moreover, the new Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax
Purposes would be outside the OECD structure, be funded independently of the OECD,
and allow membership by non-OECD countries.324 This left China with influence over
the work both by means of its presence and its budget contributions. 3 25 It also seems to
have relieved the burden from the G20 of the political implications of confronting China
316 See Kubosova, supra note 309. In the October meeting. convened by France and Germany. the
delegates lamented the slow pace of the OECD's efforts, and called for a new list from the organization.
which they claimed that Switzerland should be included in. The OECD promised to deliver one by mid-
2009.
317 See, e.g., Anna Willard, France's Sarkozy turns toforminggovt, next polls, REUTERS, May 7,
2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid USL0663346820070507 (last accessed Oct. 12,
2012).
318 See, e.g., James Joyner, Sarkozy Delays University Reforms, Feared Greek-Style Riots
December, NEw ATLANTICIST POLICY AND ANALYSIS BLOG (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.acus.org/
new atlanticist/sarkozy-delays-university-reforms-feared-greek-style-riots (last accessed Oct 21, 2012);
Anna Willard, French workers strike against Sarkozy's reforms. REUTERS, Nov. 14, 2007. available at
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/11/14/uk-france-strike-idUKL126064620071114 (last accessed Oct. 21
2012).
" 9 Interview 5 with OECD personnel, supra note 100.
320 See, e.g., Editorial, Gordon Brown: Labour's dilemma, THE GUARDIAN, Jun. 2, 2009, available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/02/editorial-gordon-brown-labour (last accessed Oct.
8,2011).
321 John Kirton, From G7 to G20: Capacity, Leadership and Normative Diffusion in Global
Financial Governance (Feb. 20. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/
scholar/kirton2005/kirton isa2005.pdf; see generally Geoffrey Garrett. G2 in G20: China, the United States
and the World after the Global Financial Crisis, 1 GLOBAL POL'Y 29 (2010) (discussing China's entrance in
the G20 and its place among world leaders).
322 Richard Woodward, From Boom to Doom to Boom: Offshore Financial Centres and
Development in Small States 23-24 (July 5, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract 1879298 (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
323 Interview 5 with OECD personnel, supra note 100.
324 The OECD claims that Hong Kong and Macau do not meet the definitions of a tax haven.
OECD, COUNTERING OFFSHORE TAX EVASION: SOME QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE PROJECT 12 (2009).
available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchangeofinformation/42469606.pdf (last visited Oct. 12. 2012).
325 Interview 5 with OECD personnel, supra note 100. As Christians notes, the "G20 membership
may appear broad and inclusive relative to the OECD, but its membership appears to be both over-
representative of and tightly controlled by the 'old' powers that created it." Christians, supra note 4, at 31.
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when endorsing continued efforts for transparency and sanctions on tax havens. 326
However, Allison Christians persuasively argues that the G20's role is primarily to
"syndicate OECD policy positions under the new, more inclusive and representative label
of G20-endorsed 'internationally agreed tax standards.' 3 27 She notes in particular that
the only formal commitment the G20 made was "'to maintain the momentum in dealing
with tax havens, money laundering,' and other 'non-cooperative jurisdictions.' 32" Thus
the role played by China in this instance may be the exception rather than the norm.
The Global Forum set to work on new "transparency standards" for participating
states, prohibiting secrecy and demanding information exchange "where it is 'foreseeably
relevant' to the administration of domestic laws" of the treaty partner.329 The group
published a new list of non-cooperative jurisdictions in 2009. While only Costa Rica,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Uruguay were listed as not having made any
commitments, 38 other jurisdictions that had committed to fulfilling the standard, but had
not yet fully implemented it were listed in an intermediate "gray list. '330 By the fourth
meeting of the Global Forum in October 2011, the organization could announce a
membership of over 105 jurisdictions.33 ' Even Switzerland had declared in February
2011 that it would comply with all the Global Forum's standards on full exchange of
information. 332 Non-members are also to be reviewed, a process that began in June 2011
with an assessment of Botswana and Trinidad and Tobago.333 By the G20 summit in
November 2011, almost sixty peer-review reports on the transparency of different
jurisdictions were to be published.334 In addition, the 1988 OECD Convention on Mutual
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters was amended with a new protocol in May
326 The G20 officially declared from the 2009 summit: "We stand ready to take agreed action
against those jurisdictions which do not meet international standards in relation to tax transparency." In its
communiqu6 from the meeting on April 2, 2009, "The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform," they
announced that "we agree ... to take action against non-cooperative jurisdictions, including tax havens. We
stand ready to deploy sanctions to protect our public finances and financial systems. The era of banking
secrecy is over." Their full support and readiness to take measures against tax havens have been echoed in
later meetings since. OECD. THE GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR
TAX PURPOSES 37 (2011), available at http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/
OECD-Global Forum Sep_12 Peer Reviews.pdf (last accessed Oct. 2. 2012).
327 Christians, supra note 4, at 20.
328 Id. at 22. She also notes the advantages the OECD's structure gives it relative to the G20,
including the permanent staff. Id. at 31.
329 OECD, supra note 326, at 21. See also DENEAULT, supra note 23, at 33 ("Tax havens became
opportune blind spots where different funds could be mingled and any representative of the public who
ventured to investigate their origin could be confounded.").
33
0
See OECD, A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE JURISDICTIONS SURVEYED BY THE OECD GLOBAL
FORUM IN IMPLEMENTING THE INTERNATIONALLY AGREED TAX STANDARD (2009). available at
http://www.oecd.org/tax/harmfultaxpractices/42497950.pdf (last visited Oct. 12. 2012).
331 See OECD, THE GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX
PURPOSE: STATEMENT OF OUTCOMES 1 (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 11/21/
48929580.pdf (last accessed Oct. 12, 2012).
332 See OECD, supra note 329, at 3.
333 Id. at 15.
... See id. at 16. In these, jurisdictions are assessed in two phases: "Phase 1 reviews will include a
determination of whether each element is 'in place'. 'in place. but certain aspects of the legal implementation
of the element need improvement', or 'not in place'. Phase 2 and combined reviews will include a rating as
to whether the jurisdiction is 'compliant', largely compliant', 'partially compliant', or 4not compliant' with
each of these elements in practice." Id. at 14.
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20103"' to control the use of tax information exchange agreements. Fifty countries have
so far either signed the Conventions or stated an intention to do so.3 36 The level of
exchange is described as "full exchange of information on request in all tax matters
without regard to a domestic tax interest requirement or bank secrecy for tax purposes. '
Under the 2009 criteria of the Global Forum, a jurisdiction had to have signed twelve
bilateral agreements on information exchange (called Tax Information Exchange
Agreements, or TIEAs) to be whitelisted,338 a somewhat meaningless numerical quota
that encouraged agreements between some odd couple jurisdictions.33 9
Although the OECD counted over six hundred such agreements signed since
2009,340 the new Convention provided a new framework that goes further than simply
encouraging TIEAs. Because it is multilateral, jurisdictions do not negotiate over
adapting the provisions to the particulars of their circumstances but can only alter their
obligations by making reservations, which can be withdrawn later. 4' Moreover, as a
country enters the convention, it enters an agreement with all prior signatories. 42 The
question that the economists of the League of Nations struggled with in the 1920s may be
approaching an answer: can a multilateral agreement on taxation be created? As we
previously discussed, differences in tax codes make it inherently difficult to impose
general rules for many countries that would serve as a tax treaty for all countries. The
updated Convention may be limited to issues of disclosure and transparency, but it is a
large step towards reaching the goal of a tax agreement including all countries of the
world. Moreover, the OECD is in the process of creating new soft law standards that
influence the discussion of tax issues by changing the legal framework within which
those issues are discussed.343
335 See OECD & COUNCIL OF EUR., PROTOCOL AMENDING THE CONVENTION ON MUTUAL
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS (2011), available at
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchangeofinformation/48980598.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
336 OECD, GLOBAL FORUM ON TAX TRANSPARENCY WELCOMES NEW MEMBERS AND REVIEWS 12
COUNTRIES (2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/globalforumontaxtransparencywelcomes
newmembersandreviewsl 2countries.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2012) ("The Convention was amended to open
it to all countries, at the request of the G20, which is now encouraging jurisdictions to join ... We look
forward to wide-ranging accession to the Convention, which will turn it into a truly global instrument for
international co-operation in tax matters."); see also OECD, IRELAND SIGNS MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ON
MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS (2011). available at
http://www.taxmann.com/news.aspx?nid=6005 (last visited Nov. 19, 2012).
337 OECD, THE CONVENTION ON MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS -
BACKGROUND (2010) available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchangeofinformation/
theconventiononmutualadministrativeassistanceintaxmatters-background.htm (last accessed Oct. 12, 2012).
338 See OECD, supra note 329, at 25-26, 31.
39 The Cayman Islands' agreement with the Faroe Islands seems an unlikely policy goal for
enhancing international tax cooperation. See CAYMAN ISLANDS FIN. SERVS., CAYMAN CONTINUES TO
DEMONSTRATE TRANSPARENCY (2010). available at
http://www.caymanfinance.gov.ky/portal/pagepageid=4081,7094057& dad-portal&_schema=PORTAL
(last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
340 See OECD, supra note 329, at 3.
341 See OECD & COUNCIL OF EUR., THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ON MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE
ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS 3 (2010), available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-
Management/oecd/taxation/the-multilateral-convention-on-mutua-administrative-assistance-in-tax-
matters_9789264115606-en (last visited Oct. 12. 2012).342 See generally OECD, THE CONVENTION ON MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX
MATTERS, A BRIEF OVERVIEW (2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/51/47690147.pdf (last
visited Sept. 18, 2012).
343 Christians, supra note 5, at 114-16.
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Five things stand out in this account. First, the OECD's (and Jeffrey Owens')
entrepreneurial behavior in creating a role for the organization in a new area is an
impressive example of how institutions can develop a life of their own. Second, for the
interests within the industrialized nations threatened by the increased competition for
economic activity brought on by globalization, Harmful Tax Competition offered a
mechanism through which to enforce their preferences on jurisdictions unable to
participate directly in the policymaking. Third, ideas matter. The naked self-interest in
Harmful Tax Competition, as revealed by its clever definition of "harmful tax
competition" that excluded the behavior of OECD members, were undercut by the OFC's
successful invocation of more coherent ideas in Towards a Level Playing Field. Fourth,
the forum matters. Just as Owens was able to use the G7 to outmaneuver opponents
within the OECD, the OFCs were able to use the Commonwealth Secretariat and G20 to
fight back. Finally, China's role will be critical in the future, in ways that might surprise
those accustomed to think China only in the context of international debates over human
rights, since China's interests in international finance differ significantly from OECD
members' interests.
V. CARTELIZATION AND COMPETITION
In this section we offer three alternative explanations for the OECD's shift in its
tax policy activities. We explore the history of this shift in the OECD's role and sketch
the institutional setting between the OECD and governments as well as within the OECD
itself, to compare the alternative explanations. We call these (1) the public interest
explanation; (2) the cartel explanation; and (3) the bureaucratic incentive explanation.
A. The Public Interest Explanation:
The OECD is a benevolent organization dedicated to improving the world,
staffed by publicly spirited individuals without personal stakes in the outcomes of its
efforts, and funded and organized by governments that desire nothing more than to
promote global economic cooperation and development. The shift of the OECD from
promoting competition in the international economy to helping large economies limit
competition in finance from smaller jurisdictions is an expression of its effort to develop
"rules of the game" that ensure that financial competition promotes overall economic
welfare.
This is in line with the classical public finance models reviewed briefly in Part II.
The OECD solves a prisoner's dilemma between states by allowing them to sign a
contract not to poach on each other's mobile tax bases by lowering tax rates or favoring
foreign businesses. Without the OECD, all countries know that global welfare would be
higher if only tax rates would be set at the optimal level, which would maximize the
welfare of all people on earth. However, since every country will gain much for its own
sake by lowering tax rates, a race to the bottom is inevitable without an international
auditor, judge, and policy-maker. Governments know that they should not cheat on
others by lowering taxes. Realizing that cooperation through the OECD creates more
welfare for all, they are therefore happy to be "tied to the mast" and restrict competition.
To some extent this is exactly the role the OECD played with respect to economic
policies, using its country reports to hold member governments to their commitments to
economic liberalization.
B. The Cartel Explanation:
The people in the governments that act on behalf of the OECD have their own
incentives, and are at times well placed to pursue them. The OECD provides a forum in
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which member governments can help establish "best practices," which in many cases are
a means to win political battles at home and influence domestic policies. Thus, the
OECD becomes a new arena for the political process and the struggle to win votes by
gaining support for policies that interests favor. Aware of the organization's importance
in this respect, interest groups do their best to influence politicians to act in the OECD
arena and may also seek allies for international cooperation through the OECD.
Increasing tax competition poses many threats. Tax bases are eroded, depriving
domestic interests of the opportunities that large state coffers provide, while their status
may be tarnished if they are forced to adjust domestic policies to the actions of small
jurisdictions that should be their inferiors. Politicians that fear losing control of their own
tax base are faced with a choice. The new competition can be met by policies designed to
meet the competition, offering a more welcoming environment for businesses and foreign
investments and promoting the economic strength of their countries, whether it be a
secure and stable environment or good legal institutions. Alternatively, they can seek to
limit the competition. The former is not only hard work but may expose a politician both
as a weak global actor and as inconsistent ideologically. If the opportunity is provided, it
may be better from a politician's point of view to form a cartel on taxation as a
protection. With a cartel, there are fewer constraints on domestic policy, improving the
politicians' welfare by increasing the degrees of freedom available to satisfy domestic
constituents and win re-election.
C. The Bureaucratic Explanation:
Focusing on the inner workings of organizations allows us to consider the
incentives of the staff to expand their mission.344 This may be an expansion of the
magnitude of the organization's responsibilities in their area of expertise as well as the
range of areas over which it has jurisdiction and the size of the bureaucracy in general.345
The incentive for the staff of such an organization is to explore opportunities to further
broaden their roles by expanding the scope and scale of their unit, while maximizing the
opportunities for their future careers. Entrepreneurial minds within the staff will be
active in this pursuit. They have the wits and opportunities to expand the resources at
their disposal in search of prestige, power, and compensation.
It may be hard for a bureaucracy itself to push for new policies to expand their
mission. The best strategy is to offer policy-makers their services when it is most likely
that their suggestions may gain hearing. The bureaucrats of the OECD would therefore
not be immune from changes in the global economy and opinion climate towards tax
harmonization. The bureaucratic explanation thus does not imply that the OECD
bureaucrats are particularly vocal proponents of global strategies. With few exceptions,
like Jeffrey Owens as the director of the OECD tax unit, bureaucrats are not in a position
to personally engage in the debate. Rather, they will address policy-makers when they
see signs that their interests align, thus capturing the opportunities when they present
themselves.
344 See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971)
(demonstrating how a bureaucracy can expand its services thanks to its special place in the economy); see
also GORDON TULLOCK, THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY (1965) (analyzing the incentive structures within a
bureaucracy and the managerial dilemmas of a politician).
345 See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK, supra note 344 (explaining the desire of a politician to have as
many subordinates as possible).
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D. Conclusion
How well does each of these models fit the OECD's behavior? Any account of
an organization's actions that does not include the interests of the governments that fund
the organization or the people who act within the organization would not be credible. We
are therefore skeptical that the public interest explanation can stand alone. However,
there is one key element from this model that is important to acknowledge. The OECD
as an organization has, over time, promoted economic liberalization. In their Economic
Surveys, the organization provides policy recommendations to countries, which
traditionally have focused on increasing competition, work incentives and fiscal
discipline. Other recommendations include monetary reforms and promoting labor
market flexibility. 346 As the organization has generally been supportive of the opening of
markets and the expansion of competition as a means for economic development, the
OECD might be seen as a "tie me to the mast" effort by member states to assist them in
resisting domestic political pressures to restrict the growth of markets. The
tax-harmonization efforts appear on the surface to be similar-as with
competition-expanding measures, there is an element of self-imposed restrictions being
used to prevent defections. The similarity is only on the surface, however, as the tax
harmonization efforts are primarily aimed at non-members-thus rather than "tie me to
the mast," they appear to be more "tie you to the mast."
The OECD developed from its founding as an arena for international agreements
on taxation and the prominent body of experts on tax treaties. It gained prominence as its
Model Tax Convention came to serve as a blueprint for bilateral tax treaties, as countries
tried their best to avoid double taxation between countries to prevent reductions in
international business and economic growth. The project that the organization launched
as part of its work on taxation and against harmful tax competition in the 1990s broke
with the tradition of enhancing the global business climate to influence the national tax
policies of non-compliant countries. Those sympathizing with the OECD project against
harmful tax competition hold that the OECD consists of self-sacrificing souls pursuing
the global good; meanwhile, tax avoiders and tax planners are sinister misers draining the
common resources by enjoying public goods while not contributing to them. Critics of
the OECD project may describe governments as evil socialists trying to quash small
island jurisdiction, remorselessly draining them of their own income and forming the
international tax cartel that they need to tax their own citizens as much as possible. We
take the view that bureaucrats and politicians are neither more nor less sinister than
anyone else, a view that allows us to analyze the incentives of the actors as rational.
How did this mission creep come about? Considering the bureaucratic and cartel
explanations helps us understand the development of the OECD's tax efforts. Given the
organization's focus, the original mandate was to coordinate the North American funding
of efforts to rebuild Europe's economies after the devastation of World War II. As that
goal was accomplished, the organization turned to expanding markets and reducing the
transactions costs of doing business across members' borders. This served as a winning
strategy in national politics, while benefitting growth in a world that was becoming
increasingly tied together. Politicians could show that they were promoting trade and
therefore prosperity by unilateral or bilateral commitments and treaties. Others could use
the OECD to make shared commitments. Since the interest in reaping the benefits from
346 See Bergh & Dackehag, supra note 5, at 4.
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global integration and trade was shared among most countries, interests groups seeking to
further economic liberalization were able to coordinate with similar interests elsewhere.
As people within leading European governments grew worried about the impact
of unbridled "Anglo-Saxon capitalism" on their social systems, 347 they became more
interested in seeking cooperation on issues of taxation and financial regulation. As
international financial competition grew, these interests sought to use the existing
structure that the OECD provided to coordinate measures to advance their agendas. The
politically costlier and less attractive option, to alter domestic policies and institutions,
were set aside in favor of inducing others to change by invoking international agreements
and standards to restrain competition.
National government delegates to the CFA are expected to pursue their nation's
interests. On the other hand, they are also driven by the incentives of prestige, salary, and
a relatively conflict-free life. 3 "4  They are most likely to sympathize with the aim of
limiting tax competition, as it disrupts existing arrangements., 9 Further, for many
delegates, the OECD is a possible future employer, offering rewarding and stimulating
jobs in the secretariat for people who are familiar with the organization and have proven
to be competent and on board with the project. These bodies may therefore be a channel
for governments in which to pursue policies, but only if those policies are not too
strongly in contradiction to the organization's agenda over all, as their delegates are
likely reluctant to confront the general agenda too sharply. 5
National government delegates to the CFA are expected to pursue their nation's
interests. On the other hand, they are also driven by the incentives of prestige, salary, and
a relatively conflict-free life.35 ' They are most likely to sympathize with the aim of
limiting tax competition, as it disrupts existing arrangements.352 Further, for many
delegates, the OECD is a possible future employer, offering rewarding and stimulating
jobs in the secretariat for people who are familiar with the organization and have proven
to be competent and on board with the project. These bodies may therefore be a channel
for governments in which to pursue policies, but only if those policies are not too
strongly in contradiction to the organization's agenda over all, as their delegates are
likely reluctant to confront the general agenda too sharply. 53
147 See John Thornhill, France Reforms its Anglo-Saxon Attitudes, FINANCIAL TIMES. Sept. 22, 2008,
available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9e839a34-88c5-1 Idd-a179-0000779fd 18c.html ("For many years
French politicians poured scorn on 'Anglo-Saxon' capitalism.").
348 Even those delegates who are initially skeptical may find the work most rewarding and in line
with their governments interest if they can justify the project to themselves.
149 See J.R. Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3 ECONOMETRICA
1. 8 (1935) ("The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life.").
350 The delegates are somewhat constrained by politics of their home country. They would not like
to be seen as giving up too much sovereignty or working to a large extent against the political program of the
politicians that may be appointing them. Bruno S. Frey & Beat Gygi, International Organizations from the
Constitutional Pint of View, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A PUBLIC
CHOICE APPROACH 58, 66 (Ronald Vaubel & Thomas D. Willett eds., 1991).
351 Even those delegates who are initially skeptical may find the work most rewarding and in line
with their governments interest if they can justify the project to themselves.
352 See J.R. Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3 ECONOMETRICA
1. 8 (1935) ("The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life.").
15' The delegates are somewhat constrained by politics of their home country. They would not like
to be seen as giving up too much sovereignty or working to a large extent against the political program of the
politicians that may be appointing them. Bruno S. Frey & Beat Gygi, International Organizations from the
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Disentangling the complex social networks that are in the background of forming
tax policy within the OECD is, if possible at all, not a goal of this paper.354 Rather the
question we set out to ask was why the OECD made its shift toward establishing
substantive standards and coercing non-member states. In other words, the question is
why politicians trying to promote certain policies pursue cooperation through the OECD.
It is rational for them to tie themselves to the mast and lose some freedom of action as
long as they gain on other fronts. An international relations explanation of the
willingness of political leaders to cooperate is that they gain more national sovereignty
than they lose through such cooperation.355 In a world of mobile capital and people,
where territorial borders become porous under the pressure of globalization and falling
transactions costs, de jure sovereignty means less in terms of de facto sovereign power
than it did fifty years ago.356 Taxation policy is one such power. Where international
organizations offer them a better position to obtain their goals, promoting certain policies
through these organizations may in the end yield the results that interest groups desire
more effectively than doing so through domestic means. Here it becomes important to
ask to which international organization they turn, for all such bodies are not equal in
terms of serving an interest group's agenda.
Our account supports an important role for the bureaucratic explanation as well.
While tax experts within the OECD were well established to claim global prominence in
technical tax issues, expanding into broader issues on taxation such as tax competition
allowed for more responsibilities and funding. The OECD staff enjoys excellent jobs for
academics, with high salaries and benefits. The organization offers enjoyable work,
opportunities to participate in important international venues while obtaining the merit of
having held a prestigious appointment at one of the world's top organizations.
International bureaucrats are generally portrayed as impartial concerning the
policies of their home country government. If those bureaucrats have a background of
serving their country on tax matters, they may have a bias in favor of their home country
that will reflect on their work. If they in addition perceive a possibility for future
employment for their home governments, this would further increase their incentive not
to work against the policies of their home country and risk losing out on future
appointments at home. 5
Constitutional Pint of View, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A PUBLIC
CHOICE APPROACH 58, 66 (Ronald Vaubel & Thomas D. Willett eds., 1991).
354 Id. at 20-22 (describing in detail the connections between OECD entities and stressing that
disentangling them and understanding how tax policy is formed is virtually impossible for an outside
observer).
355 Christians, supra note 5; Ronen Palan. Tax Havens and the Commercialization of State
Sovereignty, 56 INT'L ORG. 151 (2002) (discussing the issue of sovereignty in the context of taxation) Diane
M. Ring, What's at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?: International Tax and the Nation-State (Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers, Paper. No. 219, 2008) (sovereignty and taxation).
356 See Christians, Networks, supra note 72, at 104-14.
357 A former CTPA official pointed out that one does not sit secure on the job at the OECD,
especially not when involved in such volatile and insecure projects as those on harmful tax competition.
Interview 5 with OECD personnel, supra note 100. The work of the CFA is supported by the Centre for Tax
Policy and Administration (CTPA), which since 2001 has been a separate directorate within the OECD
Secretariat. The OECD Council is formally the body with decision-making power, where decisions are made
by consensus. OECD, Who Does What. http://www.oecd.org/pages/
0,3417,en 36734052 36761791 1 1 1 1 1,00.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2011). It consists of high-level
diplomats, representing their own countries.
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The CTPA provides a possible explanation of the OECD project from the
bureaucratic point of view. Both the Director and the CTPA staff can be entrepreneurial
by looking for new possibilities to expand the CTPA's mandate. The political discussion
in any member country can open such windows of opportunity. Thus if a politician
shows interest in fighting tax evasion, the OECD may step in and offer its services.358 If
a country finds national regulations to fight tax evasion and avoidance inadequate, the
OECD staff has arguments for why dealing with the issue through the OECD is a good
idea. Whatever the problem may be, international cooperation, they can argue, is needed
to deal with it constructively. Before taking any steps on the issue, the proper measures
must be carefully considered. This requires expertise and experience, and this is
precisely what the OECD has to offer, along with trips to Paris.359 If a politician has
already suggested a willingness to pursue a goal and OECD representatives announce
themselves ready to work on the issue, a natural alliance emerges.
The person with the biggest incentive to expand and drive a project forward is its
leader. The founding CTPA Director Jeffrey Owens is arguably the person who has been
the driving force behind the project on harmful tax competition. Beside professional
expertise and experience,"' Owens is a highly skilled negotiator and lobbyist and a
brilliant policy entrepreneur. Without him, the CTPA would have been unlikely to
become its own directorate in 2001. Not only did he have the personal motivation based
on salary, prestige, and position, but he has also proven keen on stepping into the
spotlight to take credit for these successes.361
The CTPA staff also has incentives to help expand their portion of the
organization. With more tasks and more people needed in the office, there may be better
chances for promotion. Moving up from an "economist" to a "senior economist," for
instance, means a rise in pay from C5,254 to C7,534 per month (not including allowances
for family, children and other allowances).362 Staff also has an incentive to accomplish
changes, to be an active part in various projects and to develop new ones. If members of
the CTPA staff are not counting on, or even pursuing, longer term OECD employment,
they may rather seek projects which they can lead or in other ways make a mark while
working on them while at the OECD, than to merely do what is required from them to
stay at the office.
358 Interview 3 with OECD personnel, supra note 100.
359 Interview 3 with OECD personnel, supra note 100.
360 Owens earned his doctorate from Cambridge in 1973 and has 30 years of experience as an
international civil servant. OECD, Jeffrey Owens, Director - Centre for Tax Policy and Administration,
http://www.oecd.org/document/10/0.3746.en_2649_34897_39363018 1 1 1 1,00.html (last visited Oct. 3,
2011).
361 Interview 5 with OECD personnel, supra note 100. Owens also had some experienced tax
experts working with the project. As it became clear to his colleagues that Owens would not let his staff take
the credit for the work that they believed that they deserved, some of them would end up leaving the project.
Id.
362 See OECD, Salaries and Benefits,
http://www.oecd.org/document/30/0,3746,en 21571361 45609340 40803550 1 1 1 1,00.html (last visited
Oct. 3. 2011). Salaries and allowances are tax-free for all except for OECD officials who are liable to pay
income tax in the United States. Id. A large share of the Secretariat are seconded, and as many as seventy to
eighty percent have time-limited employments in the OECD. Trondal, Marcussen & Veggeland. supra note
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 12. There are some bureaucrats within the OECD who stay there for
decades but these are not representative of the majority of the Secretariat's bureaucracy. Even short-timers
have a motive to support innovations, however.
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This is not to say that all arguments for and against tax competition are solely
tools for obtaining personal wealth, status, and fame. Politicians and bureaucrats
maintain ideas of what rules and principles make the world a better place and may act
based on those beliefs regardless of their personal incentives. The CTPA staff would
more likely than not believe that tax competition actually is harmful as they define it.363
It would remain more pleasant to pursue goals one approved of if that pursuit also
resulted in personal benefits, however. The bureaucratic explanation of the changes in
OECD tax policy thus adds value as well.
What larger lessons might we draw from the OECD's mission creep from
technical expertise used to reduce friction in trade among its members to efforts to coerce
substantive changes in non-members' tax laws? First, the force behind this change in
OECD policy seems to be that of political national agendas and international bureaucrats
in tandem. The project against harmful tax competition had its ups and downs. It has
been pursued and opposed at different times by some of the world's most influential
governments. The director and staff of the CTPA innovated and met a previously unmet
demand by actively seeking new opportunities to expand and pursue their project. A
resource grew in value and, unsurprisingly in retrospect, interests sought to capture that
value by directing the resource toward their own goals. The OECD cannot act without
support from its members, but the organization makes it easier for interests within the
membership to form an effective cartel. Reducing the autonomy of an organization's
staff and requiring unanimous votes to approve new initiatives are ways to limit mission
creep.
Second, the choice of forum makes a difference. Shifting the debate to the
OECD and G7 made it easier for the high tax interests to shape the debate; invoking the
Commonwealth Secretariat and G20 made it harder for them to do so. Engaging in
"fundamental restructuring" of international tax policymaking to ensure "developing
countries [have] meaningful input in the crucial idea and agenda stages of tax policy
development" 364 is critical. Paying attention to how and where issues are debated is thus
important.
Finally, and somewhat ironically, what the OECD's expansion of its mission on
tax issues primarily suggests is that developing international law standards for evaluating
when an organization is experiencing mission creep may be necessary. The most
objectionable feature of the OECD's expansion of its mission was its effort to impose its
standards on jurisdictions that had no voice in the creation of those standards through the
blacklist. To the extent that the OECD is "assert[ing] its legitimacy in guiding both
taxpayers and tax administrations on grounds that its guidance represents international
consensus," '365 it should be pressured to cede that claim to an organization with a more
representative membership. Moreover, the radical nature of the shift in
conceptualizations of sovereignty implicit within the OECD's formulation of tax law
standards 366 deserves full and open debate. Among other things, the approach to tax
treaties favored by the United States disadvantages developing countries by placing the
heaviest burden of foregone revenue on source countries while refusing to make
363 It would be difficult for any person to perform a task contrary to one's belief, so those believing
in tax competition are likely to seek alternative employment either with the OECD or elsewhere.
364 Christians, supra note 4, at 39.
365 Christians, How Nations Share, supra note 12, at 1448.
366 Christians, supra note 5, at 127-129.
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compensating concessions through a tax credit.367 This seems to us to be an area in which
real international standards could play a role. As Christians notes, the OECD's position
seems designed to avoid "more difficult conversations about fundamental tax reform,
especially in the context of countries with vastly different resources. '368 Moreover, the
opaque nature of much of the substantive content of international tax law rulings makes
the "obscuring [of] public observation of international tax law as it develops" particularly
inappropriate.3 69
The OECD has evolved into a convenient vehicle for many policies. The
organization offers an arena for networking and informal opportunities for changing
sentiments without media scrutiny. It is also convenient for having developed an image
as a benign organization of technocrats not under the political influences that many of
their peers in other organizations are. The OECD is clean and rich. As long as
politicians show a willingness to pursue policies through the OECD, the people of the
organization will seek to expand the mission of the organization and form it to an even
more attractive arena for making policies. There is thus little to suggest that there will
not be more efforts to harmonize previously national policies on a global scale, through
recommendations, blacklists, and sanctions. Furthermore, there is every reason to believe
that the proliferation of new international networking opportunities will be developed.
The continuing fight against harmful tax competition serves as a good example of how
politicians' pursuit of their interests can be enhanced by the willingness of an
international organization to take on more tasks. Considering issues now exploding into
public consciousness like public pensions, healthcare funding, and the environment, there
are more potential areas in which politicians will find useful the role of international
organizations. Perhaps the OECD itself will be there to help.
367 Tax Treaties, supra note 14, at 66 (describing how the U.S. approach to tax treaties harms
developing countries).
368 Christians, supra note 4, at 28.
369 Christians, How Nations Share, supra note 12, at 1412. Christians made the point in the context
of debates over wealth distribution but we think it applies more broadly. Elsewhere she also notes that tax
authorities have chosen to keep the process by which international tax soft law evolves "obscure, not well-
understood, unaccountable to those other than the competent authorities themselves, and rife with
administrative and procedural issues." Id. at 1435.
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APPENDIX I
List of Acronyms
BIAC Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD
BVI British Virgin Islands
CFA Committee on Fiscal Affairs
CTPA Centre for Tax Policy and Administration
EMS European Monetary System
FATF Financial Action Task Force
FCO Foreign and Colonial Office
G7/8/20 Group of 7/8/20
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEEC Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
OFC Offshore financial center
PTR Preferential tax regime
U.S. United States
UN United Nations
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